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requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Philosophy
ABSTRACT
Recent work in cognitive psychology, linguistics and artificial
intelligence purports to provide "computational ll theories of certain
"mental" states and events. This thesis develops the view that when
we are careful about the ~onstrual of these theories, they are defensible
and interesting, but the relation of their theoretical claims to our
familiar folk psychology, on the one hand, and to computer science and
engineering, on th~ other, is consjderably less straightforward than the
overlap of terminology might lead one to suppose.
Chapter One defends cognitive psychology against some !priori
objections to theories that make claims about mental representations.
Among other things, the classical "regress of explanation ll arguments,
recent versions of which can be found in the work of Daniel Dennett and
Gilbert Harman, are considered.
Chapter Two considers Gilbert Rylels suggestion ,that it is a mistake
to think that we could ever get a theory of those mental states and events
that can only· come about in a cer'tain physical or social contextQ 'This
is related to what Hilary Putnam and others have called the IIClssumption
of methodological solipsism. 1I
Chapter Three presents a theory of computing systems based on the
work of Dana Scott and others on the formal syntax and semantics of
programming languages. An account is provided of what it is for a
physical system to "compute a function," to "comptlte a program," to
"use a prograrrming language," etc. This theory is designed to have
clear application to computational theories in psycnology and neuro-
physiology.
Chapter Four makes use of the theory of Chapter Three in a consider-
at;on of the sorts of evidence that support the claim that certain rules
or programs are mentally represented and govern language processing in
the bra;n. Noam Chomsky·s theory that a generative transformational
grammar is mentally represented and used in langauge processing is
considered in detail.
The final chapter is directed against the view proposed by Jerry
Fodor, Merr;ll Garrett and others that the only plausible theories of
language learning available are committed to the view that virtaally
all concepts are innate. It is argued that there is a plausible
alternative that avoids this commitment.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jerry A. Fodo~
Title: Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy and
of Psychology
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CHAPTER I
A PRIORI OBJECTIONS
TO REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES IN PSYCHOLOGY
1. Many recent theories in psychology and related fie·ids
propose explanations of mental processes according to which
"mental· or "internal R representations are produced and
manipulated. These theories typically suppose that organisms
have mental representations that they cannot be consciously aware
of; the posited representations are not introspectively
accessible. Perception, for example, is thought to involve
proeesses that we cannot be consciously aware of: information
about sensory stimulation is represented and leads to the
formulation of internally represented hypotheses about what is
perceived. There 1s a long tradition of hypothesis-testing
theories of discrimination and concept learning that does not
generally assume that organisms are aware of the posited learning
processes. (See Brown, 1974, for a review.) And the application
of such theories about internal processes is not restricted to
organisms that speak and understand a language~ The early
hypothesis-testing theories of human learning were preceded and
inspired by hypothesis-testing theories of discrimination
learning 1n rats. (Krechevsky, 1932; Levine, 1959) Such
theories of animal learning are still in the running. It has
5
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been proposed that first-language learning in pre-verbal humans
also involves hypothesis-testing. (Chomsky, 1959, 1965, etc.)
And even theories of the flight behavior of the common housefly
maintain that houseflies internally represent visual information
sufficient to enable them to comp~te the relative velocity of a
moving target and to chase it. (Reichardt and Poggio, 1976) In
this chapter a cluster of related worries about the coherence and
integrity of "representational" theories like these will' be
considered an~, hopefully, dispelled. We will not be concerned
with the question of whether ~ny of these theories are really
true; rather, we will consider arguments to the effect that t
regardless of the data, such theories must be incoherent of
non~explanatory.
2. The basic problem
A number of different objections to these representational
theories arise from a concern over how mental or internal
representations can be interpreted if they are not consciously
accessible. It is commonly supposed that being inte~preted is
what makes something a representation. C.S. Pierce(1932) says,
for example, ·Of course, nothing is a sign unless it is
interpreted as a 819n.-(2.307) A sign or representation is
·somthing which stands to somebody for something. n (2.228)
Something is a representation only in this relation to a "mind,"
a ·scientific intelligence,· an Rintelligence capable of learning
by experience." (2.227-2.229, 3.303, 8.176) Something like this
is, I think, the natural view: something is a sign or
6
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representation only if someone takes it to stand for or express
something.! Charles Morris says, nsomething is a sign only
because it is interpreted as a sign of something by some
Pierce that the essentials of the meaning-situation are found
•
interpreter." (1938, p.82) e.l. Lewis says he agrees with
•
•
I
wherever there is anything which, for some mind, stands as a sign
of something else."(1944, p.236) And Wittgenstein says that an
arrow points ·only in the application that a living being makes
of it."(1953, §454)
These views all seem to be vaguely correct, but the truth
could be stated more precisely. Is it really obvious that
representations must be interpreted by some mind? In the first
place, one might object that this idea has no plausibility
whatever as a view about representation-tokens, i.e., as a view
about particular utterances or inscriptions of representations.
A book that waits at the bookstore for its first reader is, one
would think, full of representation-tokens that have never even
been percieved, let alone rercognized and taken to stand for or
express something. So perhaps the view about representation that
1. Pierce intends these views to apply to all signs, but some
philosophers have argued that -natural signsr-need not be
interpreted. Allston(1964, ch.3) argues, for example, that
boulders of a certain kind are a sign of glacial activity and
that "they would still be signs of glacial activity, even if no
one should ever realize-rhis. w So he distinguishes the notion of
! being taken as ! sign of I from the notion of ~ being ~ sign of
YJ he argues that only the former notion' presupposes that some
mind is involved. If Allston is right about this, then the
discussion in this.chapter is to be understood as concerning only
the former notion. It is the former notion that is relevant to
the accounts we will consider here, as well as to computational
accounts of physical systems in general.
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we are after should be that if anything is a representation-
token, then either it or some other token of the same tlE! must
have been interpreted as such by some mind.
But even this view does not pass~preliminary inspection~
. .~
.;~~ .".
There are also representation-types tWat axe perfectly meaningful
even though no tokens of those types have ever been interpreted.
There are surely indefinitely many English sentence-typ~s, for
e~ample, of which no token has ever been interpreted by any mind.
A token of such a sentence-type may be a meaningful
representation-token despite the fact that no one has ever
interpreted a sentence of that type. If I had meant to write
'The sun was shining on the sea' but accidentally wrote 'The sun
was shining on the pea' without noticing my error, then my
manuscript might well contain a sentence-token of a type that had
never been interpreted by anyone before, but it would be a
meaningful sentence neverthel~ss. Its interpretation as ,a
sentence of the language 1s determined. Similarly, for a system
of analog representation, we might have rules of inte~pretation
that specify an interpretation for infinitely many
representation-types, despite that fact that there will always be
representation-types that have never been considered at all by
any mind. If this is correct, then we need to modify the
proposed view about representation. Let's say that a
representation-type is interpreted if either a token of that type
has been interpreted by some mind, or if its interpretation ,as
part of some system of representation (used by some mind) is
determined, as in these cases. Then we can say that something is
8
a representation-token only if either it has been interpreted as
a representation by someone or it is of a type that has been
interpreted.
Before considering whether this view.is going to expose a
p~oblem in theories of mental representation, there is one other
sort of case that should bs taken into account, viz.,
representations which are produced and used by machines of one
sort or another. A tape recorder produces a representation of
its acoustic input, and a computer may store a representation of
the trajectory of a missile. Are these representations
interpreted? Surely we want to say that they are. One might say
that these representations are taken to be representations not by
humans but by the machines themselves. But this position really
seems implausible, at least for machines like tape recorders,
calculators and typical computers. It is absurd to suppose that
the tape recorder itself takes the pattern of magnetization on
its tape to represent, as it might be, Jimmy Carter speaking
about nuclear disarmament; it is we humans who recognize what is
represented on the tape. It seems equally abs~rd to suppose that
a computer (or a computer program) takes the states of its memory
devices to represent anything; it is the human mind that
recogriizes that certain states can be systematically interpreted
as it might be, numerically, and that certain state transitions
can then be described as computation. So until some good
argument to the contrary is presented, let's assume that the
representations produced by such machines are interpreted; they
9
are interpreted by us, by people. It is often very useful to so
interpret the states of machines or of their associated equipment
when we want to give an account of their operation. In the
typical case we do not see or hear representation-tokens of this
sort, but nevertheless we may know perfectly well that they exist
and that they playa role in the operation of these machines. So
it looks like these cases provide no reason to modify the
proposed account of representation: something is a
representation only if either it has been interpreted as such by
someone or if it is of a type that has been intepreted.
Now let's consider whether this account of repr~sentation is
going to cause problems for representational psychological
theories. Consid~r theories that claim that organisms have
internal representations that they are not awar~ of. If 'the
organisms are not even aware of the internal representations,
then how can they be interpreted? Clearly the answer is that
they are not interpreted by the organism in such cases, but by
the theorist. The theorist does not need to assume that the
subject interprets his own internal representations any more than
we need to assume that a tape recorder or computer itself takes
its representations to stand for something. The psychologist has
no problem unless he claims both that a subject has internal
representations he is not aware of and that the subject himself
interprets them as such. Surely no psychological theory is
committed to both of these claims.
10
3. Dennett on the basic problem
The basic problem is to give a satisfactory account of the
interpretation of internal representations that does not require
that the sUbject be aware of them. An account di.fferent from the
one just presented has been offerred by Daniel Dennett in a
recent series of papers, but his alternative account seems
incoherent. On the one hand, he urges that views like the one
defended here are "misconceived;" they are misconceived because
they do not acknowledge "the important distinction between the
content of a signal to the system which it informs, and the
content we on the outside can assign it when we describe the
signal and the system of which it is a part." (1977, p.IOO) He
suggests that the latter notion of content is not the one the
psychologists are using, so the relevant notion of content must
be the former, the content of the signal "to the system it
informs." Dennett calls the internal mechanisms that interpret
alld use these internal representations winner exempt agents." But
then, on the· other hand, he claims that computer science has
given us an important conceptual advance in showing that internal
representations are ·vehicles of representation that function
without exempt agents." (1972, p.102; cf. also 1978, p.123) So
the internal representations are not interpreted by internal
interpreters "on the inside" after all. Since they are not
interpreted by us ·on the outside either, we seem to have a
reductio ad absurdum of Dennett's views. Surely it is absurd to
suppose that there are internal representations even though
nothing internal or external interprets them. But Dennett is
11
apparently willing to accept this uncomfortable result. He says
that internal representations are "self-understanding," but never
explains what that means. Why does he accept this seemingly
incoherent position'
To begin with, Dennett ultimately wants to reject the view
that internal representations require internal understanders
which interpret and use them, Rinner exempt agents." This is
certainly right; the requirement of internal understanQers is
untenable. Dennett suggests that this requirement brings the
threat of an infinite regress of explanation, and this view will
be discussed below. But the requirement also seems to be faced
at the outset with counterexamples like the ones mentioned above.
A tape recorder does not understand that the representations on
its tape represent anything, and the representations eouid still
be produced even if the tape recorder had no mechanism for even
I
playing back what it had recorded. In this case we would have
representations that are neither understood by an internal
mechanism nor used at all. ,A computer or calculator does not
take its states to stand for numeric values; the user "on the
outside" does. It is useful to interpret calculator memory
states numerically because its changes of state may then
correspond to numerical operations that we would like to have
performed. 2 This is the basis of a symbolic, computational
------------~-------
2. A theory of computation is presented in Chapter III which
spells out in detail what is involved in giving such an account
of calculators and other computing machines.
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account of the role of the representations. It is a mistake to
suppose that there are any internal understanders who "read" the
internal repres~ntations and act accordingly. The interpreted
states just have a certain role; they have a certain effect on
the operation of the machine such that memory state transitions
correspond to numerical computations. So we can agree with
Dennett that internal representations do not need internal
understanders.
The problem is that Dennett rejects not only internal
interpreters but also external ones, so he is apparently saddled
with the view that there are no interpreters at all. He notes
that this result might make some people uncomfortable:
•••one could insist that the very lack of exempt agents
in computers to be users of the putative representations
shows that computers do not contain representations --
real representations -- at all, but unless one views
this as a rather modest bit of lexicographical purism,
one is in danger of discarding one of the most promising
conceptual advances ever to fall into philosophers'
hands •. (1977, p.102)
The worry about the missing interpreters, the missing "exempt
agents,· is not just a lexicographical concern, however; it is a
worry about the very coherence of the account, no matter what
terms it is expressed in. If we grant that the internal states
of a computer or of an organism may be taken to represent things,
then it is not mere lexicographical purism that prompts one to
inquire, WBy whom, or by what, are these states taken to stand
for or to express something?" It is not mere lexicographical
purism that makes the answer, RBy nothing internal and nothing
external" unsatisfactory. If no one and no thing takes these
13 .
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For instance, one badly misconceives the problem of
• perception 1f one views the retinal receptors as
-telling- the first level of hypotheses testers "red
wavelength at location L again,· for that level does not
utilize or understand (in any impoverished sense)
information of that sort. (1977, p.lOO)
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not want an interpretation that distinguishes them. So, for
representations are interpreted by the theorist "on the outs.ide?-
As was noted above, he suggests that the view is misconceived,
·utilize or understand- our interp;:etation of these s1gnals,
because it does not respond differently to the two cases. But
this suggests only that our lnterpretat~.on of the signals is not
a theoretically appropriate one; since the theorist would
presumably want to give the same account of both cases, he would
Why does Dennett reject the view that internal
He urges that imposing our interpretation of internal states from
the outside does not provide the interpretation th~ psychologist
but the reasons for this s~9gestion are not made entirely clear.
I
system. We on the outside might recognize that 8 particular
signal can be taken to represent red light at Leven ·when, as far
as the system 1s concerned, precisely the same effect might have
been produced by a signal resulting from gree~ light at location
M. In this situation we might say that the system does not
needs. He says,
can interpret internal states and events in a way that is not
appropriate for a theoretical account of the operation of the
The point of this example is apparently to show that the theorist
express anything, then surely they don't.
states to rApresent anything, to stand for anything, or to
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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•
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theoretical purposes, the choice of an interpretation will be
constrained by such facts. But this does not show that the
theoretically relevant interpretation is not an interpretation
imposed by the theorist at all. Surely there is no reason here
for supposing that the system has its own interpretation of its
states and events; the theorist is the only being who actually
recognizes any content 1n the neural signals.
Another example that Dennett uses to illustrate the
importance of distinguishing the content of a representation "to
the system- is a little clearer. He considers the possibility of
discovering that Wcertain features of brain activity could be
interpreted as a code,· and he says,
Discovering such a code is not establishing that the
information the code carries is also carried for the
person or even for his brain. 0.8. Perkel and T.H.
Bullock •••discuss the discovery of a code "carrying"
phasic information about wing position in a locust; it
fa accurately coded, but -the insect apparently makes no
use of this informationw· (Blocking this input and
substituting random input produces no loss of flying
rhythm, a b 111 t Y, etc.) (1 971, p. 43n)
Once again, though, the example does not support Dennett's
conclusion that th~ system has its own interpretation of its
-
internal representations. The fact that we can recognize some
representations of information that play no role in the
functioning of the organism does not support the conclusion that
we are not the interpreters of those representations that do play
a role. Quite to the contrary -- it is not hard to see why
psychologists, like computer scientists, would be particularly
interested in representations that playa significant,
specifiable role in the operation of the system under study. It
15
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seems that Perkel and BUllock express their dicovery
appropriately in saying that they had discovered the
representations of information that the insect does not use.
There ~ be representations of information that is not utilized
at all by the system, as well as representations that play
significant roles; both can be recognized by the theorist. The
point is that only the latt~r representations wil be significant
for a theory of the functioning of the organism.
It seems that this is the sort of point that Dennett is
really after, and that it can be accepted without the absurd
commitment to uninterpreted representation. This is, I think,
the truth that unde~lies Dennett's remark that "What makes it the
case ultimately that something in this sense represents something
within a system is that it has a function within the
system ••• Content is a function of function •••• n (1977, p.106) This
remark is ~isleadin9 in its suggestion that having a function in
,
the system is what makes something a representation; surely if
it is not interpreted by anyone or anything it is not a
representation whether it has a function or not. The remark also
appears to rule out cases like the one just discussed in which we
can recognize representations of information that have no
function in the system. The correct point in Dennett's claim is,
I think, just that psychologists are (typically) int~reste~ in
using interpretations of internal states and events that lend
themselves to giving a general theoretical account of the
functioning of the system. Thus even if the theoretically
relevant interpretation of an internal state or event is not a
II
"function of function,· it will at least be "related to
function.-) We could give an alphabetic interpretation to memory
states of a numerical caluculator, but that would not be
expedient for an account of the system's operation. Or, as ~n
the first example, we could specify an interpretation of internal
states and events that would not be appropriate for all instances
of the theoretically relevant kind.4 The appropriate theoretical
interpretaion will be sharply constrained. Still, we can
maintain that the interpreted internal states are interpreted ~
the theorists, by humans on the outside of the systems. This
position has the enormous advantage of avoiding the commitment to
representations that are taken to have content by no one and no
thing at all. That is, this position avoids the reductio ad
absurdum that undermines Dennett's position. We can relapse into
the natural position with which we started: representations that
are produced and used by machines and organisms are interpreted
by other humans.
3. It should be noted that some psychologis:s want to claim that
-metal representations· have a determinate cootent, that we are
not free to interpret them one way or another as we might the
states of a calculator. This view 1s not, or at least not
obviously, incompatible with the view defended here. It could be
that in some cases the causal role of a state -- the way it is
related to inputs, outputs and other states -- determines
completely the theoretically relevant, correct, interpretation of
the state, and this may be all the psyhcologist needs. In such a
case, the content of the representations would be, as it were, a
-function of function.- See, e.g., Loar(ms), and Fodor(ms) for
discussions of the determinacy of mental representations.
I
4. This sort of point is discussed in Chapter II and in Fodor,
1980.
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'4. Related problems
There are other challenges to representational theories in
psychology that are very similar to the basic problem we have
been considering. The basic problem concerns the interpretation
of representations; one collection of related problems concerns
the understanding of a language. Norman Malcolm points out in a
discussion of the neurophysiological basis of memory that
symbols, rules and descriptions are used by people who understand
a langauge. He asks, RHow does the brain of a person or animal
fit into this picture? •• Does it apply words or other "symbols"
to objects and situations· (1977, pp.208-209) In a criticism of a
theory of first language learning that attributes internal
representations of rules to infants, Gilbert Harman says, WIt
does not seem to make sense to suppose that [someonel can
represent rules without representing them in some language," but
certainly we do not want to accept the "absurd assumption that
before he learned his first language [the language learner1
already knew another language." (1967, pp.76, 77) This is to
-treat the child as if,he were a linguist investigating some
hitherto unknown language. W (1968, p.661) In these passages
Malcolm and Harman are worried about 'a featur~ of psychological
theories that is really quite common: the attribution of
representations in a language to things that do not understand a
language. Other theories apparently assume that rats use a
language in which they couch their hypotheses about
discrimination learning situations, and others, that houseflies
use a language in which they can carry out the necessary
:8
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computations of flight trajectory. The problem, then, is to
explain how any of these theories could be reasonable. Isn't it
obviously a mistake to attribute -languages," systems of
representation, to organisms that apparently do not understand
arty language?
This problem is just the "basic problem" in a new guise;
our resolution of the bastc problem provides the basis for the
resolution of this one as well. Suppose we make a tape recording
of a speech that includes descriptions, rules and hypotheses.
The tape recorder then has representations of descriptions, rules
and hypotheses on its tape, representations that: playa role in
generating the acoustic output we get when the tape is played
back. There is no problem with this account of the operation of
the tape recorder because there is absolute1y no need to 'assume
,
that the tape recorder itself understands the language it has
represented. We Iuse ~ interpretation of ttle states of the tape
to provide this convenient account of what is going on.
The situation is essentially the same for computers. a
computer can also store and manipulate the te~t of a speech in
English. There is no need to assume that the computer
understands English in such a case. We are the ones who
understand the internal states of the machine as a representation
of the text, and so we can describe changes of state as the
-manipulation- of the text. Similarly, we might interpret states
of the computer as the representation of a hyp~thesis and
19
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interpret certain input to the computer as data relevant to the
hypothesis. In this case we could describe the operation of the
computer as hypothesis testing if certain inputs would cause
appropriate changes in the states that represent the hypotheses.
Computers (and sometimes also computer programs) are said to
use certain programming languages, and even sometimes to
understand them. There is nothing wrong with saying this,
perhaps, so long as it is recognized as an unnecessary bit of
anthropomorphism. That is, we do not need to assume that the
computer (or the program) is itself recognizing the
representational content of the representations that we recognize
the machine to have. A computer is using (and ·understands·) a
programming language just in case there is some interpretation of
its states under which formulae of that language playa certain
role in the operation of the computer. (See Chapter III for a
detailed account.,
,
the computer does not -read" and interpret
II
•
•
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the representatio,ns and then act accordingly; again, the
interpreted states simply have a certain effect on the operation
of the operation of the machine which can be given a symbolic
description. We do not need to assume that anyone or anything
other than we htmans recognizes the interpretation of the states
or ·understands· the programming language in the sense of taking
formulae of the language to stand for or express something.
Someone might want to argue for the view that 1n some cases a
computer (or its ~rogram, also ·understands" a language in this
latter sense, in the way we do, but this view seems entirely
implausible at least for the machines and programs we have now.
20
In any case, there are clear cases where we correctly attribute
to a machine representations in a language that the machine does
not understand, as in the case of computers and tape recorders
with representations in English. Thus, the mere attribution of
internal representations in a language does not commit us to· the
view that the system under study understands or interprets that
language. Representational theories need not have any commitment
to internal understanders or interpreters.
~
5. The regress arguments
The problems discussed so far have also been associated with
some "regress arguments· against certain psychological theories.
Getting straight about the basic problem and its near relatives
unfortunately does not defuse the regress arguments entirely, so
they deserve separate consideration. Dennett has argued that the
assumptio~ that internal representations require internai
interpreters, winner exempt agents," would (if it were accepted)
threaten representational theories in psychology with the danger
of an infinite regress. He says,
The only psychology that could possibly succeed is
neo-cognitivist, which requires the postulation of an
internal system of representations. 'However, nothing is
intrinsically a representation of anything; something
is a representation only for or to someone; any
representation or system of representations requires at
least one user of the system who 1s external to the
system. Call such a user an exempt agent. Hence, in
addition to a system of lnternal representations,
neo-cognitivism requires the postulation of an inner
exempt agent or agents -- in short, undischarged
homunculi. Any psychology with undischarged homunculi
is doomed to circularity or infinite regress, hence
psychology is impossible.... (1977, p.lOl)
21
IThi.s passage leaves a number of points unclear. What circularity
and what regress is psychology doomed to? And why is'a
representational psycholgy doomed to one or the other of these
fates? Apparently Dennett has something like the following
argument in mind:
(1) If a psychological theory attributes internal
representations to an organism, then it is committed to
some internal being or mechanism that interprets and
uses them.
(2) Presumably our explanation of any such internal
interpreter will involve attributing internal
represen'tations to it, and these must also be
interpreted by some internal interpreter that will also
need to be explained, and so on.
(3) Continuing the account in this way, will generate an
infinite regress of explanations of an infinite number
o'f internal interpreters, unless the account is' circular
(i.e., citcular in that the system of internal
represen~ations used by some internal interp.reter I is
interpreted either by ! itself or by an interpreter at
some Whigher W level whose own internal internal
representations I is ultimately involved in
interpretin9) •
(4) Any explanation that leads to such an infinite
regress or to such circularity must be incorrect.
Let's call this the -regress of interpreters" argument. There
are other arguments of basically the same form. Dennett notes
22
the follwing examples:
For instance, it seems (to many) that we cannot account
for perception unless we suppose it provides us with an
internal image (or model or map) of the external world,
and yet what good would that image do us unless we have
an inner eye to perceive it, and how are we to explain
its capacity for perception? It also seems (to many)
tnat understanding a heard ser.tence must be somehow
translating it into some internal message, but how will
this message in turn be understood: by translating it
into something else? (1978, p.122)
Here we have the beginnings of a "regress of perceivers" and of a
-regress of understanders.· The threat of a "regress of
understanders· has been used by Gilbert Harman in a similar
argument against Noam Chomsky's theory of language understanding:
Taken literally, he would be saying that we are to
explain how it is that Smith knows how to speak and
understand a language by citing his knowledge of another
more basic language in which he has (unconsciously)
-internally represented" the rules of the first
language. (It does not seem to make sense to assume
that Smith can represent rules without reptesenting them
in some language.) The main problem with such a literal
interpretation of these remarks would be the
implausibility of the resulting view. How, for, example,
would Smith understand the more basic language?' In
order to avoid either an infinite regress or a vicious
circle, one would have to suppose that Smith can
understand at least one language directly, without
unconsciously knowing the rules for that language. But
if this is admitted, there is no reason why.Smith cannot
know directly the language he speaks. Thus, literally
interpreted, Chomsky's theory would almost certainly be
false. (1967, p.76)
It will be argued that all of these regress arguments are
fallacious. They provide no good reason for thinking there is a
problem with the theories against which they are directed.
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Consider the -regress of interpretersW argument. Its first
premise has already been challenged, but its second premise is
also a mistake. It is a mistake to see a regress getting started
in any of the theories considered here. Why would anyone accept
premise (2) of the -regress of interpreters" argument? Well, it
is forced upon anyone who accepts both the first premise and the
general claim that all -interpreters" use internal
representations. But surely no psychological theory explicitly
asserts both of these claims. 5 Typically the first is explicit,
and it is the critic who presumes a commitment to the general
claim. The passage by Harman suggests the most likely basis for
such a presumption on the part of the critic, viz., that the very
reasons for proposing the "first level R of internal
representation are present at every level, so if a further level
of representation is not needed at some point then there is no
reason to suppose that it was needed in the first place to
explain the original phenomena.
Suppose, for example, that the -regress of interpreters"
argument is directed against a theory of language understandidng
or some other theory about what is involved in the interpretation
of perceived symbolS. If such a theory posits a system of
internal representation to explain the interpretation of the
5. Some regress arguments are clearly directed against views
like these in which there is some general claim about how
something is to be explained. Cf., e.g., Ryle, 1949, pp.28-32i
Block, 1979, pp.4-S. These arguments do not, I think, apply to
any psychological theory that has been seriously proposed.
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symbols, then it is natural to presume that we would want to
posit a further system of representation to explain the
interpretation of the posited representations; after all, the
-interpretation" of sjrnbols is what needs to be explained in both
cases. If, on the other hand,we do not invoke a second level of
internal representation but can successfully explain how the
first internal representations simply play some role R in certain
internal processes, then this would show the first level of
internal representation to be unnecessary; the original
phenomena could then be explained by supposing that the perceived
symbols play some role R
'
, similar to or identical to R, in
internal processes. Something like this is apparently the idea
behind the proposed defense of premise (2). But it is easy to
see that this defense is not generally going to work.
Consider a typical representational theory of language
-
understand.ing which presumes that the posited internal
representations are neurophysiological states under some
interpretation, and which provides some preliminary account of
their role in internal processing and in the causation of
behavior that exhibits an understanding of what has been
understood. It is certainly far from clear how such a theory
could be recast so as to avoid the commitment to internal
representations even if we did have an account of the internal
processes involving the internal representations which did not
attribute a further level of representation. It is wildly
implausible that the symbols perceived, the acoustic signals or
whatever, are themselves accessed by the internal processes. The
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symbols perceived surely do not "act at a (spatial and temporal)
distance R to influence internal processes directly. If this
hypothesis is even metaphysically possible, it could presumably
be defeated experimentally by showing that the influence of the
external symbols depends entirely on the mediation of certain
internal states as the original theory claims. So, in sum, there
is a difference between the original phenomena of language
understanding and the posited internal phenomena, even if the
problem in both cases is to explain -interpretation;" the obvious
difference between to two cases provides clear reason for
supposing that the internal mechanisms do not call for the same
sort of explanation as is given of the original phenomena.
Therefore, it is a mistake to see any danger of an infinite
regress here, regardless of whether the internal mechanisms ought
to be called -interpreters· or not.
The o,ther regress arguments suffer from analogous p~oblems.
As a last example,. let's consider Harman's arg~ment against
Chomsky's theory that a sUbject uses ·unconscious· internally
represented grammatical rules in understanding his language.
(The argument is presented in the passage quoted above.) Harman
is apparently ass~min9 that if the internally'represented rules
are represented in a language t~en the subject must understand
that language. This assumption was challenged above (in 14), but
let's set this issue aside. Suppose that the rules are somehow
·understood R by the subject, or rather, by internal mechanisms in
the sUbject which have access to the internal representations.
Then the question is: how is this internal language understood?
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And, more g&nerally, what influence do the internal
representations have on internal processes?
As a matter of fact, Chomsky does not attempt to answer this
question. He does not offer any account of what role the
internal representations play in in the internal processing. The
-whole question is still substantially uninvestigated, a matter
for speculation. Certainly it is not clear that the su~ject must
have a further system of gramma~ical rules for understanding the
internal language in which the first rules are represented, and a
further set of rules for understanding the second set, and so on.
There are good reasons for thinking that the ·understanding" of
the internal language will need an explanation that is
substantially different from the propsed eX~lanation of the
understanding of the spoken language. In the first place, as in
the last example, there is good reason to suppose that t~e
internal representations can playa role in internal processing
that the representation-tokens of the spoken language cannot
play. And in the second place, the internal language. may be
quite different from the spoken language. Thus we can grant
Harman's point that some langauge must be understood "directly·,
i.e., without the representation of its grammatical rules in some
other language, and still have good reason to reject the view
that there is then 8 no reason why Smith cannot know directly the
language he speaks.- Harman apparently just presumes, without
defense, that the appropriate explanation of natural language
understanding will also be the appropriate explanation of
internal language understanding, and vice versa. This
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presumption seems most implausible and in need of defense, yet it
is Eustered without defense as tha basis fo the conclusion that
Chomsky's theory, literally interpreted, is almost certainly
false.
The basic idea behind the regress arguments is that the
explanations at which they are di~ected do not get us anywhere,
they move the original problem into the head or into the
mysterious realm of the mental, 1~avin9 it essen~lally unanswered
at that level. Since we then are left with the same sort of
problem inside the head, presumably we want to offer the same
sort of explanation for it, and carrying on in this way generates
an infinite -regrass of explanations. Our response to thio idea
has been to point out that in each case the representational
theories do not leave us with the same problems that they set out
to explain in the first place. On the contrary, they leave us
Nith different problems, problems which typically do not call for
the same sort of axplanation as the original problem called for.
They leave us with different problems because they do get us
some'where, that is, they do have conterjt, and in the normal
course of scientific inquiry this content is tested and confirmed
by relevant data~ The explanations of the internal mechanisms
posited by representational theories are typically quite
different from the explanations of the original phenomena, but,
in any case, these ~ill also have to account for the data and
survive whatever testing can be b~ought to bear.
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There is a .tendency, I think, in some responses to the
regress arguments to concede too much. Many of the recent
discussions of these arguments mention the computational accounts
of the internal mechanisms posited by representational theories,
accounts founded in our recently acquired understanding of the
operation of computers.6 These accounts are of considerable
interest, but it does not seem to me that they ought to ~e even
mentioned in this context. The methodological respectability and
empirical plausibility of the representational theories does not
hang on the success of these accounts of the internal processes.
If these new computational theories turn out to be in~dequate,
that would leave psychologi.sts with the difficult problem of
finding some other sort of account of tho posited internal
processes, but it would not in itself indicate any defect 1n the
representational theories. Even in the physical sciences it is
common to invoke mechanisms for which no adequate account is to
be had. The famous example (whose time may at last be passing)
is our inability to explain the gravitational forces invoked by
Newton and his successors, the problem of explaining gravitation
remained, yet the physics developed and has become the paradigm
of good science. It could happen that the representational
theories in psychology will also continue to be developed and
refined, that the domain of phenomena that they can explain will
be extended dramatically, without a~ adequate account of the
posited internal mechanisms. In short, th6 regress arguments do
-----~--------------
6. See, e.g., Fodor, 1968; Chomsky, 1969; Dennett, 1975a,
1977, 1978; Rarty, 1977, Block, 1979.
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not suffice to show any flaw in representational theor.les. The
arguments that .the theories are committed to infinite regresses
are fallacious, and if they do succeed at least in pointing out
problems that remain unexplained, that does not show the theories
to b~ any worse off than the best. To suppose that we need the
new explanations to answer the regress arguments is to concede
too much to them.
6. Related objections
There is another objection to representational theories that
is sometimes associated with what we have called -the basic
problem- and with the regress argumentse This objection should
be mentioned here, though a detailed consideration of it goes
.
well beyond the scope of this chapter. Consider the following
passages from Norman Malcolm(1977) on theories of memory:
,
If the man who went into he next room to fetch a bolt of
cloth to match the color of the one he had just seen
carried 1n his mind an image of that color, then (we
think) he would know which color to fetch, and there
would be no mystery about his getting it right ••• There
seems to be a knowledge-gap between the man's looking at
the first bolt and his subsequent response of selecting
in the next room another bolt of the ri1ht color.. Wefelt the need to fill this gap with an mage (attended
with certain feelings) that he consulted as he selected
the second bolt. But when we think ~bout this
intermediary, we realize that it, too, presents us with
a g~p. For why does an image that feels familiar guide
the man's action? How does it inform him which cloth Is
of the right color? Surely we have another gap here
that needs to be filled with a second intermediary whose
function will be to inform the man how to interpret the
first intermediary. Out exactly the same sort of
question can be raised about the second intermediary.
What tells the man how to interpret it? Thus we are
confronted with still another gap, wnTch requires still
another intermediary, and so onl (pp.91-92)
The conclusion that should be drawn is that the thinking
up of possible features of mental content will bring us
10
no nearer to the goal of understanding memory. No
hypothe.sls about what goes on in our minds when we
remember, as to how rememberin9 works, will remove our
puzzlement. (p.93)
It 18 this last conclusion I am interested in: the view that -No
hypothesis •••will remove our puzzlement.- The first thing to·
notice is that this conclusion 1s !~ supported by the regress
argument. In the first place, the regress argument has ~o
appllcati~n at all to theories that do not posit images or oth,r
representations, yet the conclusion 1s that ~ theory will
suffice. And in the second place, the regress argument is
fallacious. The subject does not need to interpret his own
memory images, at least on many accounts, and the conclusion is
not restricted to those that do have this requirement. And we do
not need further representations to account for an image':s role
in the processes 1 ead ing to the sUbj ect_' s response, so we a re not
driven into a regress. The regress argument provides no 'reason
for thinking that we will not be able to get a good
I
representational theoryG
The interesting point is that some of Malcolm's remarks
suggest that even if we actually had a complete account of all
the internal processes "involved w in remembering, he would still
want to maintain that this theory would not explain how ~
remember. He suggests th~t this 1s really not sometning that
calls for any explanation at all: • •••why are we not content to
hold that a person's ability to give such a report [of something
he witnessed earlier) is a primitive fact about people? Why are
we not willing to allow that this is a natural human power?-
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(p.89, cf. also pp.l01-102)
This sort of view cannot be supported with a regress
argument, though there may be other reasons for ac~epting it.7 In
particular cases, for example, by taking a certain line on the
nature of mental events 11ke remembering, it might be argued ~.hat
a particular theory does not explain any such events. Suppose
that I .8. a bolt of cloth, and that later on I remember it and
tell you what color it was. Imagine a theory th~t provided
grounds for roughly the following sort of account: Light
reflected from the cloth produced an image on the retinas of my
eyes; this produced an internal representation of certain
information about the cloth (including its color) which was
stored in memory; later, some of this represented information
was retrieved by the processes leading to my verbal report of the
color of the cloth. Now, someone might want to argue that this
is just an account of certain neurophysiological processes under
a computational interpretation, and as such it cannot explain how
I remembered the color of the cloth. No one doubts that certain
things were going on in my nervous system and that these things
were responsible for my articulation of the r~port. What can be
~
•
I
doubted is that any account of these things is (or provides
grounds for) an explanation of ~ ! remembered. Of course, if
my remembering is just a certain surt of retrie?al of stored
information that occurs in my brain, then this theory presumably
--------------------
7. A different argument for the view that no scientific theory
will be able to explain certain mental events is considered in
the following chapter.
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could provide an explanation of my remembering, but just such
identity claims are currently a subject of controversy. It 1s at
least not obvious that any computational theory can provide an
explanation of my remembering_
This sort of claim 1s interesting, but it is not an a priori
objection to representational theories 1n psychology 8S the other
arguments were. That ls, it 1s not an argument that purports to
show representational theories to be confused or devoid of
content, rather, it is a claim about what such theories can be
expected to expl~in. On any account, the things that so-called
theories of memory do explain are going to be intimately related
to remembering, but nevertheless the question of whether they can
actually explain the remembering itself is of interest.
Unfortunately, it is not a question which will be explored here.
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CHAPTER II
MENTAL TERMS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY:
METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM AND RELATED CONSTRAINTS
1. In Chapter VII of Dllemmas(1954) Gilbert Ryle ·argues
that there is a ·strong pressure- to accept the -mistaken
assumption- that ·seeing, hearing and the rest- are states or
processes that scientists can investigate, and that this
assumption is a source of a prc,blem about how we can percieve the
external world. He says, -The programme •••of locating,
inspecting and measuring the process or state of seeing, and of
correlating it with other states and processes is a hopeless
programme •••• ·Cp. 104) In accepting this mistake~ assumption, he
says,
•••we have yielded to the temptation to push the
concepts of seeing, hearing and the rest through the
hoops that are the proper ones for the concepts which
belong to the sciences of optics, acoustics,'physiology
and psychology. The unscheduled but well-disciplined
conduct 1n ratiocination of the notions of seeing,
hearing and the rest diverges sharply from the eonduct
we have been induced to schedule for them.(pp.~09-110)
In support of this view, Ryle urges that R no one woul~ ever
suppose that 'winning' stood for a physiological or psychological
condition or process,· and that certain mental terms like
'seeing' are· analogous to 'winning' in important respects. We
would not expect physiologists or psychologists to be able to
develop a scientific theory of winning, and similarly, we should
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not expect to be able to develop a theory of seeing or hearing.
One of the important analogies between winnln9 and seein9
that Ryle mentions here 1s that neither sort of event occurs
merely in virtue of what goes on inside of the SUbject. Thus he
says,
A runner's victory, though it is tied up, in lots of
important ways~ with his muscles, nerves and frame of
mind, with his early training and briefing recieved just
before the race, still refuses to be listed among these
kindred phases of his private career. However fast,
resolutely and cleverly he has run, he has not won the
race unless he had at least on rival, did not cheat and
got to the tape first. That these conditions were
satisfied cannot be ascertained by probing still further
into him. (pp.10S-106)
In short, winning a race.is the sort of thing that can occur only
in a certain context. And similarly, contextual conditions must
be satisfied for one to see something. Ryle illustrates this
point in the following passage:
••• the question whether or not the spectators saw the
doves emerging from the conjuror's pocket is for him,
not them, to decide. Notice that he is in a position to
reject the claim of the spectators that they saw it
happen, if he knows it did not happen. But if they
claim to have seen something happen which did happen,
then he cannot, on this score alone, concede' their
claim. If the thing happened, but happened behind a
screen, then their claim to have seen it must be
rejected. They could not have seen it unless it
happened, and unless it happened in such a place, and at
such a distance and in such a light that it was visible
to them and unless their eyes were open, properly
directed and so on. (pp.107-108)
So Ryle 1s apparently claiming that seeing doves emerge from a
pocket is also the sort of thing that can occur only in a certain
context, and that this is one reason for thinking that it is not
a matter for scientific investigation. The question I want to
consider in this chapter is whether there is any sound argument
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hore. Granting that 'seeing a dove' is truly applicable only in
a certain sort of context, what follows with regard to the use of
this term 1n psychology?
Ryle suggests that 'seeing', 'hearing' and the rest are
unlike the terms of optics, acoustics, and physiology in
requiring a certain context for their true application. But even
if he is right that the terms of th~ physical sciences a~e
different in this way, we want to know why this is impor~nt.
Why shouldn't the physical sciences use terms that have
contextual conditions on their application? Now this is a
question that we can answer, for it is apparent that to have
certain conditions on the application of some physical terms
would render them unsuitable for scientific theory, and i~ could
be that the conditions on the application of certain mental terms
are analogous to these unsuitable ones in crucial respect~. This
will be the strategy then: to characterize a kind of term that
is unsuitable in a scientific theory, to point out the problems
that may be engendered by the use of such terms, and ~o point out
that, in certain domains, some ordinary, pre-theoretical terms
are of this kind.
2. One sort of term that is inappropriate in science can be
indicated with the following simple example. Suppose that we are
studying a certain kind of electronic circuit. Let's suppose
that we have specified two different points in circuits of this
kind: an input point and an output point. And let's suppose
that the following law holds:
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(ti) Applications of a signal to the input cause the
output signal to go to zero.
(For present purposes, we can call any nomologically necessary
sentence a -law.-) Given only this much information we cannot be
sure that we would want to include (tIl in a statement of our,
theory of the circuits under investigation; we may want to
subsume this fact under more general laws, for example. But we
can say something about what laws would not be appropria'te in our
theory •.
Laws that we would presumably not want to include in our
theory can be constructed easily enough. Let's say that the
·comprehension- of a term t that applies to events is the union
of the extension of t with the set of nomologically possible
events that would have been in the extension of t had they
occurred. (And let the comprehensions af terms that apply to
other sorts of things be defined analogously. Thus the
comprehension of a term t that applies to objects is the union of
the extension of t and the set of nomologically possible objects
that would have been in the extension of t if they had existed,
and so on.)l Consider a term, then, whose comprehension contains
a proper subset of the comprehension of the term 'application of
a signal to the input'. For Qxample, let~s call an event a
--------------------
1. I have taken the term •comprehension' from e.l. Lewis
(1946), who uses it slightly differently. Lewis says, "the
comprehension of a term is the classification of all possible or
consistently thinkable things to which the term would be
applicable~· I have restricted my ·comprehensions" to the realm
of the nomologically possible, i.e., to the realm of what is
possible given natural laws.
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conditional application of a signal to the input just in case it
is an application of a signal to the input that occurs when I am
standin9 up. The comprehension of this term is presumably a
proper subset of the comprehension of the term 'application of a
signal to the input', though their actual extensions might well
be identical. Presumably we would not want to use this defined
term in our statement of the theory ~f these circuits, if we
assume that I am not hooked up to a switch or any other component
of the circuits under investigation~
The term we have defined can be used to state various laws,
though. For example, it is used in the following law:
(L2) Conditional applications of a signal to the input
cause a dropping of the output signal.
But this law is just a special case of (Ll). The original law,
(Ll), covers all that this law covers, and more. So, if we have
discovered the more general law, there 1s no point in our using
the defined term in (L2) in any statement of our theory. That
is, if we make the natural assumption that the questi~n of
whether I am standing up or not is utterly irrelevant to the
operation of the circuits, then the comprehension of the defined
term will be an arbitrary subset of the comprehension of the more
general term, a subset that has "no special significance that
would make it worth mentioning anywhere in the theory. I will
call terms that are inapprnpriate in this way -arbitrarily
restricted- terms. Those are the terms I want to consider.
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One might think that the undesirability of these terms stems
merely from the fact that they ar~ ~restricted· in the sense that
more general terms can be' used :n their place. Since we want
scientific theories to be (in~er alia) as general and informative
as possible, we do not want to use a restricted term 1f there is
a more general term that can replace every occurrence in the
theory of the restricted term without loss of truth value. But
this is not quite right. There are cases in which we would want
to use terms that were -restricted- in this sense. For example,
if only one sentence of some chemical theory contained the term
'electron', the te~m might well turn out to be restricted just
because it does not apply to things outside of the theoretical
domain. We do not show the term 'electron' to be arbitrarily or
inappropriately restricted in the theoretical sentence 'Electrons
have negative charge', for example, just by pointi~g out that the
term does not apply to the anode of my car battery and that if it
did, the sentence would still be true. That 1s, we could
introduce & term t' which, by stipulated definition, ~pplies to
electrons and anodes of car batteries; this new term would have
a larger comprehension than the term 'electron', but it would
not, presumably, be preferable. In any such case we would want
to keep the rest~icted terms.
I do not see how to specify, in any precise and interesting
way, which subset of'the class of restricted terms contains all
and only the restricted terms that we do not want to keep.
Fortunately this is not needed for our purposes. The term
'conditional application of a signal to the input' is restricted,
42
and we suppose that it is inappropriate in our theory because it
1s restricted by an arbitrary condition, a condition that has no
theoretical significance. Whether I am standing up or not is
presumably irrelevant to the operation of ordinary electronic
circuits, so the comprehension of this restricted term ~s not
anything we would want to pick out. Anything we would want to
say about the comprehension of this term we would also want to
say about the cnmprehension cf a term that does not have the
arbitrary restriction on its application. This much is clear.
For the moment we will rely on this point, and leave open the
question of whether the comprehension of the arbitrarily
restricted term is always a proper subset of the comprehension of
the preferable term that lacks the restriction, as has been the
case in the examples considered so far; we will return to this
issue in 16.2., below.
Putting matters roughly, we can say that, within the domain
of interest, we want to use terms th2t apply to all and only
those things that have a certain set of theoretically relevant
properties. We do net want to use terms that apply only to
things that have both the theoretically relevant properties and
also some other properties that are irrelevant" to the domain of
interest, particularly when the possession of the former
properties does not generally coincide with the possession of the
latter. The terms that fall into this last, worst case are the
ones we call -arbitrarily restricted."
3. Now we can exercise our imaginations a little and say
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something more about the problems we might get into by using
arbitrarily restricted terms. At the very least, the use of
arbitrarily restricted terms will either complicate our theory or
else restrict its scope of application. In the example discussed
above, the law (L2) which contains an arbitrarily restricted-term
1s just a special case of the more general law (Ll). So a theory
which contained only (L2) would be less general than a theory
with (LIl unless we had some other laws which covered the same
phenomena. So we have either a more complicated theory or a more
restricted theory when we use arbitrarily restricted terms. ftj1s
will be the case whenever arbitrarily restricted terms are used,
but, as we shall see, in some cases more serious problems may
Consider a causal law or other theoretical generalization
that contains more than one arbitrarily restricted term. In any
such case the question arises of whether the arbitrary conditions
of these terms coincide, i.e., whether they hold in the same
circumstances. For example, consider again the pair ~f terms
'application of ~ signal to the input' and 'conditional
application of a signal to the input'. The latter term is
arbitr~rily restricted, and the former, we may suppose, is not.
But it"could happen that in studying our circuits we would
discover at first only the following:
(L3) Conditional appl ications of a signal to the i,nput
cause a ·coincidental dropping" of the output signal,
where an event is a ·coincidental dropping" of a signal just in
case it is a dropping of the signal that occurs when I am
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standing up. (We can assume that the time between the
application of an input signal and the consequent dropping of the
output is so small that I never (or almost never) change position
significantly in that time.) I call this a ·coincidental
dropping- of the signal because its arbitrary condition, that it
occur when I am standing up, coincides (almost) perfectly with
the arbitrary condition on the cause-term, 'conditional
application·.2 Now if (L3) is in our theory, then the business of
replacing the arbitrarily restricted terms becomes a bit more
complicated. Simply substituting 'application of a signal to the
input' for the term 'conditional application of a signal to the
input' in (L3) does not preserve truth. In this case, we would
want to replace both arbitrarily restricted terms at once.
We get the worst situation , though, when in stating a
generalization we use terms with arbitrary conditions that do not,
coincide. As we have seen, if we were investigating the effects
of conditional applications of a signal to the input we might
discover (L3). But we would not discover even this much of the
law (Ll) if for some reason we restricted our investigation to a
search for the relations between conditional applications of a
signal to the input and ·conditional droppings of the output
signal to zero,· where a conditional dropping of the output
signal to zero is a dropping of the signal to zero which occurs
2. We could make the coincidence of the conditions really
perfect by defining a coincidental dropping of the signal to be a
dropping of the signal that is caused by an input that is applied
when I am standing up, but this would make the example less
natural and, I think, less like the actual cases we might
e~count.r.
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when I am sitting down; the arbitrary conditions on the correct
applications of these terms do not coincide in any situation. So
restricting our attention to the extensions of arbitrarily
restricted terms will not only restrict the scope of our theory,
but, as in this case, it may also more or less completely conceal
just the sort of relations that we would like to discover. The
degree of concealment will depend on the degree of coincidence of
the respective arbitrary conditions.
In summary then, we have presented a defense of the
following methodological principle:
(Pl) Arbitrarily restricted terms should be avoided
in the statement of theor ies; when unrestr'icted
replacements for these terms are not avai12ble, they
should be sought.
As we have pointed out above, the ·seeking- for the appropriate
replacements amounts to the seeking of the theoretically relevant
properties in terms of which the replacement may be defined. And
as we have seen, the severity of the adverse consequences of
using arbitrarily restricted terms depends on features of each
particular case. In cases where the adverse concequences are
minimal, as, for example, when the arbitrary conditions on the
application of a term hold in all possible situations, the
injunction to seek a more appropriate replacement is, of course,
less pressing.
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4. Now let's consider ordinary, pre-theoretical mental terms
like 'sees a robin' and 'sees a dove emerging from the magician's
pocket'. Perhaps the truth of Ryle's suggestion about such terms
is that they are analogous to terms like 'conditional application
of a signal to the input'. If we can show that these ord1na~y
mental terms have arbitrary conditions on their application that
would render them arbitrarily restricted 1n psychology, then we
can conclude that they should be avoided in psychological theory
for the reasons just discussed. Many philosophers and
psychologists have argued that mental terms are inappropriate for
other reasons as well, but we do not need to consider here
whether any of these other claims are correct. We do not even
need to assume that any ordinary mental terms are ever actually
used in the statement of a psychological theory (which t of
course, they are) in order to argue that if they were, they would
be arbitrarily restricted by some conditions on their
application •
Ryle has pointed out, as others had" before him, that certain
ordinary mental terms have ·contextual- conditions on their
application. In the passage quoted above, for' example, he
considered some spectators witnessing doves emerging from a
conjuror's pocket and said, -They could not have seen it happen
unless it happened, and unless it happened in such a place and at
such a distance and in such a light that it was visible to them
and unless their eyes were open, properly directed and focused
and so on.- Let's suppose that this claim is correct, that such
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conditions must indeed be satisfied if the spectators can be
correctly said to have seen the evento On our construal, Ryle's
point is that appropriate scientific terms do not have such
conditions on· their application.
Our problem, then, 1s to decide whether these conditions are
"arbitrary· conditions on the application of psychological terms,
whether they are suitably irrelevant to what psychology ,1"5 about.
~ And before this problem can be properly dealt with, we need some
assumptions about the domain of psychology. Unfortunately, it is
not very clear what psychology is (or should be) about, and a
fUll consideration of this controversial matter is beyond the
scope of this chapter. Since our interest is primarily to be
clear about how certain methodological principles apply in any
domain, we will just make some assumptions here about the domain
of interest and keep in mind that analogous methodological
principles will apply in other domains. It will be convenient to
assume, then, that our interest in psychology is to predict and
explain behavior, where we take the term -behavior- v~ry loosely.
We will assume that virtually any kind of physiological state or
event or physical movement that is caused by an event in the
nervous system may be something we want psychology to explain.
We will return later to the question of how our conclusions
depend on this assumption.
Given this view of the domain of psychology, it is natural
to hold that the contextual conditions on the correct applicati,on
of the predicate 'sees the event' or of the term 'seeing the
event' that. are mentioned by Ryle !!! arbitrary in psychology.
Consider, for example, whether doves really emerged from the
magician's pocket. Is this question relevant to the explanation
of the subject's behavior? We naturally assume that it is not;
the subject will act in the same way whether he really saw the
doves or just mistakenly believes that he saw them. Presumably
the subject's behavior can be explained on the basis of his
sensory inputs and his internal states, if it can be explained at
all; the question of what actually caused the sensory input to
be such as it was is thus irrelevant. This is, I suppose, an
empirical assumption, though it is eminently plausible. It is
conceivable that some part of a subject's behavior is contingent
upon the actual occurrence of such an event, just as it 1s
conceivable that the operation of some ordinary electronic
circuit depends upon whether I am standing up or not. It is
conceivable but not believable. We can c~ll such assumpt'ions
about the factors relevant to the domain of interest,
-assumptions of causal closure-.
We will not undertake to catalog all the ordinary mental
terms that are arbitrarily restricted in psychology. Many mental
terms that contain some form of a factive verb clearly have
arbitrary conditions on their application which would restrict
their application in psychology. And less obvious arbitrary
conditions on certain mental terms are apparently suggested by
causal theories in the philosophy of mind, by some theories about
the entailments of sentences containing mental terms that include
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proper names, indexicals, or natural kind terms, and by theories
about what Burge(1979) has called ·socially dependent features of
cognitive phenomel~a."3
I~ any case, it is clear that when our empirical assumptions
about the causes of behavior are taken together with our
methodological claim that arbitrarily restricted terms should be
avoided in science, we have some substantial guidelines ,for
psychology. To take one that has attracted some interest
recently, we have a principle that is very much like what
Putnam(1975) has called -methodological solipsism-. He says,
••• an assumption which we may call the assumption of
methodological solipsism ••• ls that no psychological
state, properly so called, presupp~ses the existence of
any individu~l other than the sUbject to whom that state
is ascribed. (p.220)
Putnam considers whether psychology should adopt this assumption,
and he distinguishes the assumption from a view that is more
common in philosophy, viz., -that no psychological state
presupposes the existence of the subject's body even.- SO' when
this passage is taken in its original context, it app~ars to be
suggesting an assumption that is similar to a methodological
principle for which we have provided a defense, namely,
(MS) Avoid using terms that have as a condition on their
3. Factives are discussed by, e.g., Kiparsky and K1parsky(1970).
Causal theories in the philosophy of mind are discussed by, e.g.,
Grice(1961), Martin and Deutscher(1966), Goldman(1967), and
Wilson(1972). Putnam(1975, ch. 12), for example, discusses
mental terms that contain indexicals and natural kind terms. And
the social and historical context presupposed by certain
sentences containing mental terms is emphasized by, e.g.,
Wittgenstein(1958), Ryle(19S4) and Burge(1979). A complete
bibliography of the relevant literature would be very extensive.
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application the existence of any person other than the
sUbject to whom the term is applied.
So, for example, the predicate 'sees Jimmy Carter' should be
avoided in psychology, since it has as a condition on its
application the existence of Jimmy Carter. We want to reject ~ny
such term in favor of a term that would apply regardless of the
existence of any other particular individual. Of course, the
view we have defended supports not only the principle (MS) but
also analogous principles that deal with terms that presuppose
the existence of robins, cabbages, rocks, and so on.
Although we do not really have any very good idea of what
will be needed to explain visual perception (if it can be
explained at all), it is surely implausible that there are
lawlike relations between the actual presence of other
individuals and visual perception or anything else that falls
within the psychological domain we have indicated. Once again,
it should be emphasized that we are trying to stick to cases that
seem clear; even these are of some lnte'rest.
It also seems that there are clear cases ~o establish that
the rather vaguely apprehended distinction between the
·contextual B conditions and the -internal- conditions of an
organism does not, given our natural assumptions of causal
closure, coincide with the distinction between conditions that
are arbitrary in psychology and those that are not. It is easy
to think of -internal-, wnon-contextual- conditions that are
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arbitrary in psychology. Consider, for example, the predicate
'knows that his own blood is AS positive'Q No one can know that
his own blood is AS positive unless hi:; blood is AS positive, but
this -non-contextual- condition certainly looks quite arbitrary
in psychology. Or consider the term, 'feels his ulcer acting
up'; no one can feel his ulcer acting up unless he really does
have an ulcer. So there appear to be many common mental terms
that have conditions on their application that are internal but
arbitrary nevertheless. And, on the other hand, there presumably
are contextual conditions that are not arbitrary in psychology.
Certainly the behavior of an organism is contingent on the
environment's meeting some conditionsl This much is clear
despite the difficulty of finding laws that govern these
organism-environment relations. So there are internal conditions
that are arbitrary, and there must be contextual conditions that
are not arbitrary. But the precise limits of the arbitrary is a
matter for future psychologists to discover.
5. Some psychologists would certainly want to object to
our methodological proposals. One way of undermining them would
be to refute our arguments for our ·assumption~ of causal
closure.- Let's consider how one such objection might go. A
psycholoqlst might object to our comparison of the supposition
that a subject's behavior depends on the actual presence of other
individuals with the supposition that the operation of ordinary
electric circuits depends on whether I am standing up. Certainly
there are differences between these two cases that are relevant
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to the present discussion. We would assume that my being
standing up was an arbitrary condition in the circuit theory even
if there happened to be a correlation between the obtaining of
the condition and, say, the production of a certain output; this
correlation could presumably be broken in an experimental
situation, and this would support our claim about the
arbitrariness of the condition. But in psychology, as in the
special sciences generally, we are typically not concerned with
determinate, exceptionless laws of the sort we have in circuit
theory, and so the business of deciding what conditio~s are
arbitrary in psychology becomes considerably more complicated.
If the psychological laws are probabilistic,· then we must jUdge
the relevance of conditions on the application of their terms
accordingly. But, 1n fact, the situation is even more difficult
than this.
Many of the generalizations that one finds in psychology not
only allow exceptions, but also do not make any precise, testable
claim about the improbability of the exceptions. Grice(197S) has
suggested that some or all of the laws containing ordinary mental
terms are of this kind. And Fodor(1975, pp.13-25) has suggested
that it should be expected that the laws of the special sciences
generally will have exceptions. So given the present state of
generalizations in psychology, decisions about what conditions
are arbitrary may become a bit sticky, as does the methodology of
theory confirmation generally.
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Perhaps this is the point that a psychologist would try to
exploit in an objection to our assumptions of causal closure.
Consider some predicate like 'sees a rigid object'. Couldn't one
grant that this predicate does not apply to a subject unless
(inter alia) there is a rigid object in his field of vision. and
that the effect of. this object on th~ '~\~1! Ject could have been
just the same regardless of whether there was really a rigid
object there or only, say, a hologram of some rigid object, and
nevertheless deny that this condition is arbitrary? Suppose one
held, for example, that we can do fruitful work finding
psychological generalizations that hold only in certain normal
human -ecological- situations. 4 Then our argument for the
arbitrariness of certain contextual conditions has no force; it
merely points up the acknowledged fact that these generalizations
will break down 'or fail to apply outside of the Rnormal"
contexts.
4. I think there are grounds for construing the position of some
Gibsonian psychologists this way. (Cf., e.g., Gibson, 1966, and
Mace, 1974.) Certainly this construal misses whatever virtues
there are in taking ecological considerations seriously in
perceptual psychology, e.g., to suggest what stimuli the senses
are likely to be responsive to. But Gibson apparently would
object to our po'sition •.. ·For example, he says (in his usual
inscrutable style), -The classical theories of
perception ••• explaln both perception and misperception, both
detection and illusion, with the same assumptions... There 1s a
lack of logic here5 If misperception is the opposite of
perception, the law of association or the law of sensory
organization cannot apply to both at the same time. The same
principle should not be used to explain Why perceiving is so
often correct and why it is so often incorrect. A theory of
perception should certainly allow for misperception, but it can
hatdly at the same time be a theory of misperception. (1966, p.
287) I cannot make out any sound argument here.
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But this will not do. Suppose that in an ecologically
-normalw·situation, seeing a rigid body has a certain effect on,
BUY, behavior and internal state. Then, as we have urged, seeing
something that looks exactly like that rigid body woulcl have had
\
~
the same effect, and so we should look for a term that would~
apply in both cases, i.e., a term that is not restricted by the
condition that a rigid body actually be present. A theory with
this unrestricted term would constitute an improved extension of
the -ecological- theory. I cannot imagine any good reason for
thinking that making improvements of this sort whenever we can
would impede' the project in any way. Let the ecological approach
produce its theory (if it can), and we will produce an extension
of it that has wider application~ No grounds have been offerred
here for thinking that such a ·naturalistic psychology· must
1
fail. Rather, we have argued that if such a project succeeds, so
will a better one.
6.1. There may be a temptation here to say that what
psychology can r'ally explain is just ·part ofw an event like
se~ing Carter, or ·part ofe whatever other mental event, state or
process falls in the extension of an arbitrarily restricted term.
But whether this satt of metaPhYSical claim is intelligible and
correct or not, it is nevertheless of interest to consider what
events are in the extension of the appropriate replacement for an
arbitrarily restricted term. What predicate would be an
appro~riate replacement for the predicate 'sees Carter', for
example? What event occurs when one sees Carter that we should
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expect the theory to explain? One proposal is offerred in the
following passage from Fodor(197S):
••• one might, as it were", 'construct' a
nonrelational propositional attitude corresponding to
each relational one by 'dropping' such conditons on the
ascription of the latter as constrain nonpsycholog ic.al
states, events or processes. So, to a first
approximation, 'rationally believing' corresponds tu
'knowing' in the sense that an organism believes that a
is F iff the organism satisfies all the conditions on
knowing that a is F except the £activity condition. In
a similar spt r it, • seeming to see I corresponds 'to
seeing, 'seeming to hear' corresponds to hearing, etc.
(p.76n)
It does not seem to me that any of these suggestions
provides quite what we need. For example, it is not at all clear
that 'seems to see Carter' would be the appropriate replac~ment
for therarb1trarily restricted 'sees Carter'.
One might take instances of the schema'S seems to see x' as
equivalent to the corresponding instances of 'It seems to S that
he sees x', but this is surely not the reading Fodor has in minde
A sUbject might actually!!! a robin without its seeming to him
that he sees a robin, he might not have any idea about what sort
of animal he saw. Presumably Fodor intends us to read instances
of'S seems to see x' as equivalent to something like the
corresponding instance of'S 1s having a visual experience as of
x'. The problem with this proposal is that we don't really have
any clear idea of what having the requir~d visual experience is.
For example, could one have had -a visual experience as of
Carter W even if Carter had never existed? We need to assume so,
1f the term 'has a visual experience as of Carter' is not to be
restricted by the condition tha~ Carter exist. But if one could
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have had this visual experience even if Carter had never existed,
then one might begin to wonder what sort of experience it is •
How could we individuate this experience?
The po 1nt I want to make is really just the obvious one.
• Suppose that we actually have psycholog tcal laws that contain
some predicate like 'sees a rob in' • (It is not really likely
that we would have a theory with laws about perceiving robins or
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
perceiving Carter, but our examples serve.to illustrate some
general points.) Presumably the behavior (and internal states) of
a sUbject depends on his sensory inputs and his internal states;
as we noted above, what actually causes the input to be such as
it is is presumably irrelevant. We want a term that will apply
to any event which is like seeing a robin in psychologically
relevant respects. The point is that we don't know a priori what
the psychologically relevant respects are. It is not at all
clear that the mere fact that the subject's visual experience was
like seeing a robin in whatever respects are psychologically
relevant guarantees that it would be correct to say he seemed to
see a robin •
I do not see any good grounds for supposing that merely
choosing related terms that are not relational will generally
give us appropriate rep!acements for arbitrarily restricted
terms. It might well be that English does not contain the terms
we will want to use in our theory. In such a case we could
resort to neologism, or there is the option suggested by Ryle in
the passages quoted at the beginning of this paper, viz., that
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ordinary mental terms may be used in psychology with non-standard
meanings. This is what we might expect to find most often in
mentalistic psychology, since the comprehensions of the
appropriate unrestricted terms will often come to be recognized
only gradually, in the course of developing the theory.
6.2. There is another interesting issue with regard to finding
appropriate replacements for arbitrarily restricted ter~s,
namely, the question of whether the comprehension of an
arbitrarily restricted term will always be a subset of the
comprehension of an appropriate replacement ~r that term. I
will not attempt to decide the question; I will just point out
one example in which one might plausibly argue the the
comprehension of the replacement will not include the
comprehension of the arbitrarily restricted term.
Consider a theory with terms like 'seeing a robin' which
apply to events, as opposed to, or in addition to terms like
'sees a robin' which apply to people and other sorts of things.
If we grant that 'seeing a robin' truly applies to an event only
1f a robin 1s present, and that the presence of a robin is an
arbitrary condition in psychology, then, for our theoretical
pursuits, we -ought to-look for a term that is not restricted by
this condition. The interesting point is that in this case one
might hold that the appropriate r~placement is one whose
c~mprehension does not include the comprehension of 'seeing a
robin' as a proper part. A term whose comprehension does include
the restricted comprehension as a proper part would presumably be
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preferable to the original term, but it seems that in a case like
this we might want to use a term whose comprehension 1s disjoint
from the comprehension of the original term. Let's consider why
this might be so.
Suppose that we are looking for a replacement for the term
'seeing a robin', a replacement whose application is not
restricted by the condition that a robin be present. One might
1111'
suppose, as a first guess, that the psychologically relevant
event that occurs when I see a robin is the having of a certain
sort of visual experience, or something like tl,at, as Fodor
apparently means to suggest in the passage discussed above. So
we might guess that~the appropriate replacement for 'seeing a
robin' would be a term t that applies to a subject's seeing a
robin and to a subject's having certain visual experience, e~
Presumably everything we would want to say about ~he
comprehension of 'seeing a robin' we would also want to say about
the comprehension 'of t. But if t will serve our purpose here,
then it is plausible to suppose that the term 'having.visual
experience e' would serve the purpose more naturally, even though
it is plausible that the comprehension of this term Is disjoint
from the comprehension of 'seeing a robin'. The reason for
thinking that the comprehensions of these terms are disjoint is
that it is plausible that each event in the extension of 'seeing
a robin' has the presence of a robin as an essential property;
it is plausible that my seeing a robi,n is an event which could
not have occurred if there were no robins arounde And, on the
other hand, one might suppose that each event in the
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comprehension of the term 'having visual experience e l would
surely be an event that could have occurred regardless of whether
a robin were present or not. If this is correct, then the two
comprehensions must be disjoint. We know that the latter
comprehension is larger though, since whenever a subject seeS a
robin he has the psychologically relevant visual experience e,
and one may sometimes have this visual experience withou~ seeing
a robin. So if everything we want to say about seeing a robin we
also want to say about having visual experience e, then the
latter claim is the one we want to make even if the
comprehensions of the respective terms are disjoint.
Accepting this conclusion would bring our view a little
closer to Ryle's. We could urge that an -ideal- psychology, i.e.
a psychology that did not contain any arbitrarily restricted
terms, would probably not mention any events like seeing ,or
hearing. But it should be noted that many philosophers would
object. to the account of seeing that was used to defend this
conclusion. Some would want to argue that (1) my seeing a robin
ls an event that could have occurred even if a robin had not been
present, or (11) that the idea that events have essential
properties is somehow confuse~. Both of these alternatives have
their advocates. The former view is presupposed by certain
causal and functionalist theories of mental states and events.
Certain causal theories suggest that my perceiving x is my having
a certain sense-impression, a sense-impression caused by x.
(Cf., e.g., Grice, 1961.' If I could have had that
sense-impression even if x had not existed, then, on this view,
my perceiving x is an event that could have occurred even if x
had not existed. Similar views are suggested by the following
passages,
Though it is always logically possible, for any
given effect, that it exist without being caused, we'
would not say that it would, in that case, continue to
be an effect. Similarly, we might grant, if the
emotion/object relation is merely a causal one, then
either of its terms might exist apart from that .
relation. But we needn't grant that either of the terms
would, in that ease, continue to be the same sort of
emotion, or even to be any sort of emotion at all.
(Aquila, 1974, p.280)
Geach thinks that descriptions which specify
thoughts by reference to certain of their contextual
relations (perhaps by reference to their distal causes)
are the Ofles which pick out their essential properties;
whereas, I think it's descriptions which specify
functional properties that do so. (Fodor, 1980, p.102)
If these views are correct, then the argument presented for the
view that 'seeing a robin' and 'having visual experience e' have
disjoint comprehensions is unsound. This would not exclude the
possibility of other examples, though, in which we would want to
allow that the comprehensions of appropriate replacements for
arbitrarily restricted terms do not include the comprehensions of
the terms they replace.
7.1. Now that we have proposed some methodological guidelines
for psychology on the basis of some empirical assumptions, it is
of interest to consider their impact on psychology. First of
all, it should'be noted that there seems to be a tendency to
assume that the penalties of using arbitrarily restricted terms
are more serious than has been claimed here. For example, it has
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been suggested that Ryle's arguments show that ·strictly
speaking, there can't be a psychology of perception.- (Fodor,
1980, p.64) And one hears claims like the following,
In satisfying ••• demands for comprehensive and exact
explanation, I shall find that I am investigating the
mechanisms of the performance rather than the
performance identified and described as a social and
cultural phenomenon, and as an expression of thought.
The descriptions of behavior which can be fitted into a
scheme of scientific explanation must be appropriately
determinate and exact; they must not depend for their
interpretation on the context of use ••• Psychological
terms, drawn from the common vocabulary, do not satisfy
these ••• conditions •• eThe truly scientific study of human
nature, necessarily concerned with universal laws, will
leave the explanation of human thought, conscious and
unconscious, untouched, except for the abstractions of
logic ••• which are detached ••• from any particular
social context. (Hampshire, 1978, pp.66-67, 68)
But as we have seen, the mere fact that a term is arbitrarily
restricted by contextual conditions does not show that it will
not occur in any laws. This point was demonstrated by our laws
(L2) and (L3) which contain the arbitrarily restricted terms
'conditional application' and 'coincidental dropping of a
signal'. To get generalizations as reliable as these in
perceptual psychology would be significant and exciting. And, as
we have seen, appropriate replacements for arbitrarily restricted
terms will often apply to everything the restricted terms apply
to, and more. The mere fact that a term is arbitrarily
restricted does not show that we cannot give any scientific
account of the things in its comprehension.
What has been argued here is only that if there are laws
containing arbitrarily restricted terms, we can expect to find
laws of broader application that are preferable, and that the
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search for laws containing arbitrarily restricted terms may
divert our attention from the more general relations that we
would like to discover. (See 13.) Of course, it could turn out
that some or all ordinary mental terms have problems more serious
than just that they are arbitrarily restricted in psychology; but
here we are only concerned with the penalties of using terms that
are arbitrarily restricted.
Let's consider a little more carefully what penalties we
would expect psychology to be paying for its use of arbitrarily
restricted mental terms. The amount that arbitrarily restricted
terms will restrict the application of the laws in which they
occur depends on how restrictive their arbitrary conditions are.
And it was argued above that restricting our attention to
relations between extensions of arbitrarily restricted te,rms may
conceal relations that we would like to discover, and that the
,
degree of concealment depends on the degree to which the
arbitrary conditions on the application of the relevant terms
coincide. If they coincide perfectly, then we would expect only
restricted application. So these are two factors that should be
kept in mind when we look at the use of arbitrarily restricted
terms in psychology: how restrictive are the conditions on the
applications of the terms, and do the conditions on the terms of
interest in a certain area coincide?
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Psychologists apparently do make claims about ordinary
mental states and events. They propose theories about concept
learning, perception, natural language understandfng, etc. And
these theories include generalizations that contain ordinary
mental terms. It could be that in psychology these terms are
used with special technical senses, but, if they are, it is not
widely recognized that they are. So such terms are at least
interesting candidates for consideration. So we want to ask: Do
~
these theories fail to respect our principles? And if they do,
do these theories suffer the ill-consequences that we expect to
attend the use of arbitrarily restricted terms, and are these
restricted terms easily eliminated in favor of more general
terms? It should be kept in mind here that our methodological
principles apply to the generalizations that would occur in the
statement of a theory~ whereas a good deal of scientific
literature discusses particular applications of theoreti~al
generalizations which are themselves sometimes only implicitly
suggested.
7.2. The psychological claims that would be of the greatest
interest to us are those that contain terms which we would expect
to be very inappropriate. One example that springs to lmind is
the predicate 'knows' and its cognates. Many terms containing
some form of the verb 'to know' have conditions on their
application that would be arbitrary and restrictive in
psychology. Predicates of the form -knows that p., for example,
apply to a subject only if the predicate complement is true, and
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the condition that it be true will often be arbitrary in
psyc~ol09Y. So one might expect that psychologists would not
work on theories about knowledge, but this is apparently not the
case. Many psychological claims about knowledge can be found
even in the most recent literature. Cognitive psychologists have
•
shown great interest, for example, in claims about how knowledge
1s mentally represented, organized and used, and in claims about
knowing a natural language. Let's consider briefly an example
from each of these areas of interest.
One paper that has been very influential in recent work on
how human knowledge is represented is Minsky's(1974) paper on
-frames·. This paper proposes (inter alia),
(E1) Human knowledge is represented in a system of
interconnected structures called -frames-.
One might argue (roughly) that the term 'human knowledge' is
arbitrarily restricted since it does not apply to fal~e or
inaccurate beliefs which are also, or could be, represented in
the frame system. That ls, the internal, ~ental representation
of information in frames is surely not contingent on the truth of
that information. But it is clear that the holders of (El) would
want to hold that inaccurate information is also represented in
the frame system, so we can conclude either that Minsky is using,
the term 'human knowledge' much more loosely than it is
ordinarily used, or that he intends to make a more general claim
than (E1) that he has not stated explicitly. On this latter
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assumption, then, (EI) does contain an arbitrarily restricted
term, but this is easily recognized and a more general claim
could be made. A well-developed theory would indicate clearly
what that more general claim would be. As a matter of fact, the
proponents of this framework apparently want to claim that frames
are used to represent not only the content of beliefs (regardless
of their truth), but also the content of propositional attitudes
genarally, the information processed in' visual percept1o'n, etc.
So it looks like a new term will have to be coined in order to
make the most general claim about what is represented in frames.
Psychologists, linguists and others 'have also expressed
great interest in theo~ies about knowledge of language. Chomsky,
for example, has argued that,
(£2) If a person knows a natural language L', then
that person has internalized a grammar of L. (See,
e.g_, Chomsky, 1~75, p.304.)
One might argue that the predicate 'knows a natural language L'
is arbitrarily restricted because no one can be in the extension
of 'knows a natural language L' (for any L) unless L really is a
natural language, and this condition is arbitrary in psychology.
If there were no such language, but a subject's sensory input
were just as if there were, then the subj ect would presum-abl y
internalize a grammar anyway; the actual use of the language by
other people is really irrelevant to the psychological account of
the matter.
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Once again, we cannot go into this matter in detail, but I
suspect that Chomsky and other advocates of this view would
reject our argument on the grounds that it is a mistake to
presume that a natural language must be one that is or has been
used by a community of speakers. If a subject recieved senso~y
input that caused him to internalize some grammar of a language,
that language is ipso facto a natural language, a possible human
language, regardless of whether it is actually used by a'
community of speakers. If this is the right account, then our
argument that 'knows a natural language L' is arbitrarily
restricted fails. So we have no good reason to think that this
knowledge claim is inappropriate in this way.
Another set of terms that are prime suspects for being
arbitrarily restricted are the terms used in theories of
perception. So let's briefly consider an example from this
domain. One area of perceptual psychology that has attracted the
interest of many psychologists is the perception of natural
language. One claim that has been accepted by many recent
theorists is the following:
(E3) Recognizing an acoustic token t of a spoken
sentence involves formulating a syntactic representation
of that sentence token. (See, e.g., Marslen-Wilson and
Tyler, 1980, and references cited there for a discussion
of this claim.)
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This claim contains the term 'recognizing an acoustic token t of
a spoken sentence' which seems to be arbitrarily restricted,
since no one can recognize a spoken sentence token t unless there
actually is such a token, and this condition is presumably
arbitrary in psychology. If a subject's sensory input were as if
such a token had been produced in his presence, he would
presumably (according to adherents of this theory) produce a
syntactic representation of the sentence whether it was,actually
spoken or not. This point would probably be conceded by anyone
who holds (E3). But notice that this condition is not very
restrictive; fortunately, a subject who receives sensory input
just as if he had heard a spoken sentence has, as a matter of
fact, almost always heard a spoken sentence. And, although
theorists would probably recognize the restricted nature of their
claim, it is not entirely clear how to formulate a better one;
it is not obvious what term should be used in place of this
arbitrarily restricted term.
It is interesting to note that some recent theories that are
concerned with perception do not use arbitrarily restricted
perceptual terms at all. We have, for example, theories of
·visual information processing- instead of theories of ·visual
perception-. These theories typically take special care to
account for cases of misperception, 10e., for visual illusions~
And we find claims like the following:
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I
t(E4) The difference between relative p~sitlons of"
visual images on the retina of each eye is measured and
used to compute an estimate of depth; this involves
(inter alia) producing descriptions of the images that
are rather like sketches. (See, e.g., Marr, 1919, and
references cited there.)
There are apparently no ordinary perceptual terms in this claim,
thocgh it is of course a claim that would be considered. relevant
to the psychological explanation of actual cases of perception.
7.3. In sum, these examples are perhaps typical of what we
would expect to find in psychology. We would not expect to find
sevarely restricted terms. Neither would we expect to find terms
in psychology whose conditions are highly non-coincidental, since
,
we would expect to find arbitrary conditions that hold most of
the time. We do find claims about knowledge that are, perhaps,
'restricted. But it is no surprise that we find predicates like
'knows a human language' ratber than predicates like 'knows
Carter is present'. We can explain why these sharply· restricted
terms are avoided, and we can do so without committing ourselves
to the implausible view that there can be no scientific
generalizations whatever about the events in the extensions of
arbitrarily restricted terms.
8. With regard to the assumption we made about a domain for
psychology, there are two points to be made. In the first place,
we have not defended the view that work in this area is likely to
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be fruitful. Indeed, considering the amount of effort that has
been invested in this program, there has been disappointingly
little progress in discovering any laws underlying any
interesting aspect of the (suppo~ed) dependence of behavior on
sensory stimulation and internal state. It may be that this
domain will never prove to be fruitful; it may be an area in
which we will be unable to find significant psychological laws.
/ The second point to be made about our choice of a
psychological domain has been noted already, that our conclusions
about what terms are arbitrarily restricted in a theory depend
crucially on the theoretical domain, and so they will not
generally hold in other domains. We argued, for example, that
the presence of other individuals is an arbitrary condition in
any theory that aims to explain individual behavior on the basis
of sensory stimulation and internal state. But surely there are
other domains in which this condition is not arbitrary, such as
domains in which the individual is viewed in a certain context.
Consider, for example, the domains of human ethology,
evolutionary biology, and sociology. And presumably there are
also ·psychological- domains in which it is not at all obvious
that our contextual conditions would be arbitrary, as perhaps in
certain theories in psychophysics or social psychology. There
may even be other psychological domains of this kind that we have
not distinguished yet, domains in which we could do fruitful
scientific work.
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Perhaps these considerations about the fruitfulness of
various domains of inquiry are what we need to shed some light on
Putnam's· comments on methodological solipsism. He says,
Making this assumption is, of course, adopting a
restrictive program ••• (We shall ••• refer to mental states
that are permitted by methodological solipsism as
'psychological states in the narrow sense'.) Only if we
assume that psychological states in the narrow sense
have a significant degree of causal closure (so that
restricting ourselves to psychological states in the
narrow sense will facilitate the statement of
psychological laws) is there any point ••• in making the
assumption of methodological solipsism. But three
centuries of failurg of mentalistic psychology 1s
tremendous evidence against this procedure, in my
opinion. (1975, pp. 220-221)
This passage suggests that Putnam anticipated the sort of defense
of methodological solipsism that was developed here, and that he
thinks that since mentalistic psychology has failed, we should
look for other more fruitful psychological domains in which th6re
might well be no argument for accepting methodological solipsism.
But if he did anticipate our argument, then his remarks are
surprising. In the first place, our defense of methodological
solipsism does not justify the adoption of any restrictive
practiceso If we had defended the vie~ that the prospects of
finding significant generalizations containing arbitrarily
restricted terms were hopeless, then we might .want to adopt the
-restrictive- program of avoiding them entirely. But this strong
conclusion i~ not defended here. We allow that significant
genera~izations containing arbitrarily restricted terms may be
forthcoming, and recommend only that these terms are not the most
general that we could use and so we will want to seek the more
general terms. The second peculiarity of Putnam's remarks is
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that he is apparently suggesting that the assumption of
m,~tnodological solipsism should be rejected because mentalistic
psychology has failed. This is a little odd, though, since in
the first place, mentalistic psychology has not respected this
assumption; and in the second place, the mentalistic psychology
we have developed hardly begins to to exhaust the field of
possible theories that do respect this assumption. And the third
peculiarity of Putnam's remarks is that he seems ~o be ~uggesting
that psychologists should reject methodological solipsism despite
the sort of argument that has been presented here. Perhaps,
then, he is suggesting that methodologlc~l solipsism is
restrictive and to be discarded even in theories that aim to
explain individual behavior, theories in the domain we have been;
considering. But to reject our argument and maintain this view,
one would need to deny either the plausible principles of causal
closure discussed above or else the general methodological
principles on which our defense of methodological solipsism
rests. Neither of these options looks attractive. So, in any
case, it is not clear what Putnam means to suggest.
9. Apart from the related questions about what psychology
ought to !!plain, the views that have been proposed here are, I
think, the most significant th~t we can derive from the
suggestion of Ryle's with which we began. I suspect that Ryle
and some other philosophers have thought that more devastating
conclusions would follow, but our conclusions are really fairly
strong. We have advanced some general methodological principles
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•
•
that are supposed to apply to ahy possibl~ science of the
relevant domain, so the mere fact that they do not conflict with
present day psychology (if indeed they do not) affords them but
little merit. Some philosophers and psychologists would
certainly want to argue that our conclusions are too strong, but
it is at least not obvious how such a challenge could be carried
through successfully.
f,
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CHAPTER III
A THEORY OF COMPUTING SYSTEMS
1. Introduction
The deve,lopment of computing machines with remarkable
abilities is certainly due, in large part, to the fact that we
are able to describe the complex internal operations of these
machines as -information processing.- The possibility of finding
similar computational accounts of the operation of naturally
occurring systems like the nervous systems of humans has aroused
considerable excitement among psychologists and
neurophysiologists. The development and assessment of any
computational account of the nervous system, however, requires
some general understanding of what it is for a physical system to
be a computing system of a particular kind. Computer scientists
have provided theories that apply to our electronic computers,
but psychologists need theories that have clear application to
physical systems that are really quite different, and they need
theories that answer questions that are not of general interest
to computer scientists and engineers. Psychologists have made
claims about what sort of computing language the human nervous
sy,t•• uses, for example, but the content and credibility of such
c1a1•• are obscure until we have a general understanding of what
it 1s for a physical system to use a computing language. In this
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chapter an elementary theory of computing systems will be
presented which will have clear application to such issues in
psychology. This theory of computation will be applied to some
psychological issues in the next chapter.
The hardest question that our theory of computation should
go some way towards answering is the one just suggested:, Given
any particular programming language, L, what is it for a physical
system to use L? Answering this question requires that we say
something about what it is for a physical system to execute the
programs of the language, and this, in turn, requires that we
explain what it is for a physical system to compute a function.
A program may be used simply to specify the function computed by
a system, or simply to specify the program computed by the
system, or to specify the program that is represented and, in
control of the computational processes. Other accounts of the
role of programs in explaining the behavior of physical systems
have failed to distinguish these three roles, yet, as.we shall
see, these distinctions are crucial to un~erstandin9 claims about
what programs are used and claims about what programming language
1
is being used. As we will see, defining what function 1s
computed by a program and defining what it is for a system to
compute a program depends on what sorts of statements or
--------------------
1. Other accounts of the role of programs in explaining the
behavior of physical systems are provided in Fodor, 1968, ch.4;
Newell and Simon, 1976; Cummins, 1977; Haugeland, 1978; and
Pylyshyn, 1980.
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instructions our programs are allowed to include. But
programming languages contain so many sorts of statements, each
of which requires special treatment, that our task quickly
becomes overwhelming, as we will point out below. So instead of
providing a fUlly general and precise account that applies to any
programming language, we will provide a relatively precise
account for only one simple programming language. The way in
which the account should be extended to cover other languages and
the difficulties involved in such extensions will be rather
vaguely indicated.
We have chosen for detailed consideration a language
suggested by Scott(1967). It is a simple language capable of
expressing any program that can be represented by a flowchart.
We want to define the language in a way that does not depend on
any particular implementation on a machine, since we want our
~ccount to be as general as possible. In particular, we want our
account to cover physical systems other than the artefacts
. produced by our electronics industry. The definition,suggested
by Scott serves admirably in this respect, so only minor changes
have been made in it. The theory of computation that has been
developed by Scott and others has been presented in introductory
texts by Clark and Cowell(1976) and Stoy(1977), but we make use
of only the most very basic and uncontroversial part of the
approach.
2. A simple computer
The basic elements of our account of computing systems can be
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illustrated with a simple example. Consider what would suffice
to make some physical system! an adding machine. We would need
to be able to interpret some states of the system numerically.
Letls assume that for n parts of the system we specify a mapping
from states of those parts to numerals. If we specify an
ordering of these computationally relevant parts of the system,
then we can specify the relevant total states of the system with
an n-tuple of these interpreted states, <5 , S ,es., S). We
1 ~ 2 n
will use 's ., 's • and 's • to refer to the i-th, j-th and k-th
i j k
elements of such an n-tuple of computationally relevant states of
P (where i, j, k ~). Since these n-tuples will indicate our
values, we suppose that for any two such n-tuples and for any i,
if s ~s I, then it is not physically possible for P to be in both
i i
sand s • at the same time;
i i
thus the state of P at anY,time can
I
;
be specified with at most one n-tuple. So let's assume tnat we
have a set S of all and only the states of P that are elements of
these n-tuples and a 1-1 mapping from S into a set N of numerals,
f: S -+ N.
R
This mapping allows us to specify the interpreted state of P at a
time with an n-tuple of numera~s, <n , n , ••• , n >, i.e.,
1 2 n
(f (s ), f (8 ), ••• , f (8 ». Our system! can be ccnsidered a
R 1 R 2 R n
machine, then, if we have f and a 1-1 mapping from N into a set
R
of integers I
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f: N -+ I,
M
such that the following condition holds in virtu~ of physical
laws that apply to the system:
(R) For some i, j, k , n, all sand s are such that
i j
1f P is in sand s , then in some (physically possible)
i j
circumstances, C, P will go into a state
f (f (5 » + f (f (s » • f (f (5 I».
M RiM R j M R k
s '
k
such that
I
Of course, P would not be a useful adding machine unless some
other conditions held as well:
(1) There are a large number of n-tuple~ of physical
states of P for which f is d~fined, so that a l~rge
R
number of sums may be calculated~
(2) It is easy to tell which computation811y r~levanL
,
states P is in at any particular time~ and it is easy to
tell when circumstances C CO\ile about.
(3) The functions f and fare ea9Y to compute. We
M R
want to be able to read off the mathematical results
from the physical states easily.
(4) Por many pairs of integers, <i, it>, it is easy to
bring it about that P is in the states s sf
i R
-1
( i) )
-1
(f
M
and s af
j R
-1
(if» and then to bring about
circumstances C e That is, we would like to be able to
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t-initialize- and ·start- ~he system easily.
(5) The system P 1s portable, convenient and
inexpensive.
Any of the cheaper hand calculators are examples of such systems.
For these, S would include the states of the memory registers.
The initialization and start arc accomplished just by pressing
the right buttons. The computationally relevant states are
indicated by the digital display which also indicates the
appropriate ••pping f into numerals, and the mappln9 f 1s just
R M
the standard int.rpretatlon of the numerals. Everythlnq 1s so
conv.nlent that the u•• r of the calculator need only think about
numbers and th. bl.tton. on the calculator, evel'ythlng else takes
car. of it••lf.
It will be convenient to d••cribe such computing systems as
physlcal reali.ation. of ab8tract ••chines. In this case, we can
think of the .b8tract ~.chln. e. a function
where M is the ••t of n-tuple. of nuMerals that we can use to
specify the interpreted state of P. The function ~A maps 8ac~
n-tuple of M with elements n , n , into an n-tuple of M with
i j
element n such that f (n ) + f (n ) • f en). We ~an define a
k M i M j M k
parti51 Qncoding function for ~A '
e: I x I ~ M.
This function maps pairs of integers, <1, 1'>, into n-tuples of M
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-1 -1
such that n • f (1) and n • If (1'). The values of the
i M j M
other elements of each n-tuple, if any, can be arbitrarily
specified in order to ensure that each pair of integers is mapped
into a unique n-tuple in M. The decoding function for. M~, .
d: M -+ I,
-1
maps every n-tuple of M into the integer f (n l. Thus the
M k
composition
d o!!J\ 0 e
1s a partial function that maps pairs of integers into their
sums. The abstract machine ~A is physically realized by P
because we have the mapping f which associates the physical
R
states of ! with numerals, and the condition (R) which guarantees
an appropriate correspondance between changes in physical state
and the mapping ~~ •
It should be noted that this is an example of something that
,would, on the present account, count as an adding machine; it 1s
not a specification of what is requir~ for something to be an
addin9 machine. The example 1s intended only to give a simple
illustration of how the theory of computation that we will
present handles a familiar case.
3. A simple programming language
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3.1. Introduction
We will now provide a theory of computation that covers not
only simple adding machines but also macnines that can execute
complex programs. We will define a language, ·SPL,· that can
represent any program that can be represented by a simple
flowchart. Our flowcharts will each have one start circle, at
least one halt circle, operation boxes, and te.t box... Thus, if
'P1' and "2' are operation names and 'P1' and 'P2' are t ••t
names, (PLOWCHART e ) represents a simple program:
(FLOWCHART f, )
T L5
,
F
T
In the programming language SPL, which was designed by
Scott(1967), this program is written as follows:
(PROGRAM e )
START: GOTO Ll
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LI: IF PI GOTO LS ELSE GOTO L2
L2: IF P2 GOTO L4 ELSE GOTO L3
L3: DO Pi GOTO L4
L4: DO F2 GOTO Ll
LS: HALT
When interpreted in the obvious way, this list of instructions
represents the same program as is diagrammed above. Of course,
we do not know how to execute the program until we know,the
intended interpretation of the operation and test names. We will
first provide a syntactic definition of SPL.
3.2. The syntax of SPL
I. Vocabulary
a. The following nine symbols we will call the basic
symbols:
START
GOTO
HALT
••
ELSE
THEN
•,
DO
IF
B. The labels:
LI, L2, L3, •••
c. The operation (or function) symbols:
F1, F2, F3, •••
D. The test (or E!edicate) symbols:
PI, P2, P3, •••
II. Formation rules
A. The instructions:
(i) If L is a label, then 'START: GOTO L' is a start
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instruction.
(il) If Land L' are labels and F is a function symbol,
then i L: DO F, GOTO L" is an operation instruc tion.
(ill) If L, L' and LI. are l~bels and P is a predicate
symbol, then r- L: IF P THEN GOTO L I ELSE GOTO L' 8' 1s
a test instruction.
(tv) If L 1s a label, then i L: HALT' 1s a hal t
instruction.
B. A program is a finite set of instructions containing
exactly one start instruction and containing for any label in
the set exactly one instruction that begins with that label.
III. Additional nomenclature
We will uses IL' to refer to the set of labels, I!I to refer
to the set of operation or function symbolS, 'pl to refer to the
set of test or predicate symbols, and lA' to refer to the set of
programs.
3.38 Interpretations of SPL
We will say that 3n interpretation of ~ is a triple <e,M,
d>, where M is a machine, e is an encoding function whose range
is the domain of M, and d is a decoding function whose domain 1s
the range of M. A machine is.a partial function M defined over
For elements F of the set F of function symbols, M(F )
i - i
is a computable partial function,
M -+ M,
where M 1s a set of n-tuples of symbols (the memory set). For
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elements P of the set P of predicate symbols, M(Pi) is a
i
computable partial function,
.
. M ~ [ 'T', 'F '1 ·
Such an interpretation of the function and predicate symbols·of
SPL will indicate what operations should be performed to execute
any program in SPL, and hence also the values of M for elements
of !, l.e., for programs. The former point will be illustrated
when we consider a particular interpretation of SPL; we turn 'now
to the latter point. We want to specify the values of M for
programs.
The values of ! for arguments that are elements of A will be
specified according to the values of M for the function and
predicate symbols •
..
•
A completed computation by a program JT on a
machine M 1s a finite sequence,
L , m , L , m ,... , L , m ,
1 1 2 2 n n
such that:
(1) L , L ,..., L E L;
1 2 n
(2) m , m , ••• , m ~ M;
1 2 n
(3) L is the label that occurs in the start instruction
1
of Tr ;
(4) L is the label that occurs in some halt instruction
n
of rr;
(5) Por every label L that occurs in the computation,
i
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where 1<1, L is some label L such that exactly one of
1
the following conditions hold:
(a) For some r E! and LIE L, the instruction r L:
DO F GOTO L" 1s in TT, in which case L -L' and
1+1
m -M (m ),
1+1 -P i
(b) Por some p~!. and L', L" E, !:., the instruction
r L: IF P GOTO L' ELSE GOTO L'" Is in 11", in
which case m -m and either M em ).'T' and L -L
'1+1 i -P i 1+1
or else M em ).·P' and L -L".
-P i 1+1
For each program 7T in SPL, then, ~(1r) is the partial function,
!!y: M~ M,
where M (m)-m' if there is a completed computation by IT on M,
-IT
<L , m , L , m ,e •• ,
1 1 2 2
undefined otherwise.
L , m >, such that m -m and m -m l , and is
n n 1 n ·
The value of ~"') will be undefined if an
operation instruction,
L: DO F GOTO LI,
1
,
I
is reached where M (m) is undefined, or if a test instruction,
-, i
L: IF P THEN GOTO L' ELSE "GCTO LII ,
i
is reached where M (m) is undefined, or if the program gets
-P i
"
caught in an infinite loop and never reaches a halt instruction
despite the fact that its function and predicate symbols are
defined. So for elements 1T of the set A of programs of SPL,
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!(7T) is a partial function,
M : M -+ M.
-rr
A computation by 7r on ! is either a completed computation
bylr on M or else an infinite sequence,
L , m , L , m , ••• ,
1 1 2 2
L , m , L , II , ••• (L , III ),
1 1 2 2 n n
)~o represent a computation that is either non-terminating or else
completed and ending with m •
n
If the value of a machine ! is defined for every function
and predicate symbol in a program IT , we will say that nr is
interpreted by!. If a program Tr is interpreted by a machine M,
I
we will call the program Tr under the interpretation M the
W!-programlT· or wM-lT-.
Although the completed computations of any program (if there
are an¥) are determined by the specification of a machine M, we
do not know what the computations are computations of until we
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specify the encoding and decoding fuctions. The encoding
function maps some set X (the input set) into M (the memory set
of M),
e: X'-'+ M.
And the decoding function maps M into some set Y (the output
set) ,
d: M -+ Y.
The function computed by program ~ (under the interpretation (e,
~, d» is the partial function from X into Y,
d 0 !!1TO e.
Now we can specify a particular interpretation of SPL and
consider what function the program £ , presented above, computes
under that interpretation.
3.4. An interpretation of SPL
Let our input set X be the set of pairs of positive ~ntegers;
X • I x I, where I • [1, 2, 3, ••• 3 •
Our memory set M will be the set of pairs of arabic numerals
standardly used to represent the positive integers;
M • N ~ N r where N • L'1 " '2', I 3 I , • •• 1.
Let's call the 1-1 function that maps integer~ into these
standard numerals, -f ,.
M
f: I ~ N.
M
The encoding function is the mapping that associates each pair of
integers with their standard representations,
e: X -; M, e«x, y» = <f (x), f (y».
M M
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Now we can define a machine M:
I. The operation or function symbols
M • M ~ M, M «x, y» • <y, x).•
-PI -Fl
-1 -1
M • M ~ M, M «x, y» • <f (f (x) f (y»,.y>.•
-'2 -'2 M M M
II. The predicate or test symbols
M : M ~ [ IT I, IF I 1 ,
-P1 )
where M «x, y»·'T' if x·y and otherwise M «x, y».'P·J
'1 PI
M -. [IT I, I P' IJ'
~l
where M «x, y» • 'T' if f (x» f
~2 M M
M «x, y» =- 'P'.
-P2
III. The programs
For every program 1r I
-1
Cy) and otherwise
M rr= M ~ M,
where Mlr (X) • Y if there is a completed computation bylr on
M, <L , m , L , m , ••• , L , m >, such that x=m and y=m ;
- 1122 n n 1 n
and otherwise MlT(X) is undefined.
The output set Y is the set of integers. The decoding function
maps Minto Y,
-1
d: M ~ Y, d(x, y» = f (x).
M
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Now we have specified an interpretation, <e, M, d>, for SPL.
3. 5. An exampll!
Under the intttrpretation just spec i fied, Program C , wh ich
was presented abo,'., expresses the familiar Euclidean algorithm
for computing the greatest common divisor of two positive
integers. The pro9ram was the following,
(PROGRAM E )
START: GOTO Ll
Ll: IP Pl GOTO LS ELSE GOTO L2
L2: IF P2 GOTO L4 ELSE GOTO L3
L3: DO PI GOTO L4
L4: DO F2 GOTO Ll
L5: HALT.
(Also see the Flowchart t , above.) It is clear how to go about
executing such a program now that the interpretation has:been
specified. We can render the program into a corresponding set of
instructions in English quite easily. The memory set contains
pairs of numerals, but given our encoding function we can take
them to represent pairs of integers; it is less cumbersome to
describe the algorithm in terms of operations ,on numbers than it
is to describe it in terms of operations on symbols. So consider
any pair of positive integers. Under the interpretation <e, ~'
d>, we proceed according to Program C as follows:
(1) Check to see if the two integers are the same. If
they are, proceed to step (5); otherwise, proceed to
step (2).
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(2) Check to see if the first integer 1s larger than the
second. If it is, proceed to step (4); otherwise,
Iproceed to step (4).
(3) Reverse the two integers. Proceed to step (4).
(4) Subtract the second integer from the first, and,now
consider the result and the second integer of the
original pair (in that order). Proceed to step (1).
(5) Stop. The decoding function tells us that'the
second integer 1s the result.
How that it is clear how!! would carry out the program, we will
explain what it is for a program to compute this program, and
then what it is for a physical system to do so.
4. Program computation
For the moment we will consider only programs of SPL. We
will consider how our account can be extended to other languages
in 19, below. We can think of an M-program as a specification of
a certain partial function, namely, the partial function which is
the value of M for the program taken as argument. An" ~-program
also specifies a set of computations. We will say that a program
~ on a machine M with memory set M is computed or executed by a
program TTl on a machine MI with memory set MI just in case there
is a 1-1 mapping,
g: M ..... MI,
such that for every computation, c, by 1t on M,
L , m , L , M , ••• (L , m ),
1 1 2 2 n n
there is a computation, c', by ~' on Mi,
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L' , ml , L' , m' , ••• (L ' , m' ) ,
1 1 2 2 q q
such that=
(1 ) 9 (m )
• m
l .,
1 1
(li) if c is completed so is c l , in which case
'; em )-m I , and
n q
(1ii) each member of the sequence,
g(1I ), gem ), ••• (g(m »,
1 2 n
occurs in order (but not necessarily consecutively) in
C I •
Thus, if an ~-pro9ram ]r 1s computed by an M'-program 7T', then
there is a 1-1 mapping 9 such that
-1
9 o M' 0 9 • _M.."..
- rr I II
We will sometimes speak of part of a program computing ot
executing some other program, in which case the above definition
is to be applied to that part of a program as if it were a
program in itself. Notice that if we allowed that for some m 6
1
m c M such that m ,m , gem )~g(m ), then even if ~.(m )~M (m ),
2 12 1 2 . Wl/(2
there will be no function h such that heM' (g(m »)ah(M' (g(m »).
- 1 - 2
Requiring that 9 be 1-1 guarantees that this situation will not
arise and simplifies our theory without any substantial loss of
descriptive power.
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It is clear that computation, defined in this way, is
reflexive and transitive; that is,
Cal For every machine !, every !!-proqram computes
itself, and
(b) For any machines, !!, M', M", and programs TT, "TT',
TT' " if the !!' -program 7T' comp,"tes the M-program 7T ,
and the !' '-program TTl I computes the !I_program 77',
then the !"-program 7T" computes the !-program ~.
These properties hold for computation by programs, but not, as we
will see, for computation by physical systems.
We can now give a similar account of what it is for a
physical system to compute an interpreted program. A program
on a machine!! with memory set M is (physically) computed by a
physical system! (under the realization function f ) just in
R
case there is a 1-1 mapping,
f: M-+S,
R M
where S (the memory set of P) is a set of physical states of P
M
such that,
(S) For any states sand s' in S , if it is physically
M
possible for P to be in both sand s' at the same time,
then S~SI ..
and the following condition holds in virtue of physical laws
applying to the system:
(R) In certain (physically possible) circumstances, C,
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I'
f
•
for every computation by ~ on M,
L , m , L,m I ••• (L , m ) I
1 1 2 2 n n
if P is in a state f (m ) then it will go into f (m ) ,
R 1 R 2
and then into f (m ), and so on, until it goes into.
R 3
f (m ) if the computation is completed.
R n
Notice that it follows from these definitions that a physical
system (physically) computes an M-program or if it (physically)
computes any M'-program~ that computes the M-program~.
If a program ~ computes some function f under an
interpretation <e, M, d>, and P (physically) computes the
~-program rr under f , then we will say that P (physically)
R
~:,putes!. Thus, if ! computes some M-program~, it computes
the function M , since rr computes M under the interpretation
<e, M, d>, where e and d are the identity function on M. So a
physical system computes Mrr(as a program does also) 'just in case
it computes the following program:
(PROGRAM r )
START: GOTO Ll
Ll: DO F1 GOTO L2
L2: HALT,
where M' • M. (We will call programs of this form one-step
Pi -n-
programs.) A completed computation of this program on M' would be
a sequence,
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L,m,L,m,
1 1 2 2
where L -LI, L =L2, and m =M I (m )~MI (m )=M (m ). So a
1 2 2 - F 1 1 - r' 1 -IT 1
physical system that (for every completed computation by r on
~I) goes into state f (m ) because it was in f (m ) whenever· some
R 2 R 1
specifiable circumstances, C, come about, computes this
M'-program. Notice that if a complete computation by 1f"on M is
a longer sequence, t~en a physical system could compute the
M'-program r (and hence ~ but not compute the M-program ~.
It is easy to see, for example, that there could be physical
systems that compute Mt under some f R
but do not compute the
M-program t (discussed above) under f , but use some other
R
program instead. We also have the result that the simple
calculator wi th which we began computes the function Mit: (wh ich
was specified in 12, above); it may compute this function by
computing some complex program, but this need not be the case.
5. Compilers and interpreters
A compiler (or translator) i~ an M-program 6) that, under
some interpretation <e, M, d>, computes a function,
C: A ~ ~,
where for any program rr t , CC1T') is a program Tr" such that,
for some MI, ~I', the ~"-program 77'1 computes the M'_progra~
TTl •. We will say that such an M-pro9ram ·compiles H'-programs
into M"-programs,· and that it ·compiles MI into MI'.R Following
Clark and Cowell (1976, pp.24-25) we will say that MI' simulates
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M' if there is a compiler that compiles M' into M", and that two
machines are equivalent if each simulates the other.
If we have a device which executes M-programs, then, and we
want to compute some M'-program ~' on it, we could use an
M-program e which compiles M
'
into M (under some interpretation
<e, ~ ' d» to compile an M-program which computes the M'-program
?T
'
• We could then compute the M-program 7T on our device. In
fact, we could write a ·compile-and-go· program which, in effect,
compiles an M'_program into an M-program and then executes the
M-program. Consider, for example, the following ~-program X '
(PROGRAM r )
START: GOTO Ll
Ll: DO Fl GOTO L2
L2: DO F2 GOTO L3
L3: HALT,
where M :aM ~ and M :
-PI -~ -'2
M ~ M, M ( m) =M (m), where f.9 i s a
-F2 -d (m)
compiler of M
'
into M under <e, M, d>. We assume that the
execution of the compiling step, LI , does not transform the
memory in any respect that is relevant to the computation of the
second step, L2; that is, for all completed computations of
on M,
L , m , L , m , L , m ,
1 1 223 3
M (m )sM (m )am. Intuitively, the encoding of the M'-program
-'2 1 -F2 2 3
and the encoding of the compiled ~-progrftm do not intrude on the
space in memory that holds the values relevant to the execution
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of the second step of the program~
Notice that if the memory set of M 1s f~.'lite, and there are
an infinite number of (interpreted) M-programs no two of which
compute each other, then no M-program will be able to compile all
~'-pro9rams in the way we have indicated. If we allowed our
input to be read into the memory set in a ·stream," as a series
of memory states, then it might be possible to have an M-program
2
that compiled infinitely many different M'-programsa But for the
present we will stick to encodings and decodings of single memory
states.
If the memory set of M is finite, then, and so d[M] is
;finite (where d is t~e decoding function of our compiler, e ) ,
then we can write an M-program which computes M-! by actually
executing all the instructions of the appropriate compiled
program re~resented in d[Ml. We impose an ordering on the set
d(M] so we can list the compiled programs as follows,
7T, 7T.' ••• ' 7T.
1 2 n
We will use the flowchart enclosure of (FLOWCHART rr ) as an
1
abbreviated not2tion for the flowchart of program ~ ' except
1
that the start enclosure of ~IS flowchart is removed and L is
1
the label that occurs in the start instruction of ~ , and all
1
-----~--------------
2. See Clark and Cowell, 1976, ch.S, for an extension of this
account to machines with input and output streams.
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(FLOWCHART 111)
halt enclosures are removed and the lines leading to them are
connected to L'. Then a more sophisticated ·compile-and-go·
program can be represented as in (FLOWCHART K).
(,FLOWCHART ~)
F
L~
•••
• • •
We assume that none of the labels LI, L2, L3, ••• , L(3n+2) occur
inside any of the program enclosures, and that all operation and
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and otherwise M (m)='F'.
-Pi
test symbols occurring in these enclosures are interpreted by M.
The interpretation of the function symbol Fl and the test symbols
Pi, P2, ••• , Pn is as follows:
and for every predicate symbol Pi, l!l(n, the value of M(Pil is
the function
M M ~ ('T', 'F-],
-Pi l
where !!Pi (m)s'T' if me [xl<x, 11
i
> ~ d3
It should be clear that M- K. computes M- X. by executing the steps
of the appropriate compiled programs.
This last program raises the interesting point that the
compiling step really is not needed if we have tests sufficient
to distinguish the encodings of the different M'-programs. If we
have such tests, then we can just ~se the encodings of the
Me-programs to cue the execution of the appropriate M-program
Tr. A (software) interpreter or software simulation of a
i
machine M' is an M-program A that works in this way; it
computes M'-programs without compiling them as M- K does.
Instead, an encod ing of the M' -program is exec'uted step-by-step
in the course of executing M-A. If none of the M-program 1s
compiled we say that ~-A is a pure simulation of M' on ~.
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this discussion to
describe any compilers or interpreters in detail, but they are of
interest and so it is important to have a rough idea of what they
are. We will consider them again below.
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6. Direct systems
We will distinguish two sorts of physical systems that
compute programs in the sense specified above: Rdirect systems·
and ·program using systems." A "directR or "hardwired- system is
a physical system that computes some M-program 11 but not by-
using a representation of the program to control its operation;
rather, it operates in the way it does just because of t~e way it
is built. We can be more p~ecise about this once we have-
characterized program using systems, but the intuitive idea of
Wdirect" computation can be made clear by considering some
examples. These wil be examples of systems that compute programs
but clearly do not use programs to govern their operationG
6.1. First example
Let's consider first a naturally occurring system that
computes some interesting program without any human interference,
since it is such natural systems that we are mo~t interested 1n
being able to describe. So consider some naturally occurring
physical system whose operation corresponds to the behavior of
some interesting function. Since physicists like to find
functions which correspond to nice descr iption's of physical
systems, they are well equipped to provide us with the sort of
example we are looking for. Consider Newton's law of
gravitation, for example,
F • G m
1
m
2
-2
r •
This equation holds true (at least to a good approximation) of
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any two masses, m and m; they will attract each other with a
1 2
force F which is inversely proportional to the square of the
dista~,ce r between them. If we consider as our two masses the
sun and a planet, then we can use this formula and ignore the
relatively small effects of other masses upon the system. And if
~e take a planet which is not too hard to see but has a rather
eccentric orbit, then we can use the oystem to compute the values
of F for a range of r, since G, m and m are constant. So
1 2
consider the system consisting of the sun and Mars, whose orbit
was eccentric enough to lead Kepler to his first law. Let's
describe a program that this system actually computes just to
make quite clear how it could be done.
To simplify the example we will only work on finding a
program that the system computes when Mars is getting further
away from the sun, travelling from its perihelion to its
aphelion, and we ~ill keep our figures in a range that allows us
to use standard units of measurement. At any point in its orbit
Mars (with mass ~) will be at a distance r from the sun (with
mass e), and acted upon by a force F according to Newton's law.
So let our memory set M be the set of pairs of standard decimal
numerals, <r, F>, and let our encoding and decoding functions be
the standard interpretation of these pairs of numerals as pairs
of numbers. Let f be the function which mapa each numeral into
M
the rational number it standardly represents. Now we can
describe the system as computing the following ~-program,
10~
-1 ~ -2
(G,.. m (f (r) +1 ) ) >
o t! ~
(PROGRAM N )
START: GOTO Ll
Ll: DO Fl GOTO L2
L2: HALT,
where M is defined as follows:
M ~ M,
where,
-1
M C<r,F»=<f (f (r)+1), f
-F1 M M M
11 11
if 2.1 x 10 <f (r)<2.4 x 10 , and is undefined otherwise. This
M
program successively increments r by one and then computes the
new value of F. Now we can specify the realization function f
R
as follows,
f: M~ S, f «r~ F»~<s, s'>,
R R
where s is the state of Mars' being f (r) meters away from the
M
sun, and s' is the state of Mars' being acted upon by'a
gravitational force of f (F) Newtons. If Mars is on its trip
M
from perihelion to aphelion, and if no other s'ignificant forces
are applied to the system, then for every computation by ~ on M,
L,m,L,m,
1 1 2 2
if the system is in some state f (m) (such that M (m) is
R 1 Fl 1
defined) then physical laws that apply to the system determine
l~
that it will go into the state f (m ), i.e., f (M (m ». An
R 2 R -Fl 1
astronomer who could determine (quite precisely!) the values of r
and F by observation, and who knew, for example, how long it
./
takes for the system to go from some state f (m ) into the next
R 1
computationally relevant state, f (m ), could use this system to
R 2
calculate solutions to Newton's law. This would be 3 wildly
impractical scheme, of course, but it could, in principle, be
done.
It might seem that although we can describe physical systems
as computing some programs in this way, ther~ could not be a
physical system that directly computed extremely complicated
programs. But in fact, every program that can be computed by a
program using system can be computed directly by a system that
clearly does not use any representation of the program to govern
its operation. Our next example will suggest a method for
building an electronic circuit that can compute any p~rticular
SPL program directly.
6.2. Second example
Consider an SPL program with a loop, like the following
~-pro9ramJ\ that computes the sums of pairs <x,y> of positive
integers. (The interpretation of the function and predicate
symbols is indicated parenthetically in each box.) The challenge
in finding a system that can compute a program like this one is
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(FLOWCHART A)
T
14
to find a system that will make the appropriate number of loops
for any given input. One way of getting the system to do this is
to control its operation with a representation of the program,
but there are other ways. One is to use what Von Neumann,( 1958)
calls ·plugged control. w That is, we could just take electronic
circuits, electronic wboxes,· which perform the operations and
tests corresponding to Fl, F2, and PI (under some realization
function f ) and ·plug- them together in the way the flowchart
R
indicates. Thus, the electronic box corresponding to Fl in our
~-pro9ram might be a circuit that would take two inputs, x and y,
whose voltages are paired with integer values by f; it would
R
(after some delay) provide two outputs, one with the voltage of
one of the inputs and a voltage which (under f ') represents the
R
other's integer value plus one. We would connect the output of
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this box to the input of the F2 box, and so on until the whole
·plugged circuit- is connected in the way indicated by the
flowchart. The box corresponding to PI would pass its input to
one output (the IT I output) if the voltage of its y-input
represented 0 under f • and otherwise would pass the input to the
k
other output point (the IFI output). It is not difficult to
design electronic circuits which (under some f ) behave in the
R
way we would requlr~ these to behave. We will call a system that
is construeted from electronic boxes in this way a -block diagram
3
system.·
It is clear that we can describe these block diagram systems
as computing the corresponding interpreted programs. Consider
again the block diagram system corresponding to our M-program~ •
Given some input, f (m ), physical laws applying to the I
R 1
electronic circuits determine that the system will go into the
next computationally relevant state, in which an appropriate
signal has been generated at one of the outputs of the box Pl.
If the signal appears at the IF' output, the next computationally
relevant state, f (m ), will be one in which a signal has been
R 3
generated at the output of box FI, and so on until we get our
final output at the 'T' branch of Pl, if ever. This final output
will be a voltage that represents the sum of the integer values
--------------------
3. I h6ve taken this term from Dertouzos et al., 1972, where it
is used to describe similar ·plugged control" systems.
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of our input.
Notice that our various electronic boxes can share circuitr~'
so long as we have the right relations between inputs and
outputs. And notice that even if one of our electronic boxes
were itself a program using system, the whole plugged system~ the
system that computes the M-program ~ , would not be a program
using system since its execution of the M-program J1 is brought
about by the wiring of the circuit, not by the control of some
representation of formulae of our programming language in
(internal or external) memory.
Although any program that can be computed by a program using
system can be computed by a direct system, i.e., by a system that
clearly does not make use of the representation of a program,
building direct systems to execute non-trivial programs is
usually impractical given the current state of technology. For
most purposes it is much more practical to use a program using
system which, in effect, sets up the ri;ht ·wiring" in the course
of the computation.
7. Program using systems
A ·program using system- or ·program system- is a physical
system whose computation of some ~-program 11 is controlled by a
represent~tion of the program 7T. The distinction between direct
and program systems is not just that the program is represented
in a program system, since programs may be encoded in the memory
set of a direct system like the Mars-sun system. And the
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••
•
•
•
•
•
•
distinction is not just that the represented programs have an
influence un the computational process in the program using
system, since the physical states which are encoded in direct
systems also have an influence on the operation of those systems.
A program system is distinguished rather by its possession o~
some ·control mechanism- which makes use of the representation of
the program in determining what tests and operations will be
performed in computing the program. Let's try to be a bit more
precise about this.
A program using system that computes M-~ under some fuses
- R
a representation of the program tr to control its operation.
Let's define a function r which maps programs into sets of
instructions, such that for any 7r,
r(1f, =[xlx~1r and x is neither a start instruction nor
a hal t instruction1·
The representation of a program 1r that a program system uses,
then, can be specified with a 1-1 mapping,
r err) ~ s ,
A
where telT) is non-empty and S 1s a set of physical states of
A
the system P.
• The states 1n £71' (r (1T , 1 for any 7r" , i . e • , the states in the
image of any r err) under the mappi n9 f 1t ' may be states of some
input device such as a tape reader, or they may be memory states
•
•
of a stored-program system. In either case, the system must be
influenced by the image of the appropriate instruction under f
at each point in every computation. This influence is brought
about through the operation of some ·control mechanism" that
determines that the right instruction has the right influence at
the right time. So when the system executes an instruction I ,
j
it must make the appropriate transition from f (M ) to f (m ) ,
R j R j+l
but also, the control mechanism must ensure that the next state
transition will be controlled by fnr(I ). In a typical digital
j+l
computer executing a machine language instruction, it 1s the
state of a certain memory register (viz., the program counter)
which determines which instruction will be executed next, and so
the contents of this register must be appropriately reset in the
execution of each instruction.
So in any program using system, P, we can think of there
being a set S of ·control states· such that if P is in some
C
physical state s e S , then it will execute the instruction
C C
paired with some particular state s ~ S by f nr , rather than anyA A
other instruction. So we can think of the ·control mechanism •
as determining a partial 1-1 function,
c: S -+' S ,
A C
so that any particular instruction I is executed only if the
system is in a control state C(f 7r (I».
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Now we can draw all of these parts of a program using system
together in a definition. In a computation by ~on H,
L, m, L , m , ••• (L , m ),
1 122 n n
L , L , ••• (L ), are labels that occur in~; let's use I I
1 2 n 1
I , ••• (1 ), respectively, to refer to the instructions in
2 n
which begin with these labels. We will say that a physical
system P is a program using system if and only if it ·uses· some
program fir to compute M-7r (for some M). And we will say that P
uses 'Tr to compute !!:.lL (under f Rand f V )' if and only if,
(1) there is a 1-1 mapping,
f: M ~ S ,
R M
where M is the memory set of machine M and S is a set
M
of physical states of P such that~
(S) for any states sand s' in S , if it is
M
physically possible for P to be in both sand 8' at
the same time, then s~s';
(il) there is a 1-1 mapping,
rC7T) .-,. S ,
A
where S
A
is a set of physical states of P;
(lil) there Is a 1-1 partial function,
c: S .... S ,
A C
(the control mechanism) where S is a set of physical
C
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states of P (the control states), and
(tv) physical laws applying to the system P determine
that, in certain (physically possible) circumstances, C,
for every computation by ~on M,
L , m , L , m , ••• (L , m ),
1 1 2 2 n n
for any m 1n such a computation, if P is in f (m ) and
1 R 1
f.,.,.-Cl
i
), then it will go into f em ) because'it is in
II R 1+1
f (m ) and f~(I ), and f 1r (I ) has this influence
R i "i If i
because P is in the control state C(f~(Ii».
According to this definition, if P completes a computation of
on M, coming finally into f (m ), the last instruction to be
R n
executed will be I
n-l
• So this definition requires that in the
operation of the system in circumstances £, the states which are
paired by f~ with the instructions I , I , ••• (1 ) of any
" 1 2 n-l
computation by 7r on !! are causally efficacious at th'e respective
points in the computation because of the con~rol mechanism.
Notice that this set of instructions which are causally
efficacious does not include a start instruction or a halt
instruction; I is the instruction executed immediately after
1
the start, and I is the instruction before the halt. We used
n-1
the function r in order to avoid the requirement that these
instructions are even represented. Neither start nor halt
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instructions are ever involved in bringing about the transition
from f (m ) to f (m ) in any completed computat ion; rather tl~ey
R 1 R n
concern what the system is to do at the onset and completion of a
computation. -Executing- a start instruction amounts to bringing
about the conditions, C, in which P will start executing the·
program, i.e., start passing through the states f (m ), f (m ),
R 1 R 2
and so on. And we do not need to concern ourselves with what
happens to the system when (and if) it ever executes a halt
instrue t ion.
Now we can define a direct or hardwired system as a system
that computes some program hr but for which there is no
intelligible, correct description of the system as a program
using system that computes Ir. Thus, we will restrict our
application of the term 'direct system' to systems that we could
~ correctly des~ribe as pro9ram using systems. The Mars~Sun
system and the plugged-control systems are clear examples of this
sort.
We are at last re~dy to answer the difficult question that
we began with: What is it for a system to use a programming
language? Or rather, we are now in a position to explain what it
is for a system to use SPL, and other programming la~guages ~ould
be handled similarly, a~ we will point out below.
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We will say that a program using system that can compute any
(or at least many) M-programs "realizes" or "simulates" M and
·uses M-SPL.· That is, P realizes M and simulates M if and only
if P ·uses M-SPL. w And a physical system P~ M-SPL (under f
R
and f) ,just in case M 1s a machine with memory set m such that:
(1) there is a 1-1 mapping,
f: M-'+S,
R M
where S is a set of physical states of P such that:
M
(S) for any states sand s' in S , if it is
M
physically possible for P to be in both sand s' at
the same time, then sfs"
(ii) there is a (partial) 1-1 mapping f defined over A,
where for each7rcA, the value of fCTr> Cif it is
defined) is a function,
r (TT) ~ s ,
A
where S
A
is a set of physical states of Pi
(iii) there is a partial 1-1 function,
c: S -+ S ,
A C
(the control mechanism), where S is a set of physical
C
states of ! (the control states), and
(Iv) for each -rr~! for which f (V) is l'eflned, the
following condition holds:
(R) physical laws applying to P determine that, 1n
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certain (physically possible) circumstances, C, for
every computation by ~ on H,
L , m , L , m , ••• (L , m ),
1 1 2 2 n n
for any m
1
in such a computation, if P 1s 1n f (m )
R i
influence because P is in control state C(f1lr(I t
".
We would not want to describe a system as a system that uses
M-SPL if f were everywhere undefined; we assume that it must be
defined for a substantial number of programs. It might, for
example, be defined for any program that has less than 1000
instructions. Allowing f to be partially undefined makes it
possible to describe stored-program systems with finite memories
as systems that use M-SPL.
A system may simulate a machine M by computing a' software
interpretation of the machine, as was noted above, in as. In
such a case, ! w;)uld typically compute an ~-p~ogram 7T by
executing some other program that is not computed by M-7r. So we
will say that if ruses M-SPL under f and f, and 1f when it
R
computes any M-pro~rram",r under f it is not computing any
R
program that is not computed by M-7T, then P is a hardware
interpretation o't hardwar,~ simulation of M. In such a case. the
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programming language M-SPL 1s sometimes called the machine
language of P.
Just as it is possible to build a machine to directly
compute any interpreted program (when the memory set specified by
the interpretation is finite), so it is possible to build a .
hardware simulation of any machine (with a finite memory set) •
But this is not practical for most machines. It is generally
much more economical to build hardware simulations of machines
with a few very sjmple operations and tests, and then to simulate
other Whigher level- machines with software interpreters, or just
to use a compiler to compile the higher level machines into the
machines we can simulate on our hardware.
Such -layers· of machines are commonly used on typic'al
digital computers (though these machines are not typically
SPL-machi'nes). This layering is described in the followi.ng
passages:
All the time I design programs for nonexisting machines
and add: -if we now had a machine comprising the
primitives here assumed, then the job is done.-.c.ln
actual practice, of course, this ideal machine will turn
out not to exist, So our next task -- structurally
identical to the original one -- is to program the
simulation of the ·upper- machine ••• But this bunch of
programs is written for a machine that in all
probability will not exist, so our next job will be to
simulate it in terms of programs for a next lower
machine, etc., until finally we have a program that can
be executed by our hardware. (Dijkstra, 1972, pp.48-49)
A hardware computer Is termed an actual cimrUje~. A
computer that 1s partially of wholly stmu a e y
software or microprograms is properly termed a virtual
computer ••• The virtual computer that a programmer uses
When he programs is In fact formed from a hierarchy of
virtual com2uters ••• A language like SNOBOL4 Is sometImes
Implemented by coding the translator and simulation
routines in another high-level language such as PORTRAN.
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It would be appropriate to say in such a case that the
SNOBOL4 virtual computer is being simulated on the
FORTRAN virtual computer, which in turn is b~ing
simulated on the operatlng-system-defined virtual
computer, which is itself being simulated on the
hardware computer (or on the firmware computer that is
heing simulated by microprograms on the hardware
computer) .e.The hierarchy does not end with the
high-level language implementation. The programs t~e
programmer runs add another level to the hierarchy.
(Pratt, 1975, pp.29-32)
Our account makes clear that there must be a definite
correspondance between the camputations of even the highest-level
program and the physical s~ate transitions of the hardware, but
as these passages suggest, the correspondance is typically
forbiddingly complicated to spell out in detail. Specifying how
each interpretation simUlates the next highest machine is only
one step in describing the correspondance between the highest
level and the hardware, and even one such step is usually quite
elaborate.
8. Preliminary objections
In this section steps will be taken to avoid two likely
objections to our account of computing systems, viz.,· that it is
not desciptively accurate in certain cases, and that it makes a
distinction between direct systems and progra~ using systems
where there really is no dist1nction~ We will consider each of
these worries in turn.
8.1. Applications of the framework
As was indicated above, the account of SPL that has been
presented here (in &3) Is based on Scott(1967) where the relation
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of this formalism to other more standard formalisms of automata
theory is clearly indicated. This is also done in Clark and
Cowell(1976). The sort of approach to SPL that we have used here
has been extended to other more common and much more complicated
programming languages; a formal interpretation of these
languages maps well-formed formulae of the languages into
functions over sets which include their memory sets, and
implementations of the languages are defined accordingly. See
Tennant(1976) and Stoy(1977) for introductions to this work and
further references. There are other approache's to interpreting
programming langauges and defining implementations (cf., e.g.,
Dijkstra, 1976; Brady, 1977), but there does not seem to be any
objection in principle to the approach adopted here.
It 1s important to recognize that our definitions are not
intended primarily to be adequate descriptions of the intended
meaning of these terms in ordinary talk, any more than
automata-theoretic definitions of machines are intended to
capture the ordinary meaning of the term 'machine'. As was
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, it is enormously
useful to describe some physical systems as computing systems.
However, it is ridiculous to so describe others, as we have seen
in our Mars-sun example. In many cases there would be no point
to giving computational descriptions of a system. For example,
what point is there in describing a physical system as computing
the empty program illustrated in (FLOWCHART A ), or in describing
a program sys,tem that only compute~ a one-step program? We could
try to rule out these cases. We could, for example, decide not
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(FLOWCHART b.)
to count one-step program using systems as program using systems.
But then, should we allow two-step program using systems? Since
there 1s no theoretically interesting difference between these
simple systems and the more complicated ones in which we are
interested, no attempt has been made to trim out the -ridiculous·
cases.
Along the same lines, it is interesting to note that, on our
account, a system that computes the empty ~-program ~ computes
the function computed by any M'-program iT' if only there is a
1-1 encoding,
9: M' ~ It,
where M' is the memory set of M' and M is the memory set of M.
Consider the function computed by any 77 I under any
interpretation (e
'
, ~', d~, viz.,
d 10M' 0 e I •
- Tr'
Well, ~ computes this function under some interpretation (e, H,
d>, just in case
d 0 _M A 0 e • d' 0 M
'
0 e'.
- Tr'
This will be the case if we let
e • 9 0 e',
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and,
-1
d • d ' 0 M' 0 9 ,
- ..",
since M11 is the identity function on M.
Computational descriptions are interesting only in certain
cases, then. Typically, they are not interesting if the system
computes only an M-program V such that M-TT is tr tv 1al ~. They
are likely to be interesting only in those cases where the system
computes interpreted programs which involve rather complicated
transformations of the memory set of the machine. Since our
reali~~tion functiona are 1-1 mappings,
f: M-+S,
R M
a system that computes a ·complicated- program will always be one
that undergoes correspondingly ·complicated G state transitionso
And we have been assuming that the physical laws applying to the
system require it to undergo these changes in the circumstances
in which the program is computed, so only certain speci'al systems
can correctly be described as computing non-trivial programs.
In any case, these considerations point up the fact that the
definitions we have presented here are not really descriptive
definitions, they do not purport to capture the· standard-
meanings of these terms as they are commonly used. The Mars-sun
system would not usually be called a computing system, for
example. But the definitions presented above are intended to
correspond to standard usage in most of the non-trivial cases.
Thus anythlnCJ th"at an eng lneer would want to count as a
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-hardwired computer- or as an ·SPL-using system" or as an "SPL
compiler- should count as such under our definitions. The real
value of the definitions does not reside in whatever descriptive
accuracy they might possess so much as in the fact that they are
relatively precise and reconstruct notions that might be of use.
OUr interest is not in classifying things according to these
definitions rather than aceordln~ to some others, but rather to
have fairly clear definitions where there were none before and to
use them to illuminate what has been vague or obscure.
8.2. Programs and data
One often hears it said that there is no difference between
programs and data, that a program can be considered data and data
can be considered a program. Consider the following passages:
To make the usual distinction between program and data
we must divide the information placed initially on the
tape into two parts, one part to be called the program
and the other part the data. We then think of the
program as defining a function, and the data as
constituting the argument or arguments of the function,
and the computed output as being the function value for
those arguments. As so described, the disti~ction
between proqram and data is purely ar~itrary, and this
is certainly so from a purely formal point of view. For
example, it is arbitrary whether we say a number
referred to in a conditional shift of control (branch)
command belongs to the program or the data or both, and
when the program is the object of computation (e.g_, 1n
compiling) the program is the data. Our criterion for
distinguishing program from data is an informal,
intuitive one: the program is th~t which, for the most
part, directs operations; the data are those items
which, for the most part, are operated upon. (Burks,
1963, p.10S)
Implicit in the above discussion is a central concept
that deserves explicit mention: the equivalence of
programs and data. We are accustomed to considering
certain kinds of objects in programming as ·program- and
others as -data. w This is often a useful intuitive
distinction, but ••• it 1s more apparent than real.That
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which is program in one context is likely to become data
in another. For example you may write an ALGOL program,
but to the ALGOL compiler that program is input data
which it is to process. The output data produced bl by
the compiler is, to you, a program in machine language.
You might request execution of this program, but a
closer look might convince you that in fact the program
is just data to the interpreter used by the executing
computer. In the same vein we may always consider the
inputs to any program equivalently as data to be
processed or as program to be executed. (Pratt, 1975,
p.32)
We, do not have any stake in any distinction between "data" and
ftprograms· per!!. Certainly programs that are executed in one
computation may be the data in another, as we saw in our
discussion of compilers. And an interpreter brings it about that
an M-program is computed by computing some M'-program which, in
effect, treats the M-program as data. We will even want to
extend our account to languages in which we may have
self-modifying programs that treat themselves as data. But,
aside from the distinction between data and programs as objects,
these passages raise an interesting question about computing
systems. If data can always be considered a program, then is
every direct system a program system?
It should be clear that, on our account, this is not the
case. The criterion for distinguishing a program from data (whe.n
they are distinct) is not how "much they govern the operation of
the machine, but the mechanism by which they govern operations.
To say that a system is a program using system is to say that its
operation is controlled in a certain way, a way which we have
tried to capture in our definitions.
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•
•
To illustrate tbis point, let's see if we can give an
equivalent description of the block digram system discussed above
(in 16a2.) as a program system. Th~t ls, given that this system
Is a d lrect system that compute. !!-Jt, as described, can we
deduce that it is a program using system that computes M-A? The
direct, block diagram system 1s a physical system P which, un~.r
80•• f , computes the sums of pairs ot positive integers <x, y>
R
by co.put1ng the !-proqram ~ represented 1n the flowchart
repeated below.
•
•
•
•
(rLOVCHABTA. )
T
14
•
We will assume that the memory set M is some large but finite set
of pairs of numerals st6nd8rdly used to represent ,t.hft positive
•
integers, and so, fnr example, !!.Jt «'2 1 , '3'»-('5', '0').
we deduce from this account an ~ccount of the system P as a
program using system that computes arrY prc;r~m?
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Can
w. come the closest to being able to do 80 when we try to
describe! 88 the limiting case of a program system, 1.e., as a
one-step program system. So let's try to describe P as a program
using system which, in effect, treats the data <'2', 13'> as a
I
representation of the following ~-pro9ram:
(PROGRAM ¢ ')
STARTs GOTO Ll
Ll: DO PI GOTO L2
L21 RALT,
where, letting f be the standard interpretation of the numerals,
M
M' -M' ,
- PI - f/J
and,
M' : M' ~ M' I M'
-¢
-1
(X,y»-(f (f (x)+f (y», '0'>.
M M M
According to our account of program using systems (in 171. the
representation of this program j6 is specified by a 1-1 mapping,
f p : rCtj) ~ SA.
In this case, rC~). 'L1, DO F1 GOTO L2', so we need exactly one
state in f¢ (rCp)] •. The idea, then, is to let
f¢ CrC¢».f
R
C('2" ']'». All we need now is a control state Sc
that is responsible for the fact that f}IJ Cr Cp» has the
influence it does, and our description of ! as a program using
system that compute. ~t~ will be complete. But here we run into
difficulty, indeed, this is exactly where one would expect to
run into difficulty, since it is the way control is managed that
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distinguishes program using systems from direct systems.
The problem here is that nothing in our description of P as
• direct .yst•• provide. us with, or even assures us that there
ls, an appropriate control state.. So it does not follow from
c
our our claim to have a direct system that we have even the
limiting ca•• of a program using system. Recalling our
definition of what it 1s for a syste. ! to us. a program to
compute that pro9ram, we need 8 control state s such that P
c
execute. instruction I (which in this case is our only
1
represented instruction, because it was in fRC m
l
, and f¢ Cll"
and f 9S Cll' is to have this influence because P 1s in Sc·CCll'.
This requirement is a litte odd because f (m ).f~ (J ), but the
R 1 ;V 1
real obstacle is that we do not have the required control state
s •
c
So this is where the direct system fails to be equivalent to
a program using system. If we had tried to describe the direct
system P as a proqram using system that computed the )-step
program it that the direct system computes, then we would have
run into trouble earlier, because we would have needed to provide
three distinct physical states in S. And then we would have
A
needed three corresponding control states and a much more
complicated control mechanism. None of this is required by the
1?~
direct system.
It 1. important to emphasize here that we are not denying
that any particular physical device that can be described as a
direct syste. might a180 be a pro9ram using system, we are only
••lntalnln9 that th••• d.scriptions would be non-equivalent. It
1s quite po.8ible that a 81n91e physic.l device could be a direct
.vat•• that co.put•• one program 8nd a180 a pro9ram usln9 .yste.
that coaput••• progr.. , possibly even the •••• program, but
th••• would b. two .yst••• with d1fferent stat... And it 1s
iaportant to keep in mind here that we call a system that
computes 80•• program !-~ (under so•• f ) a direct or hardwired
r
systelll only if that computation of !-7T 1s not governed by a
control mechanism that operates in the way described in &7.
It 1s perhaps worthwhile to put these points in another
perspective. We have said (in 13.3.) that the memory set M of
any machine 1s a set of n-t~~ples t)f symbols. We could have
allowed memory sets to include other things, like n-tuples of
4
number, but this may lead to confusion. For one thing, not all
oomputation is numerical. When we calculate we often write
symbols down on paper, and we can think of certan computing
machines as engaging in a similar actlvlt~ To speak of them as
-storing- or -manipulating- or -transforming- the references of
--------------------
4. Clark and Cowell, 1976, for example, use memory sets with
n-tuples of numbers.
, ft~
numerical or alphabetic symbols invites confusion. So we will
continue to assume that memory set~ contain n-tuples of symbols.
If a memory •• t of a machine contains pairs of symbols, the
machine is a -two-register machine,· if it contains triples, the
machine 1s a -three-register mechlne,· and 80 on. We may wish to
ch.racterlze the symbols that can occur 1n a register of a
••chine. This m19ht be done by defining a langauge such that the
~
.,.bolG in the n-tupl•• of the m••ory set of a machine may be
well-formed formulae of that language. We will call such a
5
language a d.ta lan9uage. 1n the passages quoted above, Pratt
and Burks point out hat the data language of a computing system
might well include a programming language, indeed, it might be
the very programming language that we use to describe the
operation of the system, and the -data- may even include the
program that is used by the system to govern its own operation
(in those cases where the program treats itself as data). This
·po"int is certainly correct.
Notice that 1s we have a physical system and we can specify
a mapping f from instructions of some programming language such
R
as LISP, say, to states of the system, this does not suffice to
show that the system uses LISP as either a programming language
or as a data language. We would need to show that the system
~--~------~---------
5. Chomsky has pointed out that the operations that a machine
can perform on well-formed strings of certain types of data
languages provide interesting performance measures for machines.
see, 8.9., Clark and Cowell, 1976, chs.5~7.
be a computing system at all. If we could do this, or at least
provide rea.on to think that this could be done, then it could be
that in tho•• circumstances in which the system compute. a
pro9ram ita data language is or includ•• LISP. In order to be
justified 1n saying that the system used a progamming language
with the LISP .yntax, w. would ne.d to have 80m. reason to
believe that the .yst•• w•• u81n9 repre.entations of LISP
instructions to control its operation 1n the way specified above
(under 8o••. f)& And since LISP 1s an interpreted language, we
would not want to say that the" system used LISP as a programming
language unless 1n executing any instruction of LISP the system
makes an appropriate state transition. When we specify a machine
! that interprets SPL programs, we can say quite precisely what
state transitions must be involved in executing an instruction of
M-SPL under some f. An appropriate formal interpretation of
R
LISP would allow us to do the same for LISP instructions.
9. Extending the framework
we chose to develop our account of computing systems around
SPL for a n~ber of reasons. Its syntax and semantics are simple
I
and easy to grasp, arid it can express any program that we can
represent with a flowchart. As SCott points out, ·Of course,
people want more elaborate programs making use of subroutines and
recursive .procedure., but still, even those will be compiled
into more direct programs that could be illustrated by such flow
dia9rams (very big diagrams to be .ur.I)~·(1967, p.189) And
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finally, SPL was ideal for our purpos8,w because its features
allow for neat, perspicuous definitions of program computations,
and 80 on. Since we are interested 1n providing a theory that
will have clear applicatinn in psychology, neurophyslolo9Y and
related fields, I think that SPL is all that is needed, there
are no serious computational accounts that require any more
sophisticated language, but I suppose that this Is a
controversial clal. who•• defense goes well beyond the scope of
this paper. In any case, it is perhaps worth noting some of the
features that we would need to account for to extend our theory
to cover programming languages that are more commonly used on our
digital computer, 1f only to give some hint of the territory we
have not covered.
All the function and test symbols in SPL are simple
primitives, whereas in most common programming languages:they may
be complex, l.e., built up out of primitives according to various
formation rules. This complicates the semantic definition of the
lan9uBg8 enormously in most cases. The operation and" test
symbols of most languages have mneumonic content to aid the
programmer, but often this content gives but little indication of
what an appropriate formal interpretation of them would be.
Consider, for example, -assignments,· which are used very
frequently in programmln9~
X :- X + Z,
X ~ X + Z, or
X • X + Z,
all of which would be read, ·Set X equal to X plus Z.w In all of
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our ••••pl•• , the interpretation of an operation symbol haa been
e mapping over n-tuple. of numerals, but in most languages we
will ne.d not only nu.erals but also other -d8ta structures- of
various ·typ••• • So••how th••• must be us.d to interpret
•••1gnBents of valu•• to pro9r••••r defined names. There are
-declarations- which a••oeiate n•••• with data-typ•• and
-type-checking operations.- Specifying appropriate
interpretation. for such operation symbols is no trivial proble.,
the best vay to handle the. 1s stlll a matter of controversy.
(Cf., e.g., Stoy, 1977, and Brady, 1977.)
Various kinds of sequencing operations that we do not have
in SPL are a180 included 1n many programming languages. In SPL a
program 1s just a set of labelled instructions, each of which
(with the exception of halt instructions, of course) specifies
the label of the next instruction to be executed. In most
programming languages, however, the programs are ordered sets of
I
instructions, and the order 1n which operations are performed 1s
typically specified partly by this ordering, and partly with
parentheses and precedence rules, and sometimes by the
instructions themselves as in the case of a -jump· or -subroutine
call.-
Some languages also allow the programmer to write
instructions that call for the concurrent execution of a number
of operations or subroutines. We could incorporate this
capability in an extended SPL also. We could, for example, allow
structures like (PLOWCHART ~ ) in our flowcharts. And the
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definition of a computation could be modified analogously to
allow for this concurrency. Programs that call for this;sort of
parallel processing are usually simulated on a conventional
computer that uses sequential processing (or something very much
like it), but this is for practical reasons and not for reasons
of principle. Computers that make heavy use of parallel
processing and programming languages for them are being
developed. (ct., e.q., Dennis and Mlsunas, 1974, and the
references cited there.)
In general, then, computing a program of any programming
language involves passing through an appropriate series of memory
state. 1n any computation, as it did in SPL languag~s. The
specification of the appropriate memory states will typically be
much more complicated than it was for computations of SPL
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pro9r••• , however, and concurrent proc.seii~'~ will require some
special treatment. Since it looks like computin9 a program can
98n.rally be described 1n such a way, the framework ~dopted here
looks like it will 8110w • natural extension to the other
pro9r•••1n9 lan9u89... The ••jor change will be in how the
••qu.nce of •••ory stat•• that occurs 1n any computation wlll'be
.pecifled. Deflnln9 a computation will typically be much more
diffiCUlt.
10. Highlights for computational psychology
In this chapter we have provided relatively clear definitions
of a number of terms that are commonly used in computationaal
psychology. We will tenatlvely accept these definitions and
attempt to explicate and assess some of the psycholog leal,' claims
in which these terms occur in the next chapter. But we can note
here some important points that we get from our theory
immediately.
10.1. Three grades of program involvement
It is worth emphasizing again the three grades of program
involvement that have been pointed out already._ In a
computational theory we may use some program (e.g., a~t M-program
iT) to define a partial function (~1T) that is com~uted by a
system, we will call this the -first grade of pcoqram
involvement.- This requires interpreting the system under some f
R
such that in certain circumstances the system will always proceed
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from 80•• -initial stat.- (f (m» to the corresponding -final
R
st8te- (f (M~(m»). A theory that 1s committed only to this
a-I,
first grade of pro9ram involvement we will call a -first level
theory.-
The tr8nsltlon from an initial state to a final state may be
done 1n a number of steps, we may be able to show that the
transition 1. accomplished by executing some program with more
than one step. The specification of a program (with more than
one step) that 1s computed by the system under some f , then, is
R
the ·second grade of program involvement.-
A system that computes any program may do so either by being
-hardwired- to do so, or by using a representation of the program
to control its operation~ any program that can be computed one
way can be· computed the other way also. And we could have a
-hybrid- system t~at uses program using systems only to compute
some of the steps of the programs it computes. The specification
of a program used by a program system to control its operation is
the -third grade of program involvement.- A theory that is
committed to the existence of a program using 'system 1s a "third
level theory.-
Where.s the first two grades of program involvement use the
progra. to describe what the system does under some f , we ascend
R
to the third grade only when we are accepting a commitment to a
certain account of h2! the system computes the programs it
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compute.. The third grade of program involvement commits us to
the existence of some ·control mechanisms· that gcvern the
operation of the system according to a representation of the
prograa co.put.d~ Wa can distinguish these three grades of
program involve.ent regardless of whether the programs are
written in SPL or some other programming language.
10.2. Pormallty constraints
One constraint on computational descriptions of physical
system has been called the -formality constr~1nt· by Fodor
(1980). Computational processes are, he says, ·symbolic and
formal:- -They are symbolic because they are defined over
representations, and they are formal because they apply to
representations in virtue of (roughly) the syntax of the;
representations. W (p.64) If we use the word 'representation'
rather loo$ely so that it applies to any memory states i~ any set
f~[r(1T)l or in any n-tuple in any set f [M], then Fodor's claim
" I R
follows trivially from our definitions of program computation and
pr09ram"Use. If s is some state in a set f (M]f for example,
R
then our definition of program computation by'a physical system
guarant~es that s will influence the computational processes of
the system according to which symbol in M it corresponds to
rather than according to what it means. The state transitions
the systems makes in the execution of any program depend ~n which
memory states the system 1s in, not on what those memory states
refer to or represent. We can safely describe a computation in
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terms of what the memory states represent <as we did in A3.5, for
example), only if distinct memory states re~resent distinct
objects. And of course, the formality conl.traint applies in the
same way to both data languages and prograalming languaegsi in
either case, the operation of the system ill specified accord~ng
to which memory state Ci.e., which state of fR{M] or f 1T [fC1Jr)])
the system 1s 1n.
We could modify our theory of computation so that one memory
state would have different causal roles depending on what it
represented. We could have, for example, a programming language
with an ambiguous instruction, i, such that i could be properly
executed by performing either of two different state transitions,
and so f1rCi) could have either of two different causal roles in
a system using this language. But there would be no point to
giving such a description of a system in most cases. If :f~i)
has one causal role when the system 1s in state s and otherwise
has the other causal role, then the system is better described as
one that uses a language with two unambiguous instructions, i'
and i", such that fnrCi') is the state of being in fnrCi) and s,
and f~i") is the state of being in ~Ci) but not in s. It is
hard to see why a non-deterministic description would ever be
preferred 1f a deterministic one were available. But this sort
of indeterminacy is, in effect, what we would allow if we allowed
the causal roles of our representations to depend on semantic
properties of the representations, since then the state
transitions at respectlva points of the computation would not in
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general be completely determined by the system's formally defined
.ellory states.
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CHAPTER IV
PROGRAMS AND RULE GOVERNED BEHAVIOR
• ••• take Newton's law for
gravitation ••• it is kind of mathematical, and
we wonder how this can be a fundamental law.
What does the planet do? Does it look at the
sun, see how far away it is, and decide to
calculate on its internal adding machine the
inverse of the square of the distance, which
tells it how much to move? This 1s certainly
no explanation of the machln9ry of
gravitationl You might look further~ and
various people have tried to look further.
Newton was originally asked about his theory
- 'But it doesn't mean anything - it doesn't
tell us anything'. He said, • It tell's· you
how it moves. That should be enough. I have
told you how it moves, not why.' But people
are often unsatisfied without a mechanism ••• •
-- Richard Feynman
1. This chapter will consider whether there is evidence to
support claims to the effect that some human behavior 1s wrul e
governed- in something like the way that the behavior of~a
progr....d computer is -rule governed,· claims to the effect that
in cart.ln cases the behavior of an organism 1s the result of a
computational process that is governed by a program, a set of
internally represented rules or formulae of some programming
lan9uage. There have been many proposals that might be construed
1n this way. Von Neumann(1958) speculated that the brain uses a
higher level programming language (or, 1n his terms, a ·short
cod.-) of a peculiar kind, and this sort of claim has since
beco•• quite populer. J.Z. Young (1964) proposed that this
co.putational account was the appropriate one for
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neurophysiologists, and he has been followed in this by Arbib ~nd
others (see Szentagothal and Arblb, 1975). Similar accounts have
been adopted by psychologists. Motor learning theorists talk
about the programming of motor behavior (as in the papers in
Stelmach, 1978), and psycholinguists compare natural languages to
higher level programming languages which are compiled and then
executed (Fodor et al., 1974; Johnson-Laird, 1977). But we will
concentrate on the claim made by some linguists that linguistic
behavior is somehow governed by an internalized 9rammara This 1s
no doubt the claim that has received the most attention, and the
computer analogy has frequently been appealed to in the
controversy it has given rise to.
2. Our discussion will presuppose some understanding of
computation. All the necessary background was covered in some
detail in the last chapter, but we will briefly review the
leading ideas.
Despite the difficulties we may have in grasping or spelling
out the details of any particular computational description of a
physical system, ther. should not be anything mysterious about
c~mputatlon.l description 1n general. This is, after all, just a
certain way of describing the operation of physical systems, a
way that is of~.n quite clear and particularly useful. What we
call ·calculators- and -eomputers- are basically just physical
.yst••• which .re, by d••igft, conveniently described In this way
and useful for this r •••on. But actually, any physical system
can be given 80•• computational description or other. This can
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be done by speclfiylnq a (1-1) mapping f R (a -realization-
function) from physical states of the system into some set of
symbols, so that changes of physical state correspond to symbolic
transformations. When these changes in physical state are
regular and predictable, so are the associated symbolic
transformations. So, fOL example, sometimes we can specify a
mapping f R such that 1n some specifiable circumstances C'the
system will always, in virtue of physical laws that apply to the
system, go from one state 81 into another state Sf, where for
every such pair of states, the symbol fReSf) is a function F of
of the symbol fR(Si). This is the basic basic idea upon which
all comp~ational descriptions rest; we shall we shall call this
a -first level- computational description.
Since programs are 80 common in computational descriptions,
it is perhaps worthwhile to note that a program may be used in
providing even a first level description. Por example, if the
function P computed by a system (under some interpretation f R, in
some circumstances C) 1s quite complicated, we may find it useful
to provide an algorithm for coaputlng its values, and this
algorithm may be .xpr••••d 1n a programming 18nguage. A program
that yields a unique value for each different input define. a
(partial) function. So. progr••••y be used even in a first
level theory to apeclfy the (partial) function computed by the
system.
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Programs sometimes provide more than just a specification of
the function computed. A program typically expresses an
algorithm according to which the input symbols are transformed
into other symbols in a sequence of steps. The symbols that
result from the execution of every step in the procedure may-be
in the range of the interpretation f R, in which case the system
may compute the function specified by passing through each of the
intermediate states, it may execute each appropriate step in the
program by computing the function specified by that step. In
such a case we will say that the system £~ecutes or computes the
program; it computes the function specified by the program by
computing the program in this way. This is the ·second level- of
program involvement.
Programs may have even more of a role in a computational
theory than this. A physical system may compute a progr~m
because its computation of that program is governed by a
representation of' that program. We will call such a system a
·pro9ram using· system. In this -third level· of program
involvement, the appropriate steps of the program are executed
because a control mechanism brings it about that the
representation of the appropriate instruction (specified by a
·program realization· function f ) determines the change of state
at each point, the system uses the program to govern its
operation.
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As was pointed out in the last chapter, any program that can
be computed by a program using system can be computed directly by
a system that we would clearly not want to call a program using
system~ The Mars-Sun orbital system computes a program under
some interpretations of its states, for example. In the last
chapter we showed that it computes a program which computes
solutions to Newton's law of universal gravitation. But it is
clearly not a program usinq system. And electronic cir~uits can
be -hardwired- to compute even very complex programs directly,
without having control mechanisms to govern their operation
according to a representation of the program. Any p~ogram that
can be computed by any system can be computed. directly, or by a
program using system, ~ by a -hybrid- system that uses a program
to govern its computation of only certain steps of the program.
Notice that there is an important difference between first
and second level co.putational descriptions, en the one hand, and
third level computational descriptions, on the other. All three
grades involve giving a symbolic interpretation of the relevant
state. of the syst••• , but where•• the fl:st two grades of
program involvement us. the progr.. to describe how the symbols
are transformed or -manipulated,· we ascend to the third grade
only when we are a180 making a claim about how the specified
computations are carried out. The third grade commits us to the
existence of some mechanism that controls the computational
processes of the system according to a representation of the
program. Third level theories are those that maintain that the
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computation is carried out by a program using system, not by a
direct or hybrid system.
3. The primary aim of this paper is to explore the methodology
for confirming -third level- computational theories of human·
psychological processes. As was noted above, we will focus on a
particular theory that has received wide attention, viz.,. the
theory that language users employ an Winternalized- grammar when
they exercise their linguistic abilities. Do proponents of this
theory mean to suggest that the grammar is represented and
utilized by a program using system? As we will see, some of
their remarks suggest that they do, but we need to be careful
here becauae we are bringing distinctions to bear that are not
usually recognized.
The theory I want to consider has been most clearly·
formulated by Ho•• Chomsky. He says,
To know a language, I am assuming, is to be in a certain
mental state, which persists as a relatively stable
co.ponent of transitory mental states. What kind of
.ental stat.? I assume further that to be in such a
.ental state 1s to have a certain mental structure
consisting of • system of rules and principles that
generate and relate mental representations of v~rious
types. (1980b, p.S)
This -system of rule. and principles· is the grammar of the
lan9uage, so the following hypothesis is apparently being
proposed:
(H1) The grammar is -mentally represented- and used in
lan9u8ge processing.
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Chomsky urges that in proposing this view he is claiming that
language behavior is -rule-governed- behavior; in exercising our
linguistic abilities we are -following- the rules of the grammar
rather than merely conforming to them.(1980b, pp.13,54-55) The
evidence for this view is that it explains certain facts about
our language and that no better theory 1s available:
The evidence bearing on the hypothesis attributing rules
of grammar to the mind is that sample facts are'
explained on the assumption that the postulated r~les
are part of the AS [the Wattained state- of the language
learner] and are used in computations eventuating in
such behavior as judgements about form and meaning.
(1980b, p.54)
I know of no other account that even attempts to deal
with the fact that our judgements and behavior accord
with and are in part explained by certain rule systems
(or to be more accurate, are explained by theories that
attribute mental representations of rule systems) ••• The
critic's task 1s to show some fundamental flaw in
principle or defect in execution, or to ,provide a
different and pceferable account of how it is that what
speakers do Is 1n accordance with certain rules ,-- an
~ccount that does not attribute to them a system of
rule. (rule. which in fact appear to be beyond the level
of consciousnes.). (1980b, p.12)
t
In short, we need to propose the represented rule system to
explain certain facts about language processing_ Language
processing is distinguished in this respect from simpler
processes that presumably do not involve rules. Things like a
person's riding a bicycleC1969, pp.154-155), the fli9ht of a bird
(1975, pp.222-223), or the flight of a pigeon-controlled missile
(1980b, pp.10-ll) can presumably be explained in terms of
-reflexes- or other relatively simple mechanisms.
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There are three main points in this sort of position that
suggest that a -third level- theory is being proposed. First, it
is claimed that certain rules are represented. Second, these
rules are assumed to govern language processing; they are used
to -generate- mental representations that are used in language
understanding, for example. And finally, this sort of system, a
system that uses represented rules, is distInguished from simpler
systems that do not use them. These three points are p~eclsely
what a third level theory would be committed t~. It would have a
commitment to represented rules or instructions which control the
computation. And whereas virtually any system can be given a
·second level- computational description according to which
representations are transformed, a third level computational
description according to which the system computes a nontrivial
program is true only of certain ~uite complex systems. So let's
make a third level construal of these claims explicit.
The grammar itself 1s not a language processing algorithm,
of course. We could assume only that the grammar is used in the
course of executin9 such an algorithm. The claim that the
grammar governs language processing, then, might be construed as
entailing the following sort of hypothesis with respect to each
lin9uistic ability,
(R~) Language understanding involves the computation of
some program P, a program that includes the rules of the
grammar, G, which are executed to generate the mental
representations needed for the computation.
And so then (H1), the claim that the grammar 1s -mentally
l~
represented- and used, would be construed as committing us to the
hypothesis,
(83) In human language understanding, the computation
of P is carried out by a program using system whose
operation is controlled by a representation of P and
hence also of G.
This proposal is clearly a third level theory.
I will argue that this third level construal o~ CHI) is
untenable. But it is important to keep in mind that we will
attempt to consider only the issues relevant to this explication
of the linguists' claim. One might challenge both (HI) and (83)
on the ground that there is another theory that does not presume
that the grammar is involved in the linguistic processes at all;
one might argue, for example, that speakers use some sort· of
-heuristics· in language understanding, or that they compute a
recognition algorithm derivable from a lexlcal-interpreti~e
grammar. (Cf., e~9., Fodor et al., 1974, ch.6, and Kaplan and
Bresnan, in press.) All of these theories can be construed as
making different second level claims about what procedures are
computed in language understanding, and with respect to each of
them we could ask whether there is evidence that the postulated
procedure 1s represented and 1n control of the computation. But
(HI) 1s the best candidate for such consideration even if it 1s
not the best theory on ~.pirical grounds because, in the first
plece, the issues 1n every case will be analogous to those
encountered in this attempt to explicate (Hl), and in the second
place, only discussions of (R1) have given any particular
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attention to those issues that are relevant to this project.
Thus, although a similar consideration could be given to any of
the competing theories, an attempt has been made here to avoid
getting tangled in any problems that are not essential to making
a few restricted points about third level and other computational
explications of (R1), we will not consider whether (H1) should
be rejected in favor of one of the competing views.
In i4 it is argued that evidence typically advanced in
support of (H1) does not support (83). In 15 other evidence is
considered which is, I think, offerred specifically in support of
(83) but which fails to provide any substantial support. And 1n
16 I note that there are good reasons for supposing that Chomsky
and other linguists have not intended (HI) to be construed as
(83), and other possible construals of (HI) are briefly'
considered.
4. In this sec~ion it will be argued that the evidence that
linguists offer in support of (81) does not support (83). The
evidence for (Hl) comes from three related sources in linguistic
theory:
(1) the explanation of language comprehension and other
lin9uistlc abilities;
(2) evidence for formal properties of 9ra~matical
rules, and
(3) the explanation of language acquistion.
Bach of the•• sorts of evidence will be considered 1n turn with
regard to whether it provides substantial support for (93).
4.1. Chomsky gives some examples of the sort of evidence that
is used to support (H1) in a recent paper (Chomsky, 1980b).
Linguists discover some regular relation between declarative
sentences and the corresponding interrogatives, or some
constraints on an8phoric relations between a reciprocal
expression and its antecedent, and so they propose that
.
sOlDe general principle of ... d:~~uage applies to permit the
proper choice of ant6~~~ent -- not an entirely trivial
matter •••Similarly, some general principle of language
determines which phrases can be questioned. (p.4)
The proposed set of rules and prhnciples, the grammar, is assumed
to be ·one basic element in what is loosely called 'knowledge of
lanquage'.- Chomsky says,
I am assuming grammatical competence to be a system of
rules that generate and relate certain mental
representations, including, in particular,
representations of form and meaning, the exact character
of which is to be discovered, though a fair amount is
known about them. These rules, furthermore, operate 1n
accordance with certain general principles. I have
informally discussed rules of grammar that, for 'example,
move a question-word to the front of a sentence.or
associate an antecedent wi th an anaphor i.e expression
••,ch as ~.ach other. w ••• the movement rule 1s governed by
a principle of -locality· -- elements of mental
representations can't be moved -too far- -- and the
choice of antecedent is governed by a principle of
·opacity· -- variable-like elements can't be free in
certain opaque domains, in a sense specific to the
language faculty. (p.lOl
To explain linguistic abilities, such as the ability to
under_tand lan9uag8, we assume that the grammar 1s used. This
explains why the speaker of the language respects the
generalizations captured by the grammar in his exercise of these
abilities. That is, this explains why the speaker's performance
r ••pects the grammar insofar as it does; presumably other
performance factors will be required to explain why the speaker's
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perform.nee does not always respect the grammar. In any case, we
have an argument t~r ~upposln9 that the grammar is mentally
repre••nted and used in language processing, as (Hi) claims.
,
Granting that this is one of the basic forms of argument for
(H1), our question 18 whether it has any plausibility as an
argument for (83). If this argument does provide support for
such • co."put8t,ional account, then we should be able to render 1t
in a form that 1s explicit about its computational commitments.
So f to tJeg"in. wi th, there is perhaps a tenable argument here ~o
, the effect that 9ramm.tical rules are computed in language
understanding, that the grammar G 1s somehow -embedded- in
whatever procedure is computed. One mi9ht argue as follows: The
only Pl~u81ble explanation of how a person understands a sentence
1s that he formulate. the various representations of the .sentence
that are generated by the grammar, the representations over which
the non-generative rule. and principles are defined. The most
plausible account of this process 1s that the grammar. itself 1s
••played 1n the computation, its rules being -followed- or
- executed- to ,enerate the needed representatl,ons at the
epproprlate points of the computation and to apply the other
appropriate rule. and principles to the repre.e'ltations so
generated'. RoUCJhlY, the proposal 18 that the speaker cannot
underst8nd the ••ntence unl••• he recognizes its words and
syntax, and he c.nnot recoqnlze its words and syntax unless he
rec:otinlz•• l ts phonetic structure, and 80 on. An
an_ly.i.-by~.ynth ••i. algorithm, examples of which will be
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mentioned below, 1s a procedure of this kind, though it 1s
,
perhaps only a crude first guesfJ at wh/jt might be CjC';1ng on.
There may be other procedures that make much more ~fficlent use
of the grammatical rules. The argument that some such procedure
1s comput"d, though, is jUSf~ that it 1s plausib1e that a
procedure that has G embedded in it could presumably be one whose
computation would respect the generalizations captured by the
grammar. So this suppo~ltlon about the procedures co~puted could
explain why many diverse aspects of the sp~aker's language
processing accord with the grammar -- the procedures computed
actually involve the execution or application of grammatical
rules. '
This 13 afa argUllf-tnt for (82), though, and not an argument
for (83). That is, 'this argument supports the propos8fj view
about what' program 1s computed in language understanding, but it
doe. not s'upport 14ny particular:" view about what mecllanisms are
responsible for this computation. Since any computab~e proqram
can be ~o.put.~ by a -direct- or -hardwired- system, or by a
-hybrid- .yste., or by a ·program using- system, the attribution
of a~\y of tl'j••• lDech8ni ••.8 would suffice to 82t.plain why ttl.
syet•• co_put•• the proqr8. it compute., any of these
."tplanat'.ons can account for -how it 111 that what th.J tJpeakers do
is in aecordence with certain rule., or 1s described by these
rul••• • TttUS ,furthar Gvldence 1,. needed to support any
particular claim ~bout which sort of mechanism ia, in fact,
r ••ponslble for the computation. So even if we assume that this
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argument for (82) is a good one, the question is: What evidence
supports the further claim that the program P and hence also the
9ra~mar G are mentally represented and controlling the
computation? I am unable to see any grounds in the sort of
argument presented here for the claim that the rules of grammar
are not only computed to generate the needed representations, but
also repre.ented and followed in langllage processing • Although
it is not clear that he would accept our account of computation,
I think that exactly the right poin.t is ~nade for us by John
Searle(1980) 1n the following passage:
The claim that the agent 1s hcting on rules involves
~or. than simply the claim,that the rules describe his
behavior and predict future behavior~ Additional
evidence 1s required to show that they are rules the
agent is actually following, and not mere hypotheses or
generalizations that correctly describe his behavior;
there must be some independent reason for supposing that
the rules aro functioning causally. (p.37)
This 1s pre~isely the rlgh't poir.lt to be made about the d 1fferenee
between (82) and (83): (82) asserts only that the language
processing conforms to the rlll'Js of the grammar, while (H3)
asserts that the processing conforms to the rules bec~u8e the
rules are r.pr.s.nt.~ and tollow.d.l
If Chomsky !.! propo~.j.n9 (H 3), then we hay·e done wha t he says
the critic must do: -to show so•• fundamental flaw in principle
or defect in execution, or to provide a different and preferable
~----~-------~------
1. I suspect that Searle would want to criticize not only the
third-level theory that the rules are represented and used but
also the second-level theory that they are computed. Rowever, in
this chapter W8 .1E'8 considering, only the former claim. An
examin.tlon of the methodology for co~flrm1n9 second-level
theories 11ke (82) will have to be left to another paper.
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account of how it 1s that what the speakers do in in accordance
with certain rules -~ an account which does not attribute to them
a syste. of rules •• h-C1980b, P.12) The fundamental flaw 1n
principle is the failure to recognize that additional evidence is
ne.ded to support· the claim that the rulea are not only computed
but a180 represented and us.d. The alternative account that does
not attribute represented rUles 1. the theory that the rules are
computed -directly· or by a -hybrid- system, by some system that
1. not a pro9ra. using syst•• , and we have seen in the last
chapter that there will always be possible systems of this sort.
• This alternative may, in fact, be preferable in the absence of
any evidence against it, since direct, hardwired computation 1s
typically faster and more efficient than computation on a program
using system. If, on the other hand, Chomsky and other linguists
do not mean to propose (83), then the failure to provide the
needed evidence is not in the least surprising.
4.2. Another line of argument for (81) that we ought to
consider has been pointed out by Podor, Bever and Garrett (1974)
and other.. They polnt out that lln9uists often seem to be
Ilak.lng cl.ims about formal properti.s of the rules of the
9~....r, and only repre.entations have formal properti.s. If
hypoth•••• about formal properties of the rules are needed to
explain certain data, this surely 8upports the view that the
rule. are repre..nted. So we ought to consider whether there is
any such evidence relevant to the formal properties of the rUles,
and if there is, whether that evidence supports (H3).
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Fodor, Bever ~nd Garrett(1974) point out this line of
arqument in a discussion of how linguistic universals ought to be
accounted for:
••• there are linguistic universals which serve precisely
to constrain the form in which information is
represented in grammars (l.e., the form of grammatical
rUles). The question is: If the universals do not also
constrain the form in which linguistic information is
represented in a sentence-processing system, how is
their ~xist.nce to be explained? Surely if universals
are true of anything, it must be of some psychologically
real representation of the language. But what·could
such a representation be if it is not part of a sentence
encoding-decoding system? (pp.369-370)
I think that Fodor et ale have fallen prey to a cORfuslon here
about the status of linguistic universals which are stated as
constraints on the form of grammatical rules. In fact, most
linguistic universals do ~ involve any commitment to rules of a
certain form, rather, they involve formally specifiable
constraints on the applicability or operation of the rules.
Thus, we can think of the. as generalizations that are true of
the operations performed on the linguistic structures posited by
the theory. This di8tinction is cru~ial to the present point,
but it Is no surprise that it 1s occasionally overlooked in the
linguistic literature where it 18 usually insignificant.
Chomsky makes the relevant point in the following passage
frOID ·Conditions on TransforrnatlonsW (1973). He says,
For heuristic purposes we may distinguish two aspects of
universal grammar: (a) conditions on form, and (b)
conditions on function -- that is, <a' conditions on
syste•• that qualify as grammars, and (b) conditions on
the way the rules of the grammar apply to generate
structural descriptions. (p.232)
It 1s the ·conditions on form- that rodor et a~~ app~rently have
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1n mind, but Chomsky rightly emphasizes that the distinction
between these and ·conditions on function- is made only -for
heuristic purposes:-
The distinction is one of convenience, not principle, in
the sense that we might choose to deal with particular
phenomena under one or the other category of condit~ons.
(p.232)
This point is really quite clear. Suppose that we have one set
of rules, call them -root transformations,· which must apply
after another set of rules called ·cyclic transformations.- If it
is a universal property of grammars of all possible human
languages that th.re be two such sets of rules whose application
must be ordered in this way, we could capture this fact by
beginning all and only the cyclic transformations with the dummy
symbol 'C' and proposing:
(1) All root transformations must apply after rules
beginning with ·C'.
To capture the universal in this way we do need to require that
certain rules have a certain form (viz., that the cyclic rules
begin with 'e'), but there is, of course, no need to express the
universal in this way. Instead, we could just distinguish root
transformations fro. cyclic transformations on the basis of their
operation and s.y,
(2) Root transform.tiona apply after cyclic
transformations.
This latter claim do•• not commit us to rule. having any
particular form, ·but only to a constraint on the order in which
certain operations can be applied to linguistic representations.
~
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Perhaps this point should be illustrated with a more likely
example. Let's consider one of Chomsky's ~xamples of a
·condition on form: w
••• consider the ~efinltion of a transformation as a
structure-dependent mapping of phrase markers into
phrase markers that is independent of the grammatical
relations or meanings expressed in these grammatical
relations. This definition makes certain operations
available as potential transformations, excluding
others ••• By requiring that all transformations be
structure-dependent in this specific sense, we limit the
class of possible grammars, excluding many ima91nable
systems. (1973, p.233)
Ironically, this universal that is offerred as a ·condition on
form- has here been expressed informally as a ·condition on
function;· grammatical operations apply to linguistic
representations having a certain structure, not only to
representations having a certain meaning or a certain number of
words, for example. In fact, Chomsky never does express this
formally as a ·condition on form,· but his discussion of it
indicates that what he has in mind is that we will capture the
structur.-d.pende~ceof the rules by expressing each one in such
a way a. to indicate its dependence on structureo He mentions
the passive transformation, for example, any of the various
typical ways of writing this rule will indicate that it applies
to phrase markers with a certain structure, as in,
(3) NP1, Aux, Vx, NP2 .) NP2, Aux, 8E, by + NP1.
In this ca•• , the form of the rule (under its standard
interpretation) indicates to the linguist when it can apply and
what it does, for example, the symbols to the left of the arrow
indicate that the rule applies to strings that can be factored
into four successive substrings, the first and last of which are
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noun phrases, the second an auxiliary, and the third a verb of a
particular category. It 15, no doubt, convenient to express our
grammatical rules in some such form, but the structure-dependence
of the grammatical operations does not require us to do so. The
structure-dependence of the rules is, in fact, entirely neutral
with regard to the formal properties of the rules.
4.3. It 1s at least not obvious that there are any supportable
claims that really commit us to rules of a certain form, though
there is clearly a general pressure in linguistics to constrain
the formal properties of rules. This pressure comes with the
acceptance of a certain approach to what Chomsky has called -the
central problem of linguistic theory,· the problem of explaining
how a child can master a language given only limited and.
degenerate evidence. Chomsky has proposed that the way to solve
this problem is to assume that language acquisition involves
testing hypotheses; the child selects the grammar of his
language from the class of possible grammars on the basis of
linguistic evidence:
The child 1s presented with data, and" he must inspect
hypotheses (grammars) of a f:airly restricted class to
determine compatibility with this data. Raving selected
a grammar of the predetermined class, he will then have
a co••and of the language generated by this grammar.
(Cho.sky, 1972, p.159)
This proposal assume., then, that thet possible grammars
considered 1n this selection process!!! represented, and to make
the l •• rnlng task managable it is essential that the set of
po.sible grammars that need consideration be severely
constrained. Thus Chomsky says, -Reduction of the class of
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possible grammars is the major goal of linguistic theory.wC1977,
p.125) If the grammars are represented, then the grammatical
rules must have some formal properties or other, and so there is
a pressure to discover what they are.
Since the problem is to constrain the class of possible
grammars that need to be considered by the language learner,
linguists have adopted the reasonable strategy of assuming that
whenever we discover that grammars of natural lan9u8ges ~ be
constrained in a certain way, we should assume that they!!!
constrained in that way. This is where linguistic universals
have an important role to play. But we should distinguish here
the various kinds of constraints that would be relevant to this
·central problem of linguistic theory.-
We would like, first, constraints on what Culicover et
al. (1977, p.l) call -the expressive power of the descript'ive
devices used in writin9 9rammars.- That is, we would like to
. ,
constrain the set of languages that any rules of grammar could
generate. Notice that constraints of this sort are not
constraints on the form of the rules, but constraints on what
they can do, constraints on their formal generative power. We
would also like to impose ·oonstraints on functioning· that have
the effect of limiting the applicability of certain kinds of
rules (or of certain particular rules). Let's follow Chomsky and
continue to call constraints of this second kind ·constraints on
functionin9.- As Chomsky and others have pointed out, these
con.tralnts are potentially just as valuable as constraints on
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generative power since they will serve to limit the class of
grammars that need to be considered given some body of evidence;
that is, they will allow the language learner ti, rule out
grammars that, with the constraints on functioning, cannot
accomodate the lin9uistic evidence. And finally, a third class
of constraints that we would like to have 1s a class of
constraints on the formal properties of the represented
grammatical rUles; these are properly called ·constraints on
form.- If the rules!!! represented, they must have formal
properties, and we would like to discover what they are. It is
this last set of constraints that concern us here.
Row should the formal properties of the represented rules be
constrained? This question has not received proper attention
because it is not carefully distinguished from questions about
the other kinds of constraints. Even the most basic formal
properties r •••in essentially uninvestigated. But this is not
too surprising. Por one thing, the general pressure to constrain
the cla•• of possible grammars that the child needs tp consider
provide. the linguist with a natural strategy with respect to the
oth~~ two kinds of constraints, viz., that whenever we can
constrain the class of grammars 1n a certain way, we should. But
the probl.. 18 more difficult in the case of constraints on the
for••l properties of the rules.
w. can suppa.. that no two grammars differ only in formal
f- propertie., that there are no two formally distinct grammars that
I 9 8 n.rate exactly the •••• linguistic structures in exactly the
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sam. way. We can impose this constraint without losing
explanatory power, so we will. Thus we assume that we are
looking for a system that has at most one way of expressing any
particular rule. But what can we say about the formal properties
of the rules? It was noted above that certain linguistic
universals could be captured by constraining the form of the
rules in certain ways (given some standard interpretation of the
formalisa). Thus, if the only quantifiers in the system are 'Vx'
•
and '3x·, and we think that transfor~ational rules do not need
quantifiers, the we can propose that no rules contain 'Vx l or
13x'. But clearly the point of the constraint is to rule out ~
symbol that is interpreted as a quantifier; that is, the
constraint is not really a formal constraint at all. And we
\
could assume that the rules contain symbols like 'NP', IVP' and
so on, but as we noted above, the point of this assumption is to
rule out operations that are not structure dependent.
In all of these cases we have constraints that will bear on
what is expressed in the formalism of the represented rules, but
we have no indication as to the properties of the formalism
it.elf. Ho on. has confronted even the most basic questions.
Why 8hould we assume even that the representations of the rules
are co.plex (l.e., built up from pri~itive elements)? Halle and
Key••r(1971, p.,8) propos. that, all other thin98 beln9 equal, we
should prefer rul•• contalnln9 the least number of symbols. So
why couldn't we, for ....pl., expr••• each rule with a decimal
nUBeral (ae we alght express the, instructions of a simple machine
1_n9Qage for a computer)? Perhaps one could give reasons for
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thinking that this would not do, but the \ingUistie literature
does not address this sort of question. Rather, (as 1n Halle and
Keyser, 1971, pp.4-S) some system of notation that is perspicuous
1s just adopted, and then constraints on generative power and on
functioning are sometimes expressed in this notation under its
standard interpretation.
In sum, the hypothesis testing theory of language ..
acquisition has not, I think, provided any particular formal
constraints on grammatical rules. But the fact that this
approach presupposes that the grammar is represented itself gives
support to (H1), unless there are other plausible ways of
handling the central problem of linguistic theory. The
hypothesis testing model has, in fact, been criticised (~ee,
e.g., Sraine, 1971), and alternative theories have been proposed.
In recent work Chomsky has modified his account. H~ say~ in a
recent paper,
I will assume that universal 9rammar provides a highly
restricted system of ·core grammar,· which represents in
effect the ·unmarked case.- Pixing the param_ters of
core grammar and adding more marked constructions that
make use of richer descriptive resource., the
language-learner develops a full gra.mar representing
grammatical competence. (1980c, p.3)
It 1s not quite so obvious that this sort of proposal requires
that either the core gra.mar or the acquired grammar be
represented, but such repre.entation is apparently still assumed.
Of course, this new proposal is not completely worked out, and it
fac•• 80me difficult problems. (See, 8.9., Pinker, in press.)
But there 1s little doubt that Chomsky's basic insight is
correct: to account for language learnin9 we must postulate a
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-rich internal structure;- we must assume that the language
learner comes to the learning situation already well equipped so
that he needs only very limited linguistic experience to master
the lan9uage spoken in his community. The search for linguistic
universals is clearly relevant to discovering what the language
learner might bring to the learning situation, and hence relevant
to any such theory of language acquisition, whether the 9rammar
1s represented or not.
Now we want to consider whether the explanation of language
acquisition provides any grounds for (H3), so again let's
consider the mentioned views with explicit attention to their
computational commitments. Suppose that language acquisition
does involve representing grammars and testing them against the
evidence. This 1s apparently a second level claim about~what
sort of computation goes on in the process of language learning.
But sined selecting the right grammar in this process is an
essential part of what gives the language learner mastery of the
language generated by the grammar, it 1s plausible that this
gra.mar is used in the exercise of linguistic abilities as (H3)
claims. That is, if we assume that the appropriate grammatical
rules are computed in the course of language understanding
-because the language learner has .elected the right grammar, then
(B3) ..... like the best account. But the hypothesis test in9
theory of lanquaqe acquisition has serious problems, and
alternative theories have been proposed, as was noted above. So
we need to con8ider whether these altern.tives a180 give support
1M
to (83).
The proposed alternatives are like the hypothesis testing
theory in assuming that the language learner comes to the
learnin9 situation specifically equipped to learn a language with
a certain special, intricate structure, i.e., a language with the
structure that 1s characteristic of human languages. However, as
was observed above, it is not at all obvious that these.
alternatives require that we assume that the grammar 1s mentally
represented. Similarly, i~ appears that they do not support
(83). The parameter-setting proposal is, I think, particularly
amenable to the view that the grammar is not represented5 We
might assume, f~r example, that there is a core grammar which is
not represented and 1n control of the processing but ess~ntlally
·wired in- and that only certain adjustments and .additions need
to be made in order to yield a full linguistic competenc~.
The view that the core grammar might be built into the
syste. that executes linguistic procedures directly comports
well, I think, with Jerry rodor's proposal that language
recognition processes and low level sensory processes are
That is, they are fast -bottom-to~top· processes
that ••ke use of only a restricted domain of information. These
•
modular processes all develop in characteristic ways in the
course of nor••l human development, and each seems to be
8ub••rved by particular neural structures. Such processes are
~--~----------~~--~
2. Jerry rodor presented this thesis in a series of lectures
91ven at MIT in the fall of 1980.
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perhaps the ones in which computation is most plausibly carried
out directly, without the mediation of a control mechanism that
must access a representation of the procedure to be executed.
5. So far it has been argued that evidence typically offerred
in support of (HI) does not support (H3): (83) 1s not needed to
explain the fact that the generalizations captured by the grammar
are respected in the exercise of our linguistic abilities,
neither is it supported by various claims that are apparently
about form&l properties of grammatical rules, and it is not
required for the explanation of language acquisition. In this
section other sorts of evidence for (83) will be considered,
evidence that has apparently been offerred specifically in
support of hypotheses like (83). Such hypotheses have been
discussed primarily in the literature concerned with speech
reCo9nition models.
5.1. As has been emphasized already, to support (H3) we must
do .ore than just support a claim like (82) about what procedure
1.8 co_put.d, since any procedure can be computed 1n any number of
w\,'Y. that do not require any representatiofl of· the procsdure. It
18 not obvious what sorts of evidence would support the
additional claim of any third level theory. Given any account of
what program is computed, what evidence would support the
additional claim that this computation 1s controlled by a
repr••entation of the program? If we can find any good method
for confirming third level theQries, then it will be of interest
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to eonsidef whether that method proyides any support for (83).
It would not be expected that there would be well developed
methods for confirming third laval theories unless the claims of
third level theories were at l~ast distinguished from those of
second level theorles~ So perhaps it 1s worthwhile to digress
heL. to consider what oth~r8 have said about the distinction
between (82) and (83), or about the distinction betw~en second
and third level theories in general. The remarkable thing is
that almost nothing has been said about it. Only recently have
some psychologists discussed some closely related issues. Por
example, Zenon Pylyshyn says 1n a recent paper,
By providing a principled boundary between the
·software- and the -hardware", or between functt-ons that
must be explained .entally (i.e., computationally), and
those that can only be explained biologically, one can
factor the explanation into the fixed biological
components and the more variable symbolic or
rUle-governed components. (1980, p.127)
But this passage 18 misleading in several respects which should
be .entioned, if only briefly. First, it apparently presupposes
that only -software- (l.e., -third lev.l,· program) operations
are 8U8ceptlble to co.putatlonal explanation, whereas, 1n fact,
computational account. of direct or hardwired systems have been
around loft98r than progr•• using .yst••• and their software have.
If we want to explain the operation of a complex network of logic
circuits, for exa.ple, W8 might well want to us•• computational
account. An electronic .CQount would, in many cases, be
,xa••dlngly and unnec•••arlly complex. The second, related point
to be '.ada about PylY8hyn
'
• remark is that the attribution of any
j
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mechanism to explain a system's computation, whether ·software-
1s used or not, involves some commitments about how that
compctation comes to be realized in the hardware, whether the
hardware 1s biological, electronic, or whatever. The success of'
any computational account in psychology ultimately requires a
biological explanation. And, in the third place, the presumption
that all -hardwired- biological systems are wfixed w and
unchanging certainly needs to be defended. At first blush, this
view seems quite implausible -- surely our biological -hardware-
changes quite a lot, and so it seems likely that any direct
computational processing it is responsible for may I .so change
and develop over time.
I have similar qualms about Pylyshyn's claim that -the
architecture-algorithm distinction is central to the project of
us1n9 computational models as part of an explanation of cognitive
phenomena.- (1980, p.126) Since algorithms can be computed
, ,
directly, simply In virtue of the warchitecture- of the system,
the distinction he must have in mind is, I think, more
appropriately named the Wdirect-program-using- distinction. And
it should be noted that although there are cle~r cases, this
distinction 18 not really quite distinct. It 1s blurred by
-hybrid- systems, and, more seriously, by the difficulties of
specifying 1n any precise and principled way what ought to count
as a ·control mechanis.- of a progam using system. (See the last
chapter for a more thorough discussion of these issues.)
Nevertheless, the direct-program-using distinction!! crucially
impOrtant for third level theories, and Pylyshyn is certainly
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aware of this. He 1s one of the few psychologists who have given
it any attention.
The reason that this distinction has been neglected is
perhaps suggested by the following passage by Marvin Minsky,
It is generally recognized that the greatest advances 1n
modern computers came through the notion that programs
could be kept in the same memory with -o6ta-, and that
programs could operate on other programs, or on.
the••elves, as though they were data. It 1s perhaps not
so widely understood that one can obtain the same
theoretical (though not practical) power in machines
whose top level programs cannot be so modifled ••• (1967,
p.201n)
So our fundamental point about the equivalence of various sorts
of systems might have been overlooked partly because this latter
point 1s not widely recognized, and perhaps also because of an
implicit faith in the assumption that the considerations that so
overwhelmingly favor ·stored program· systems in so many of our
engineering projects will also apply to other quite different
systems. That is, it is typically very much more practical to
build a progra.m~ble computer to execute our programs than it is
to build a hardwired computer to execute them. Programmable
systems are much more flexible, more ·plastic.- So perhaps we
shOUld assume that the brain also has program using systems
rather than hardwired syst••s. This point deserves careful
consideration, W8 will return to it 1n 15.5., below. Let's
begin by considering so•• other ideas.
5.2. Productivity
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The theory that represented rules must be part of any
adequate model of speech recognition has dominated the field for
I
some time. In a well-known paper published in 1962, Halle and
Stevens consider the possibility that phonetic representations of
acoustic input could be provided by a procedure which compares
segments of an input s1gnal with the entries of a phonetic
-dictionary.- As they point out, this approach looks hopeless:
The size of the dictionary in such an analyzer" increases
very rapidly with the number of admissable outputs,
since a given phoneme sequence can give rise to a large
number of distinct acoustic outputs. In a device whose
capabilities would even remotely approach those of a
normal human listener, the size of the dictionary would,
therefore, be so large as to rule out this approach.
(1962, p.156)
They suggest that the way to avoid this problem is with some form
of an -analysis-by-synthesis· procedure which analyzes the input
by comparing it to synthesized rather than stored
representations. But then they immediately and without argument
make the assumption that the rules governing such synthesis must
be stored in memory the way the dictionary would need to be:
The need for a large dictionary can be overcome if the
principles of construction of the dictionary entries are
known. It is then possible to storo in the ·permanent
memory- of the analyzer only the rules for speech
production ••• In this model the dictionary is replaced
by generative rules which can synthesize signals •••
It seems to us that an automatic speech recognition
scheme capable of processing any but the most trivial
classes of utterances must incorporate all of the
feature. discussed above -- the input must be matched
against a comparison signal; a set of generative rules
must ije stored within the machine; preliminary analysis
must bG performed; and a strategy must be included to
control the order in which the internal comparison
signals are to be generated. (1962, p.lS')
It 1s really surprising how blithely the assumption of
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represented, stored rules enters this discussion and establishes
itself~ Perhaps the authors see an objection to all but the
stored-program models that they have just failed to mention, but
it is more likely that the alternatives just did not occur to
them. No objection to the view that the rules for synthesiz~ng
the linguistic structures are computed but not represented
sU9gests itself •
5.3. Multiple access
Zenon Pylyshyn(1980) has suggested three criteria for
deciding whether a computational process is -governed by
representations and rules.- He says that we should describe a
process as governed by representations and rules if it is, among
other things,
(a) -functionally transparent,·
(b) -arbitrary with respect to natural laws,· or
(e) -in~ormationallyplastic.- (p.120)
We will consider each of these criteria in turn.
Pylyshyn says that -the transparency condition reflects the
multiple availability of rules 90verning relations among
representational states:-
Wherever quite different processes appear to use the
same set of rules, we have t;ima facie reason for
believing that there is a s ngle explicit representation
of the rUles, or at least a common subprocess, rather
than independent identical mUltiple processps. The case
can be made even stronger, however, if it is found that
whenever the rules appear to change in the context of
one process, tfie other processes also appear to change
in a predictable way ••• These cases argue even more
strongly that the system could not simply be behaving as
it it used rules, but must in fact have access to a
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symbolic encoding of the rules. (p.121)
Ironically, this passage indicate precisely the point that
defeats the view that -multiple access~ provides some reason to
suppose that the rules ~re represented or encoded and used.
Pylyshyn is exactly right to point out that in such a case w~
have reason to suppose that there is eitrier a single
representation of the rules ·or at least a common subprocess.-
The problem 1s that he does not explain why the former of these
two possibilities should be preferred. Wherever the control
mechanism of a program using system transfers control to a
·single representation of the rules,· a direct or hybrid system
could execute the rules automatically using a ·common
subprocess.- This point is similar to the point that both program
using systems and direct systems can compute programs that have
-loops;· there is no program that one of these kinds of systems
can compute that the other cannot. When there 1s -multiple
access· it can be explained by assuming either a single
represented program or else by assuming a single subprocess. So
why does such a case provide any reason at all for supposing the
rules to be represented? ·Punctional transparency· provides no
ground for a third level theory because of the fundamental
equivalence of these various kinds of systems.
5.4. -Nonlawlik.- processes
The second case suggested by Pylyshyn in which we would have
r.ason to suppose that a processs might be rule governed is that
1n which the state transitions or input-output relations of the
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process do not ·instantiate a natural law.- He says,
For example, there can be no nomological law relating
f
what someone says to you and what you will do, since the
latter depends on such things as what you believe, what
inferences you draw, what your goals are ••• and, perhaps
even more more imt~rtant, how you perceive the
event ••• Systematic but nonlawlike relations among
functional states are generally attributed to the
operation of rule! rather than natural laws. (p.121)
It should be clear that the proper objection to this view is that
it mistakenly supposes that the use of represented rules can
bring about state transitions or input-output relations that
other mechanisms cannot bring about. The fundamental equivalence
of 'direct and program using systems has been neglected; any
input-output relation that is the result of computation by a
program using system could also be the result of computation by a
direct or hybrid system. This much is clear regardless of what
is made of the idea that some input-output relations are
-nonlawllke· or ·analog.·
5.5. -Informational pla~;ticity·
Th,e third of Pylyshyn··s suggestions is that if a process is
very ·plastic,· then it 1s probably rUle-governed. He says,
The informal notio,n of informational ,plastic i ty re fers
to the property of a system in virtue of which certain
aspects of its behavior can be systematically altered by
information, and h~ence by how the organism encodes
stimuli or interpre~s events5 We argued that the
explanation of such behavior should appeal to rules and
representations. (p.127)
Once again, it seems to me that what Pylyshyn is calling
·plasticity,· this malleability of the computational process,
does not by itself provide nny indication that there are
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represented rules governing the computation. Consider some
hardwired system, like a simple electronic calculator. The
operat~on of this system might seem very ·plastic· in that its
operation can be influenced in very short order simply by
pressing various buttonso This is not because the calculator is
a program using system, but simply because it is a system whose
operation depends on what numbers, what data, is represented in
its· memory registers. One could imagine more complicated
hardwired systems in which the relations between what is
represented in memory and what 1s computed are mqre subtle. In
these cases the plasticity does derive from the variability of
the representations, but these are not representations that
govern the computation in the way that a program governs a
program using system. So plasticity does not generally support
any third level claim to the effect that any process is governed
by represented rUles.
Suppose, then, that there were some creature who could learn
a human language simply by looking at a transformational grammar
of the language for a few minutes.3 This ·plasticity· in the
creature's linguistic abilities would certainly cast doubt on the
view that the creature was directly computing hardwired
procedures with the grammar embedded in them in his use of the
language. The reason is clear: it is not plausible that the
direct system that computed the grammar could be 'built in such a
short time. So we would reject this direct computation theory in
3. This example was suggested to me by Noam Chomsky (personal
communication).
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favor of the view that the gra.mar 1s somehow represented 1n the
creature and that this representation influences the computations
carried out in the exercise of the creature's linguistic
abilities. But this account is, so far at least, entirely
neutral with regard to the question of whether the grammar is
itself executed or whether it 1s just -data 8 that influences the
computation of programs that are computed by the system. The
plasticity of the process doe. not distln9u1sh these two
alternatives, though of course other considerations might do so.
Plasticity with respect to certain input, then, does support
the view that the input is represented and somehow influencing
the system, even if it does not itself support a third level
theory about the processing involved. So plasticity is certainly
of interest when we are developing a computationa.l account of a
system. Unfortuantel y, i t is not found in the sorts 0 f human
language processin9 that the grammar might be responsible for, at
least as far as I know. The 3cquisitlon of linguistic competence
in humans takes more than a few minutes. We can learn a word in
a few minute. or less, but this is not the acquisiton of
information that anyone assumes to be represented in the grammar
of the language.
5.6. Neurophysiology
It 18 perhaps possible, at least in principle, that
neurophysiological evidence could support a third level theory.
No such evidence has been found, however. The neurophysiologist
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David Rubel says in a recent paper,
The brain does not depend on anything like a linear
sequential program; this is at least so for all the
'parts about which something is known. It is more like
the circuit of a radio or television set, or perhaps
hundreds or thousands of such circuits in series or
parallel, richly cross-linked. The brain seems to rely
on a strategy of relatively hard-wired circuit
complexity with elements working at low speeds •• & (1979,
p.46)
But the distinction between hardwired and program using systems
is hardly one that would stand out on casual inspection 'of the
hardware. The distinction is really one of detail; one would
need quite a thorough90in9 computational account of the
neurophysiological mechanisms to settle this question. One would
expect the computational account of the processes to be very well
developed before the neurophysiology could be brought to bear on
anything like this. In the area of language processing the
underlying neurophysiological mechanisms are only very poorly
understood, but even in very simple cases, it would be surprising
if neurophysiological evidence would be of value in deciding
betwaen a second and third level account.
6. In sum, our discussion has revealed only one kind of
presently accessible data that would clearly support the claim
that the grammar 1s represented, viz., plasticity. But
grammatical competence apparently does not exhibit the plasticity
that would support such a cla~m. And even if it did, and if this
led U8 to conclude that the grammar is represented, this evidence
would still be neutral with regard to the question of whether the
grammar was part of a program that is computed by a program using
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system. Plasticity is what programmable systems are famous for,
though. It is largely because of this that one hardly ever
thinks of anything but a stored-program system when one considers
executing a nontrivial program. Thus although plasticity by
itself does not support a third level theory, still it is a
feature that would be of interest to proponents of such a theory.
It is remarkable, then, that linguists typically do·not
mention plasticity in their discussions of (Hl). It really
beqins to look like they must not have intended to propose (H3)
at all: not only does the evidence offerred in support of (HI)
fail to support (H3), but also, evidence that clearly would be
relevant to the truth of (83) is not considered. We can add to
this the observation that many of the linguists' comments about
(81) indicate that they do not have (H3) in mind. For example,
Chomsky compares (HI) to the hypothesis that a missile is
controlled by a computer with a representation of ~ physical
theory, without suggesting that the represented theory is somehow
part of the program computed by the computer. (1980b, p.ll) So the
question is: If proponents of (H1) do not have (83) in mind,
then what are they proposing?
We have reviewed the evidence offerrad by linguists in
support of the hypothesis (HI) that the grammar G of a language
is mentally represented and used in language understanding. It
was argued that this evidence does not Rupport the hypothesis,
(H3) In human language understanding, a program P which
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includes G as a proper part is represented and computed
by a program using system.
The problem was that the evidence offerred in support of (H1)
does not serve to distinguish (83) from,
(84) In human language understandinq, a program P which
includes G as a proper part is computed but not
represented; it 1s computed by a hardwired or hybrid
system.
In the light of tha linguistic evidence, (84) seems at least as
plausible as (83), if not more so. We discovered no evidence
offerred for (HI) which supported (H3) any more than it supported
.'- 4), ...a •
So suppose that proponents of (HI) do not mean to porpose
(H3). What else might they mean? Well, they might be construed
as intending,
(8S) In human language under~tanding, a program P is
computed (by either a program using system or by some
other kind of system) which uses G as data.
This hypothesis claims that under sOllie interpretati.on, a language
processing system has a representation of G in memory to which
certain computational processes afe sensitive; parts of G are
taken as argument to functions that are computed. Bilt proponents
of (HI) are never so explicit abo~t the role of the grammar, so
it 1s really more natural to assume that they are proposing that
either (83) or (85) is correct. That is, the most natural idea
is that they mean to suggest that whatever model of speech
processing is correct, it will be one In which the grammar is
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represented and used !omehow. We can formulate this view as
follows:
(86) In human language understanding, the program
computed either includes G and is computed by a program
using system .2!. uses G as data or bottle
This proposal seems rather unnatural, but, as was observed above,
a proposal of just this sort is what evidence of plasticity would
support.
--- ~ -So now the question 1s whether the evidence adduced in
support of (H1) supports (86). Does the evidence for (H1) serve
to support (~6) rather than (84), for example? We did not
consider this looser hypothesis, (86), but a qui~k review of our
discussion suffices, I think, to show that (86) will fare no
better than (83) did. The strategy against (83) was to argue
that in the light of the evidence, (84) was just ~$ plausible as
(R3), so there is no reason to prefer th& third level theory. !f
we succeeded in making this case fc~ lhA plausibility of (H4),
then (86) is undermined along with (83); the evldenc~ supports
the non-representational models just as well 2£ it supp~rts the
representational models. So it is hatd to make ~ense of the
linguists' methodology whether they are proposing (ft3) ~ (H6).
Purthermore, since (86) leaves open the possibility that no
program using system 1s involved in language processing, it is
hard to see what can be made of Chomsky's claim that language
behavior 1s rUle-governed. Surely we do not want to say that ~
second level system whose memory set includes rules exhibits
rule-governed behavior.
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ISo what do proponents of tBI) Mean to claim?
-
Given any
1
I
prQ 9 r•• , there are indefinitely many cliff.rent kinds of computing
.y.t••• that can co.put. that program. Some of these sy.tems are
governed by • repre.entation of the proqra~, some of them are
not, and in other. it ••y be uncl •• r which ~ccount 1. correcte
In the ~••• of langua9. understanding, it lL ~tlll •••tt.r fo~
_peculation what .ort of progr•• 1. co_put.d, if a computational
account 1. appropriate here at all. The 1••u•• lr~volv.d 1n
d.cldln~ ..ong the v.rloua co.putatlonal account. that do or do
not 8Uppo•• that the 9r....r 1. repre.ented .re r••lly quit.
eo.pl... It ••••• to •• that the peycholo9Y of lan9"Ja98 is not
yet r ••dy to confront th•• 1n any •• rious way. I do not think
that the linguists co•• to grips with th•• either, yet the idea
that gr••••r. (or language proce.sing algorithm.) ar. -mentally
repr•••nted- ha. beao•• firmly entrenched.
Iven if th.re i8 no correct model of human languige
proc••• lnfl .that attribute••ental repr•••ntations of 9:~allll.rs to
8Pllkar8 of hu.." langaug8., this would not render 1 intJuistlc
theory devGld of contentl That 18 an .b8urd idea. The
hypath••i. (84) ha. 1t that the 9 ranunar 1s not r.pre ••,nted but
neverthel••• giv•• the grammar a central role in the theory's
dearlptlon of llnguaq. proce.8ing. Or it could be t~at the
lanngua,. proc•••lnCJ algorith.& (which .ay or lIIay nc~t be
r.preunted th••••lv••) capture the infor••tlon reFlre.ented by
th_ 9r -r in 80•• dlff.r~nt form. There .ay even be algorithms
that derlv. the language proc••• lng algorithms from the grammar,
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•.
as so•• psychologists and linguists have suggested. The
possibilities are st\ll wide open.
In the pa.sage quoted at the head of this paper, Rich&rd
r.yn.an not•• how so•• scientists objected to Newton's theory
because it did not give an explanation of the mechanism of
gr8vitatlon. How it 1. clear how ridiculous it was to think that
this objection should call the significance of his achieve••nt
into qu.~tion. I think that the situation in linguistics 1.
analogous. The fact 18 that linguistic theory gives an
interesting and largely correct account of an impres.ive body of
da'ta. l"f we "do not yet have any id•• of what the .achani••• of
languag. proc•••~ng are, that hardly detracts from the linguists'
achievement.
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CHAPTER V
LANGUAGE LEARNING AND INNATE CONCEPTS
1. Theorie. in coaputatlonal psycholoqy typically assume that
an organl•• , or a physical .yet•• within an organism, can be said
to -have. certain concept- if it us•• 80•• internal symbol
which, under an appropriate theoretical interpretation, expr.ss.s
that concept. All the theorl•• that will b. con8idered 1n this
,
chapter r••t on .0•••uch •••uaptlon. Given .uch an ••sumptlon,
it 18 ••f. to ••y that coaputatlonal theori•• of natural 18nguag8
proc••• lng typically •••um. that in order to l.arn or understand
• predicate, a lan9uag. proc••• ing .yet•• mU8t either have the
concept ••pt••••d by that predicate or .1•• have concepts in
ter•• of which that predicate can be defined. Hence, the concept
expres.ed by any l.arnable predicate must be either an unlearned,
·prialtlve- concept or definable in ter.( of the unlearned
pri.itiv•• , and 89 theories of concept learnln9 typically attempt
to explain how new concepts are constructed out of the primitive
basis by definition. The question of how large this primitive
basis must be, of what it must contain to account for human
language processing, is a point of current controversy.
In a number of recent papers, Jerry Podor and his associates
have argued that since there is good reason to believe that most
lexical items do not have non-trivial definitions, attempts to
explain how lexical concepts (l.e., concepts expressed by lexical
i telfts) a're constructed from more basic concepts must fa i 1, and so
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most lexical concepts must be unlearned, innate prlm1tlve~.1 In
thl. chapter it will be ar9ued that both side. of this
controversy have been led .stray by an untenable assumption,
viz., that concepts .ust either be definable or el.e unlearned
and innately given. An alternative th.ory will be propos.d that
can .dopt the b••t f.atur•• of the rivals in this controversy
hecau•• it rejects thl••••u.ptlon; it 18 a cl.ar way through
the .1ddle of the dispute. I will argue that it 18, in fact, the
only p18u.ible theory of lan9u89. and concept 1•• rnin9 w. have.
2. The traditional approach•• to language proc••• in9
2.1. Introduction
j'
Bow do•• one learn a term or pr~dic.t. of a natural
language? All of the plausible theories agree that learning a
word involv•• fr •• lng and testing hypoth•••• about the semantic
properties of the word. That is, on the basis of some evidence,
the lanquag8 learner draws some conclusions about the word,
conclusions which are confirmed but not entailed by the evidence
and which are typically subject to revision in the light of later
evidence. Some theories can be construed as maintaining that to
l.a~n some predicate P of a natural lan9uage, one must actually
for-ulate and confirm a true hypoth.~is of the form,
(H) Por all x, x 1s in the extension of P if and only
1. The rel,vant paper. include Podor(1975), Fodor et al.(1975),
'odor(1geO), rodor at al.(1980) and Fodor (ms) •
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1f Gx,
or som. equivalent hypothesi ••• 2 The theories that propose some
:auch account d Iv ide on the cl,a racter 0 f the concepts expressed by
the term in the place of IGI in such hypotheses. We will call a
l.arning theory bpiric18t l:f it lIaintains that the lexical items
of natural language. are defined in-terms of some set of
·primitive- concepts notably smaller than the .et of lexical
concepts, so that 1•• rnln9 a word involve. learnin9 a definition
of the word in teras of the•• pri.ltive conceptse Thus the
~plrlci.t holds th.~ the t.ra in the place of IGI is typically a
complex expre•• lon who•• constituents express primitive concepts.
The opposing view i8 that of the Nativist theoria. which assume
that the set of concepts needed to fra•• such hypothese. 1s
virtually the same size as the set of lexical items, so that a
word 18 typically learned by associating it with the appropriate
priaitlve concept. On the Nativist account, then, the term in
the place of 'G' is typically a simple expression which expresses
a non-definable lexical concept.
~ls division among theories of language learning is related
I
to a similar distinction among theories of language
understanding. We will say that a theory of language
understanding is a Deep or Decompositional theory if it holds
that understanding a linguistic expression involves replacing the
-----------------~--
2. Notice that the predicate in the place of IG 1 is used, while
in the place of 'pi we will have the name of the predicate we
want to mention.
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lexical items of the expression with their definitions to
formulate a ·semantic representation- of the linguistic input.
Shallow theories, on the other hand, do not assume that
definitions are retrieved in understanding. The difference
between the.e two kinds of theories can be seen in the following
diagrall.:
(ncuu I) A DaR Datm
~etllllUoaa ]
~
.-.otic repr..entatlon
~
(nctJD 2) 'Shallow Theon
aensorJ alpal
rI1D«U1atlt processor:1
~
lex1callr epec1tled syntactic structure
or -logical f01'll"
[C8ntral ~-OC-"-llor-l
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Theories of either kind may want to allow -top-down- influences
of tha ·central process••- on the operation of the -linguistic
proce••or,· and this ••y blur the distinction between the two
processors repre.ented 1n each diagram. And, of course, the
central proc•••or .uat have ace... to More information than ~.
provided by a -s.mantic repre.entation- or -lexlcelly specified
syntactic .tructur•• • In the ca•• of verbal input, for e•••pl.,
the central proc••••••uat have 80•• acca•• to lnforaatlon about
.tr••• , tone of volce, etc. But such elaborations do not obscure
the b••ic difference between Deep and Shallow theorie.: Deep
theories are distin9uished by their supposition that at 80••
stag- 1n the proc••• in9 of linguistic input most l.xlc~l it•••
are replaced by their definitions.
A Nativist holds that lexical it••• typically do not have
non-trivial definitions, so he will have have to elect a Shallow
theory of language understanding.] If there are no definitions,
it can't be that definitions are recovered in understanding
linguistic input. -The Nativist must assume that the central
3. I have tried to divide up the positions along standard lines,
but one must be careful about the terminology~ Jerrold Katz, for
example, is not a Nativist who has been inclined towards a Deep
theory. Despite the fact that he accepts strong nativist
commitments to innately given phonological, syntactic and
semantic universals, he is an -Empiricist- in the sense specified
above, because he apparently would hold that in learning a word
we typically learn that it expresses a complex concept built up
from primitive smmantic features. So, in our terms, he is (or at
least he was in Katz, 1966, 1972) an Empiricist who elects a Deep
theory of understanding. He rightly wants to distinguish himself
from empiricists who do not accept his nativist commitments and
especially from those who think that claims about meaning must be
reducible to claims about observable behavior. OUr terminology,
however, does not mark these distinctions.
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processes are defined over the surface morphological inventory of
the lan9uage. An Empiricist, on the other hand, c,n elect either
• Deep or a Shallow theory. ae may want to maintain that the
definitions of lexical it••• must be r.~ov.r.d in understanding,
or he ••y want to ••tnt.in that definitions ara only accessed by
the central proc••••• in r ••pon•• to certain task d••ands.
2.2. Probl... for S.plrlcl.t and Deep theori••
The .oat .eriou. probl•• for IBplrlclst and Deep theori•• is
their inabllity to provide non-trivial definition. for lexical
it~•• , i ••• , definition. that are, unlike most dictionary
definitions, strictly and neces.arily true. Att••pts to define
1•• le.l it••• in ter•• of 80•• notably reduced vocabu18ry have
been notoriously unsucc•••ful, and there h.ve been a number of
various and sustained atte.pts of this sort in the phllo~ophlcal
tradition. No one has ever been able to discover the sense data
language that traditional empiricists would have liked to ground
their epistemolo9Y, and the failure of the positivist· program in
the philosophy of science is largely due to a similar inability
to reduce theoretical claims to observation claims. But tha
Empiricist account of language learning really begins to look
implausible when one considers the scarcity of non-trivial
definitions even when the defining vocabulary 1s not restricted.
And if any further objection were needed, there are·the
well-known attacks on the analytic-synthetic distinction which
strike at the very foundation of the Empiricist program. If
there are no analytic definitions, then it cannot be that we
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learn a word by defining it in terms of concepts drawn from some
r.stricted set. And, of course, if there are no definitions, it
cannot be the case that we must recover definitions in
understanding our language.
There 1s a180 psycholo91cal evidence against the Deep
theori•• of langl1a9. und.rstandi.ng. Por even the best cases of
".
definable lexical it••• , 11k. 'bachelor' or 'kill', atte.pts to
find ~ra••t.r. of the language us.rs' respons.s that are
••n8itlve to properties of the definitions of the expressions
being defined have b.en unifor81y Uftsucc•••ful. 4 Purthermore,
the evidence shows what everyone would suspect already, that
understanding tak•• place very quickly, so, cetert! paribus, a
theory that require. leS8 processing between input and output
should be preferred. 5 If the recovery of definitions 1s not
required, if it does not increase the efficiency of the
processing, then we should not asssume it is involved. The
psychology of language can offer nothing like a complete account
of these data, but what evidence there 1s certainly seems to
favor a Shallow account of language understanding.
2.3. Problems for the Nativist
Unfortunately, there are reasons for thinking that the
Nativists' account of language learning 1s not right either.
--------------------
4. See Kintsch(1974), Fodor et 81.(1975), and Fodor et
a1.(1980).
s. See, e.g-, Marslen-Wl1son(1973).
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Their best known problem is their rather extreme view about what
must be innate, a view which follows closely on their denial that
lexical items typically have non-trivial definitions. If a term
or predicate has no definiton, then one must already have the
concept expressed by the expression before the expression can be
learned. Por example, if learning the term 'electron' involves
confirming a true hypothesis like the following,
(81) Por all X, x 18 in the extension of 'electron' if
and only if PX,
then one must already have the concept F , i.e. the concept
electron, before the term can be learned. This view might seem
compatible with the commonsense view that learning a word
typically goes hand-1n-hand with learning the corresponding
concept, that one's use of a word depends on the concept it 1s
being taken to express, but the Nativist cannot accept this
commonsense view. Bis claim that terms typically do not 'have
definitions forces him to reject the view that lexical concepts
are typically learned.
Bow could someone learn the concept electron? ~~ only
plausible theories of concept learning are h~othesis testing
theories, but if conceF~ learning, like word learning, involves
confirming a true hypothesis about the extension of t~e concept,
then one cannot learn a lexical concept unless one already has
it. But this is absurd; one cannot learn what one already
knows. The Nativist is thus driven to the conclusion that
virtually all lexical concepts are unlearned. The learning of a
concept, the confirmation of a true hypoth.sis about the
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.xtensl~n of the concept, would presuppose the prior availability
of the concept to be learned. Since we do have concapts, then,
they must be innate or trigg.rred, ~ learned.
rodor calls this result -. pretty horrendous consequence.-
(1975, p.SO) It 18, at le.st, a shock. The result certainly
conflicts with ordinary pr.conc.ptlo~. about the ••tter; but
pr.c~nc.ptions are not always correct. Is there any more
substantial reason to assume that this shocking result 1s really
incorrect? It 18 important to keep in mind here that the
Nativist doe. not need to assu•• that children spring from the
womb with fUlly developed conceptual .yst••• , already masters of
the concepts of particle physics and music theory, just waiting
to get them -hooked up· to the language and the world in the
rigtlt way. The Nativist can &llow that the child' s conc~ptual
system is altered by experlence. Be 1s only committed to the
,
view that whatever concept acquisition there 1. 18 not concept
learning. It 1s not the confirmation of a hypothesis'about the
semantic properties of the concept. As Fodor says,
An environmentally occasioned altera~ion in
the •• ~conceptual system counts as a concept learning
experience only 1f what is learned (under its
theoretically relevant description) stands in a
confirmation relation to the events which cause it to be
learned (under their theoretically relevant
descri9tions). That is, it's concept learning only if
it lnv)lves the projecting and testing of hypotheses.
(1975, p.87)
The Nativist needs to reject the view that concepts are acquired
by learning in this sense. Is there any real re~son, then, to
8Uppo.8 that any undefinable concepts are learned, not triggerred
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or innately given?
It seems that there is. Presumably the Nativist does not
want to maintain that I had the concept electron before I ever
heard a word of chemistry or physics. But if the Nativist
accepts the view that somehow my study of physics and chemistry
was the occasion of my acquiring the concept! he is left in the
unappealing position of having to maintain that there is no
theoretically relevant .description of these experiences under
which they serve to confirm what I learned when I learned the
concept. Surely the evidence is such as to suggest that there is
likely to be a confirmation relation here; the content of my
exper ience in physics and chem istry !!.!!. cruc iall y rei evant to l(',~l
acquisition of the concept. For this reason the acquisition of
the concept looks like learning, and for this reason it looks
like just the sort of thing that an information processi~g theol
should be able to capture. The ehallenge for this intuitive view
is to explain to the Nativist how concept acquisition could be
learning if the concepts typically do not have non-trivial
definitions. A consideration of some problems that are common to
both Nativist and Empiricist theories will prepare the way for
taking up this challenge.
3. The interpretation of internal representations
The Empiricists and the Nativists agree that learning a
predicate or a term P involves confirming a true hypothesis
equivalent to one of the form,
(H) For all X, x 1s in the extension of P if and only
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if Gx.
If this theory is literally true, such a hypothesis must be
internally represented and subject to evidence bearing on its
truth. The confirmation of such a hypothesis will in effect
associate the internal representation of the term P with some
internally represented term 'G' which expresses the concept
expressed by P. Since a representation has content or expresses
something only under some interpretation, the intended claim must
be that the internal term 'G' expresses the appropriate concept
under the theoretically relevant interpretation. This raises the
question, then, of how the theoretically relevant interpretation
of the internally represented term is determined. What is it in
virtue of which the internally represented term expresses a
particular lexical concept?
The only reasonable answer to these questi~ns that has been
proposed is that the appropriate theoretical interpretation of an
internal representation is determined, or at least partially
determined, by its causal role, i.e., by its relations to inputs,
outputs and other states. 6 For example, an internal state that
is appropriately interpreted as a representation expressing the
concept of the color red would presumably be one that plays a
role in the representation of certain information about what is
visually perc~ived, one that 1s associated with internal
representations of color words of the subject's spoken language,
one that plays a role in the production of verbal and graphic
6. See, e.g., Chapter Ii Loar, rns; Fodor, ms-a.
lq~
reports about red things, and so on. Thera is no question but
that this is terribly vague, but it would not be expected that a
detailed account would be provided before the theory of internal
processes was developed. On the contrary, it is just such a
theory that will tell us what role an internal representation
must have in order that it allow a certain theoretically relevant
interpretation. Or at least this is what psychologists ,are
apparently presuming. No other credible view has been proposed.
There is nothing like a complete theory of internal
processes available, but there are some vague suggestions about
how an internal representation of a concept will be related to
representations of other concepts. Some Empiricists and Deep
theorists assume that the internal representation of the concept
bachelor will be rela~ed by definition to the internal
representations of the concepts unmarried and male, for example.
And some Nativists suggest that although there may not be any
definitions, there are "meaning postulates" that "mediate
whatever entailment r~lations between sentences turn upon their
lexical content.W(Fodor et al.,1975) Meaning postulates do not
serve to eliminate lexical items in favor of their definitions,
but specify semantic relations between lexical items (or between
internal terms expressing the corresponding lexical concepts) for
use by ·central processes.- Some may have the biconditional form
of definitions, but others will be simple conditionals, as in,
For all x, x is red only if x is colored,
or,
For all x, y, x causes y to die only if y dies.
196
Certainly it seems plausible that the information represented by
such rules is used in natural language processing. In any case,
the processing sy~tem is presumed to respect and make use of such
represented information. Thus the internal representation of a
term has the causal role it does partly in virtue of these
represented relations to other terms. 7 The theorist will want to
choose an interpretation of the internal states of the system
that is -appropriate- given such conaiderations.
These proposals obviously do not go very far towards a
specification of the required interpretation of the internal
states and events. When psychologists propose that learning a
term involves confirming a hypothesis equivalent to an instance
of (H), they are apparently just presuming that a specification
will be forthcoming of what role a state must have to be
wappropriately· orwcorrectly· interpreted as a represent~tion
expressing the relevant concept. One might be sceptical about
this presumption, but the strategy of proposing such
computational accounts of how representations must be,
interrelated and used in proces~ing has proven to be fruitful.
What further encouragement could be expected at this point?
--------------------
7. This point is emphasized in the Artificial Intelligence
literature as is not surprising. See, e.g., Miller and
Johnson-Laird, esp. pp.127-128i Woods, 1975, esp. pp.42-43.
This point is the computational version of the philosophical view
that the meaning of a word is determined by its role in
perception, inference and action. See, e.g., Harman, 1975, esp.
pp.294,283-284.
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There is another issue concerning the interpretation of
internal representations which should be considered. Some
philosophers have argued that learning the meaning of a word is,
at least in many ca;ses, not just a matter of associatil'lg it: with
an appropriate internal representat:ionll They argue thi:lt tl1e>
question of whether one knows the meaning of a word, or has the
concept expressed by that word, depends in part on one's physical
and social environment. For exampl(!, Hilary Putnam(19j'S, ch.12)
argues, in effect, th,at someone can have the concept wa ter onl y
if he or someone in his so~iety has had some interaction with
water, wi th H20 • A ty'pical Engl ish :speaker knows the word
'water', has the concept and has beliefs about water, but a
physically identical il,d ividual who 1,ad never seen or tlad any
interaction wi th water but instead hild had interaction wi'th some
other chemical, ·XYZ,· cannot be correctly said to have the
concept water or to knc)w the meaning of the word 'water'. This
other individual would presumably have beliefs about some liquid
he calls ·water,· i.e., XYZ, but thes~ are not beliefs about
·water" in our sense of the term, or so it is claimed. Tyler
Burge(1979) urges that the subject's physical and social
envil:onment is crucially relevant to the quest'ion of whether a
person has a particular concept in those cases where the subject
has the concept but does not have an expert's grasp of it. (See
also Evans, 1973.) It is beyond the scope of this paper to
consider the arguments for these claims in detail, but since they
are persuasive and widely accepted, it is important to consider
how they bear on Empiricist and Nativist theories of language
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learning.
Suppose that Putnam is right about the concept water'. The
Empiricists and Nativists could ~till hold that learning the word
'water' involves associating it with an appropriate internally
represented term, but they would presumably want to give up the
view that the only appropriate interpretation of this internal
term is one under which it expresses the concept water; in some
other social and physical context the same term would express the
concept XYZ. Learning the meaning of the word 'water', then,
could not be sl~nply associating the ~'ord with the appropriate
internal representation. This sort of point might well make a
psychologist worry about how far such indeterminacy can be
pushed, but I think that it is clear that the psychological
theories are not seriously threatened. That is, the theories are
still significant and of interest even if there is considerable
indeterminacy in the proper interpretation of internal
representations.
It is of interest to account for the causal role·of the
internally represented term associated with the word 'water' by a
typical English speaker, for example, even 1f the appropriate
interpretation of this internal term in some other circumstances
might be something quite different. Even if a theory is Wbound"
in this way to our physical and social context, its results will
still be interesting. The computational theories aim to provide
a formal account of the internal computation, an acccount of the
relations between internal states, inputs and outputs, and this
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part of the theory is context-free; only the interpretation is
context-dependent. Out the formal account will be significant in
itself •. If psychologists could produce only this sort of
account, only a formal account of the language processing and
other internal processes, their achievement would not be wan~ing
for importance!
In sum, it seems that there is no objection to developing
context-dependent theories in psychology. Of course, it will be
desirable to generalize these theories as it becomes clear how to
do so, but in the meantime there are apparently no grounds for
concern over the integrity of computational theories. 8 However,
as we will see, one of the motivations for Empiricist and
Nativist theories appears to rest on a neglect of the role of
context in the determination of the appropriate interpretation of
internal representations.
4. The Cognitivist theory of language learning
Now the Nativist's challenge will be taken up; a theory of
language learning will bo suggested that gives an account of how
words and concepts can be learned even when non-trivial
definitions are not available. This alternative theory will be
called the ·Cognitivist- theory.
8. See Chapter II for a more general discussion and defense of
this point.
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The best versions of the Empiricist and Nativist theories
have a good deal in common. The Nativist theories are roughly
what you get when the commitment to definticns in the Empiricist
theories is rejected. They share the following basic
assumptions:
(1) The organism has a set of primitive, unlearned
concepts.
(2) Learning a word involves framing and testing
internally represented hypotheses.
(3) These hypotheses are, in effect, tenative
definitions of the word in terms already available to
the internal processes.
(4) Therefore, all concepts that the organism can learn
are definable in terms of the primitive, ~nlearned
concepts.
(5) Therefore, the set of concepts potentially I
available to the organism is determined by its innate
endowment.
If neither Empiricist nor Nativist theories look plausible, it
could well be that there is an error somewhere among their shared
asssumptlons. The Cognltivlst urges that this- is, in fact, the
case. The source of the problems is (3). The Cognitivlst agrees
with the oth~r approaches that (1) and (2) must be accepted, but
he urges that the most plausible approach rejects (3) and its
consequeces, (4) and (5). Let's consider how the Cognitivist
proposes to avoid as~umption (3).
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The Cognitivist gives an account of language and concept
learning that parallels the ordinary, intuitive account much more
closely than the Nativist and Empiricist theories d~. Suppose
that the term 'elm' is undefinable; that there is no strictly and
necessarily true non-trivial definition of this term. This is
plausible. And supp~se that we have a subject who_~oes not have
the concept elm and has ~ey~r seen or hear~ the word before. How
could such a subject learn the word? Well, in an ordin~ry
situation he might learn the word by hearing someone else use the
word and asking what the word means. He might get an answer
like, -An elm is a deciduous tree with simple leaves that have
jagged edges.- If this is not enough to convey the concept,
suppose that the answer is as thorough as you like. What
internal information processing occurs in such a situation? At
first, the sUbject identifies the word. Let's suppose that he
associates some internally represented term, 'ELM', with ,the
word's phonological, morphological and syntactic descriptions.
Then he begins to'accumulate information about the extension of
the word. Let's use the term 'semantic information' very loosely
to apply to any such information; it may be partly
non-linguistic, empirical and even inaccurate. If he is told
that an elm is a deciduous tree, and he sees no good reason to
doubt this information, we can assume that he internally
represents the fact that 'elm' and hence also 'ELM~ have in their
extensions only things that are deciduous trees. This process is
learning, since the subject's experience serves to confirm the
truth of the information represented, and this represented
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information may be open to later disconfirmation.
How does the subject learn the concept expressed by the word
'elm'? Again, learning a concept is assumed to involve nothing
more than learning some ordinary things about the extension of
the concept. It is in virtue of having represented such learned
information that the relevant internal term comes to have the
appropriate causal role, i.e., the causal role in virtue of which
it is progerly interpreted as expressing the the concept. Thus
the Cognitivist is not committed to the absurdity that a concept
must already available before it can be learned. Rather, the
concept becomes available through the learning. The subject may
well have a suitable collection of learned information about the
extension of the concept without ever having heard the word, in
which case, of course, the subject would know the concept but not
the word.
The basic idea of the Cognitivist approach is this
commonsense idea that at some point in learning some ordinary
information about a word the subject can correctly be said to
know the word. Ha will have learned enough that the associated
internal representation expresses the concept expressed by the
word. This is how a word typically comes to be associated with
the appropriate internal term, and hence with the appropriate
concept. It is not generally the case that this association is
established by confirming an internally represented hypothesis
equivalent to an instance of (H). Rather, in learning certain
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facts about the word, ii'lternally represented information
typically leads to certain conclusions about the word,
conclusions other than instances of (8). Similar views can be
found in the philosophical'literature. Hilary Putnam says, for
example,
What ·1 contend is that speakers are required to know
something about (stereotypical) .tigers in order to count
as having the word 'tiger'; something about elm trees
(or anyway, about the stereotype thoreof) to count as
having acquired the word; etc •
••• the -information" contained in stereotypes is not
necessarily correct .... Most stereotypes do in fact
capture features posses~ed by paradigmatic members of
the clas in question. (1975, pp.248,250)
The notion of stereotypes has also been used in the explanation
of certain psychological data, as for example in the work of
Eleanor Rosch. The Cognitivist account is not committed to the
view that every concept has a stereotype, a particUlar body of
information that must be mastered before one knows the concept,
but this sort of suggestion is clearly in line with the
Cognitivist program. The revolutionary idea is that learning a
concept comes about by learning things that are nothing at all
like definitions of the concept. This has been the commonsense
doctrine all along, but it is rejected by the Nativists and
Empiricists. Let's consider why.they think that this view cannot
be right.
5.1. An ordinary language objection
The most obvious objection to the Cognitivist account of the
learning of, say, the concept elm, is that it does not tell lIS
how the concept is learned at all. It misses the mark entirely.
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Instead of telling us how the concept elm is learned, it jOust
gives the standard account of how some ordinary information about
elms is learned. But that information is not the concept, so
where is the Ccgn~tivist account of how the concept is learned?
What account can be given of how the concept is learned that·does
not require the absurd assumption that the subject already has
it? This is the hard question.
This objection is, I think, unsound, but it can be conceded
without losing anything too important from an empirical
standpoint. The Cognitivist proposes that there is nothing more
to learning the concept than learning certain information which
then has the appropriate role in internal processing and in the
causation of behavior. It is true that this information is not
itself the concept, but this is no objection even to the view
that learning the information is necessary and sufficient for
learning the concept. If one learns the rules of chess and acts
according to. them then one has learned the game; the fact that
the rules are not themselves the game does not show t~at learning
the game requires learning something more than just the rules.
So even if one takes seriously the objection that the
information learned is not the concept and so learning the
concept cannot consist in learning this information, this does
not touch the Cognitivists claim to have presented an account of
all the internal processes relevant to concept learning. That
is, the Cognitivist can concede to the objector's point and still
claim that once one has learned the relevant information, one has
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the concept. But of course Nativists and Empiricists are
concerned not merely to make the conceptual point but also to
reject this theory, so they have missed their Mark.
5.2. Is Cognitivism really Empiricism?
~ere is another similar but more sophisticated objection to
the effect that Cognitivism must really be either Empir~cist of
Nativist. THe best way to see how the Cognitivist avoids this
dilemma is perhaps to keep in mind how a simple computational
account of language learning might go. There are computer
programs already in use that provide some crude indication of
what might be involved. It is easy to write a program which can,
on the basis of some user's input, associate a word like 'elm' or
'tiger' with a list of properties possessed by typical members of
its extension.9 The Cognitivist claims that something li~e this
1s involved in human language learning. The Nativist, however,
is likely to respond that any such proposal is really just a
particularly implausible incarnation of Empiricism. (See, e.g.,
Fodor, 1978.)
Suppose, for example, that a subject associates the word
'elm' with certain properties, such as the property that it has
in its extension only things that are deciduous trees typically
having leaves of a certain shape. The"Cognitivist agrees with
9. The programming language LISP has specific features to make
it suitable for writing such programs. See Winston and Horn,
1981, Ch.5 or Greenberg, 1978.
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the Nativist that this information does not provide anything like
an analytic definition of 'elm', but nevertheless mdintains that
it typically suffices to give the subject the concept. What is
the Nativist objection? Well, the Nativist would presumably
object th&t the Cognitivist has no grounds for assuming that
learning this information constitutes learning the concept elm
rather than, say, the concept mutan~ oak, where a mutant oak is
an oak that ha~ elm-shaped leaves because of so~e minor genetic
peculiarity. The Nativist, on the other hand, does have some
basis for for distinguishing the learning of the one concept from
the learning of the other; he just assumes that there must be
something ·built into· the language processing system that
distinguishes the concept.
This Nativist assumption is, I think, implausible. In the
first place, it is not at all clear that a system that operated
the way the Nativist proposes could do anything that a
Cognitivist system could not dOn The Nativist does not want to
assume, for example, that a subject has the concept elm only if
he can correctly distinguish elms from every other kind of tree.
And in the second place, the Nativist 1s unable to explain what
it is that makes the concept elm different from the concept
mutant oak or any other similar concept.
If the Nativist account of what distinguishes the concept
elm from the concept mutant oak is incorrect, then what does
distinguish these concepts? What is it in virtue of which the
subject has learned th6 former but not the latter? And what
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distinguishes this subject from one who seems to have learned the
word 'elm' but has actually associated the word with the concept
mutant oak? Well, this case is very much like the ones
considered by Putnam, Burge and others in their discussions of
the relevance of sccial and physical context to ascriptions of
mental states. When a subject learns the concept elm it may well
be that the only thing in virtue of which he has learned this
concept rather than the concept of mutant oak is his social and
physical context. In the English speaking community he can use
the word 'elm' to inquire about elms rather than about mutant
oaks because there are experts around to decide any questionable
cases. Or he may treat the concept as one that applies to those
trees in his yard and others of the same kind, when those trees
in his yard may, in fact, be elms. If the context is relevant in
any such cases, as seems plausible, then the Nativist view that;
there must be something internal, something built into the
language processing system to distinguish each learnable concept,
can be avoided. The Cognitivist view seems much more plausible.
5.4. Cognitivism and a psychology of belief and desire
The Nativists and Empiricists will complain that the
Cognitlvist account is too vague, so vague that it becomes
unclear whether there will be any fact of the matter whether a
subject has any particular concept. Perhaps this is the real
issue between Empiricists and Nativists, on the one hand, and
Cognitlvists, on the other. The motivation for the traditioraal
assumption (3), the reason that the Nativists and Empiricists
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feel compelled to assume that learning a word involves confirming
the hypothesis that the word expresses the concept that it does
in fact express, is that they think this provides a correct,
clear account of what must be learned to learn a word. On the
Cognitivist view, on the other hand, it is very unclear whetner
any subject can be said to have the required concept. And this
makes it look unclear that the Cognitivist is going to be able to
reconstruct anything like a belief-desire psychology, since one
cannot have a belief about something unless one has the concept
of that thing (or so it is assumed).
This objection to the Cognitivist fails, however. In the
first place, as has been urged above, it is not at all obvious
that the traditional theories!!! right about what must be
learned when one learns a word. The Cognitivist account of what
must be learned is much more intuitive and does not face the
problems faced by the other approaches. In the second place,
although it is true that the Cognitivist has not provided any
clear account of when an internally represented term can
correctly be said to express a particular concept, he is no worse
off in this respect than the Nativists and Empiricists. As was
noted above, neither the Nativists nor the Empiricists nor anyone
else has a clear account of what it is in virtue of which an
internally represented term gets the appropriate interpretation.
They have offerred vague and partial accounts. For example, as
was noted above, in cases like that of the word 'bachelor' it is
plausible that one does not know the word unless one knows the
definition. If this is a requirement then the Cognitivist can
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also say that one has not learned the word until this definition
has been learned. Similarly for the Nativists' meaning
postulates; if they are what individuates a concept, they are
what must be learned before one can be said to have the concept.
On the Cognitivlst account, the knowledge required in such cases
is typically learned, not innate. So wherever the Empiricists
and Nativists can be precise, the Cognitivist can be precise too.
The Cognitivist approach does not open up any new dangers for the
reconstruction of a viable concept of concept that could serve 1n
a belief-desire psychology. And finally, we have urged above
that the Nativist and Empiricist theories are in fact worse off
in regard to this project of specifying the appropriate
theoretical interpretation of internal representations than the
Cognitivist is. Their assumption that there must be something
built into the language processing systems in virtue of which
their terms express the concepts they do is implausible;
contextual factors are surely relevant in many cases.
6. Advantages of Cognitivism
The Cognitivist theory is just as compatible with the Shallow
theory of language understanding as the Empiricist and Nativist
theories are. It assumes (roughly) that a spoken word is mappod
into some symbol of the language understanding system which
expresses the concept expressed by the word. The Cognitivist
rejects assumption (3), however; i.e., he rejects the view that
learning a word always involves confirming a rule that associates
the spoken word with the internal term. In rejecting this
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assumption, the Cognitivist approach im,Rediately acquires an
impressive list of advantages over its rivals. It is supported
by the commonsense, intuitive account of what goes on in language
learning. It is not committed to the view that most lexical
items have definitions as the Empiricist is. It can provide "a
natural account of concept learning, so it does not need to hold
that virtually all lexical concepts are innate or triggerred as
the Nativist does. And finally, since learning a term does not
typically involve defining it in terms already available to the
system, assumptions (4) and (5) can be rejected: we do not need
to assume that all learnable concepts are definable in terms of
the primitive, unlearned concepts of the system, and so the
domain of learnable concepts is not restricted in this way by the
organism's innate endowment. So unless there are serious
objections to the Cognltivlst theory that have been overlooked
here, it looks like the best theory of language learning 'in the
field.
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